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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate investment decisions are among the most important decisions of a firm. 
Internal capital markets play a key role in facilitating the allocation of capital resources in 
order to finance investment projects within diversified firms.  
This thesis investigates internal capital markets and its relationship with analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors in three countries with two distinct financial systems, namely, the 
market-based and bank-based financial system. Using segment level data for public listed 
companies in the UK, France and Germany between 2005 and 2010, we examine the 
operation and efficiency of internal capital markets in market- and bank-based systems. We 
also examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on internal capital markets and 
analysts’ earnings forecasts errors, namely, the accuracy, bias and dispersion.  
The findings indicate internal capital markets actively facilitate the allocation of 
resources within diversified firms and, in general, operate inefficiently. Furthermore, internal 
capital markets appear to be more active in France compared with the UK. On the other hand, 
their role appears to be limited in Germany, as segments appear to rely more on their own 
resources and less on internal capital markets for investments. In addition, we find that 
internal capital market activity declines and efficiency improves during the financial crisis in 
UK. In contrast, there is no significant evidence to suggest that efficiency improves during 
the crisis in France or Germany.  
This research also finds some evidence to suggest internal capital markets operations 
aggravate firm complexity and, in turn, negatively affect short-term forecast accuracy in the 
UK. In addition to this, our analysis shows there is a positive relationship between the size of 
internal capital markets and dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. In general, our study 
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shows analysts’ are optimistic about firms’ future performance; however, the level of 
optimism significantly declines during the financial crisis. Lastly, we report a positive 
relationship between efficiency of internal capital markets and optimism in earnings 
forecasts.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Internal Capital Markets, Financial Systems, Financial Crisis, Analysts’ Earnings 
Forecast Errors 
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1.1. Introduction 
Corporate investment decisions are important for several reasons, for example, good 
investment projects can enhance value of a firm, create jobs and have a positive effect on 
economic growth (Wulf, 2002). Internal capital markets play a key role in facilitating the 
allocation of resources within multi-segment firms which, in turn, enable these firms to 
finance good investment projects (Stein, 1997). Despite its benefits, Shin and Stulz (1998) 
and Rajan et al. (2000) document that internal capital markets are inefficient.  
The discovery of inefficient internal capital markets in the late 1990s fuelled the 
debate as to what causes the misallocation of resources within firms. Researchers have looked 
at the link between misallocation of resources and internal power struggles (Rajan et al., 
2000), rent-seeking (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) and misalignment of interests (Jensen, 
1986). A number of studies document that inefficiency may be due to poor corporate 
governance and lack of monitoring (e.g. Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010; Sautner and 
Villalonga, 2010). However, the empirical evidence has been limited and majority of the 
studies have focused on the US.  
In this study, we investigate the link between financial system structure of a country 
and internal capital markets. The objective is to determine whether financial system of a 
country, such as market- and bank-based system, plays a role in determining the activity and 
efficiency of internal capital markets. It is widely agreed that market- and bank-based 
financial systems significantly differ in their ability to monitor firms and provide access to 
capital resources (i.e. arm’s-length financing and relationship-based financing) (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003). For example, Chakraborty and Ray (2006) document that banks have 
“hands-on” approach and play an active role in the decision making process within firms.  
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Secondly, we examine the relationship between internal capital markets and financial 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors. It has been well-documented that diversification can 
increase firms’ complexity which, in turn, can aggravate forecast errors (for example, Duru 
and Reeb, 2002). This study aims to determine whether presence of internal capital markets 
within diversified firms aggravates complexity and, in turn, affects forecast errors. 
In this chapter, we begin with a discussion on our research objectives and contribution 
to existing literature in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, we discuss the structure of the thesis and 
provide a brief introduction to each chapter. Lastly, Section 1.4 summarises this chapter. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives and Contribution 
Unlike single-segment firms, multi-segment firms have the ability to operate internal 
capital markets, which enables them to pool resources and finance investment projects across 
the firm. Internal capital markets allow firms to reduce their dependence on costly external 
markets by financing investment projects of a segment using cash flow of other segments 
within the firm. Lamont (1997) initiated a stream of literature on internal capital markets and 
proposed a measure of the relationship between investment and cash flow at segment level.1 
The findings suggest firms actively cross-subsidise resources to finance new investment 
projects.  
Concurring with this study, Shin and Stulz (1998) report active but inefficient internal 
capital markets in the US, as they find more resources are allocated to poor investment 
                                                          
1 The investment-cash flow sensitivity model put forward by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) which 
consists of examining the relationship between a firms’ investment and its cash flow. Lamont (1997) and Shin 
and Stulz (1998) build on this model by examining segments’ own cash flow as well as cash flow of other 
segments within the firm. 
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projects. However, Whited (2000) argues that these results are controversial as Q, a proxy 
used to determine efficiency of internal capital markets, may not be a good measure for 
segment investment opportunities. Rajan et al. (2000) put forward an alternative approach 
which measures the efficiency of internal capital markets directly through one of two 
measures: absolute value added (AVA) or relative value added by internal capital allocation 
(RVA).  
Their results are consistent with internal capital markets operating inefficiently and 
allowing segments with poor investment opportunities to invest more than their industry 
benchmark. These findings fuelled the debate as to why internal capital markets are 
inefficient. Rajan et al. (2000) argue that internal hierarchy and power struggles between 
divisions can affect the size of capital allocations as well the direction of the flow of 
resources within multi-segment firms.  
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a model in which divisional managers may 
engage in rent-seeking behaviour in an attempt to extract more resources from the CEO and 
distort the operations of internal capital markets. The CEO may allocate more resources 
through internal capital markets to the rent-seeking division in an attempt to realign 
managers’ interests so that divisional managers become more productive.  
Other researchers have documented that internal capital market inefficiency may be 
due to poor corporate governance (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1998; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 
2000; Saunter and Villalonga, 2010). For example, Sautner and Villalonga (2010) examine 
the exogenous shock to corporate ownership structures resulting from the German tax reform 
of 2002 and its link to the efficiency of internal capital markets. In 2002, the prevailing 52 
percent corporate tax on capital gains from investments in other corporations was abolished 
in Germany. This led to a significant reshuffling of corporate ownership structures and 
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affected most large shareholders of major corporations. The study provides evidence of active 
internal capital markets and multi-segment firms with highly concentrated ownership having 
more efficient internal capital markets. 
The question which then arises is whether the operations and efficiency of internal 
capital markets varies by countries with distinct financial systems that differ in their approach 
to monitoring firms’ activities and providing capital. Cross-country evidence on activity and 
efficiency of internal capital markets is limited and a number of studies focus only on 
business groups2. Our study looks at conglomerates that structurally differ from business 
groups in one main way; segments are not financially independent in the former structure. 
Thus, segments within the conglomerate may rely more on internal capital markets to meet 
their financing needs.  
The literature on activity and efficiency of internal capital markets within different 
financial systems is scarce. A particularly interesting issue is whether the onset of a financial 
crisis leads to more efficient internal capital markets, as the prior literature from the US 
suggests, in differing financial systems. The literature on the differences and the benefits and 
costs of bank-based and market-based financial systems spans over a century (Levine, 2002). 
The two key distinctions pointed out in prior literature are the importance of relationship-
based and arm’s-length based financing and differences in monitoring of firms by markets 
and banks (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
Boot and Thakor (1997) argue that banks ability to coordinate a large number of small 
investors is a better approach than uncoordinated markets in terms of their ability to be 
actively involved in the firms’ decision making process and supervising firms. Holmstorm 
                                                          
2 For example, Carlin et al. (2008) examine internal capital markets operations in 69 countries. Gugler et al. 
(2013) provide international evidence on the existence of internal capital markets from 90 countries. Lee et al. 
(2008) find that internal capital markets are active and efficient in Korean business groups prior to the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, but they become inactive after the crisis.  
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and Tirole (1997) suggest that banks may have a comparative advantage in terms of 
monitoring in that they are able to keep an eye on managers’ activities and enforce 
contractual agreements. In line with this, Chakraborty and Ray (2006) document that banks 
play more active role in firms’ investment project selection process and monitoring of firms.  
On the other hand, a number of studies argue that financial markets can also improve 
corporate governance. For example, firms with weak management may become takeover 
targets through M&As (Scharfstein, 1998), and in the process, weak management are forced 
out and replaced with more competent managers. Also, financial markets can provide 
valuable information to management through feedback of price (Tadesse, 2001).    
Finally, Rajan and Zingales (2003) document that relationship-based financing and 
arm’s-length financing are sensitive to different types of shocks. For example, in a 
relationship-based system the entire firm- and project-specific knowledge is likely to be 
embedded within the one or a small group of banks, and in the event of severe crisis, it may 
be more difficult to transfer to other unaffected outsiders. In contrast, market and price 
signals are likely to indicate the health of market-based systems before the crisis becomes too 
severe and can be dealt with differently. 
In this study, our primary focus is to examine the similarities and differences in 
activity and efficiency of internal capital markets in market- and bank-based financial system. 
Our analysis looks at the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany. This is because, 
firstly, it has been well-documented that these three countries have distinct financial system 
structure (Franks and Mayer, 1997). The UK is considered to have a market-based system, 
while Germany and France are considered to be more bank-based (for example, Allen and 
Gale, 2000). Secondly, the adoption of the IFRS accounting standards in 2005 by the 
European Union requires greater segment-level disclosure by listed companies in member 
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states.3 This enables us to compare the activity and efficiency of internal capital markets 
across countries.  
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, our findings reveal the 
importance of financial structure of the country in determining the activity and efficiency of 
internal capital markets. We find that internal capital markets are more efficient in bank-
based system compared with market-based system. This suggests that bank-based financial 
system structure has important attributes such as increased monitoring of firms’ activities and 
improves governance which, in turn, results in more efficient internal capital markets.  
In line with the prior studies such as Shin and Stulz (1998) we find that internal 
capital markets are more inefficient in market-based systems. This suggests that, in the 
presence of free cash flow, managers may pursue their personal objectives or motives and 
misallocate resources at the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). The findings are also in 
line with study of Lins and Servaes (1999) who find that diversified firms in the UK trade at a 
significant discount, but this not the case in Germany.  
Secondly, we examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on operation and 
efficiency of internal capital markets in market- and bank-based systems. The recent financial 
crisis of 2008 exposed fundamental weaknesses in the global financial system and had 
enormous economic costs in terms of lost output, significant decline in sales and investment 
opportunities (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). The crisis presents an interesting event as it allows us 
to study the interdependence of segments in different financial systems when external credit 
becomes more difficult to obtain.  
                                                          
3  The IAS Regulation on the application of international accounting standards directly requires (without 
transposition into national law) the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded 
companies established in EU member states. It applies from the first financial year starting on or after 1 January 
2005. 
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Our findings complement the work of Hovakimian (2011) who finds that firms 
improve their capital allocation process during recessionary periods when external capital 
becomes more difficult to obtain. Our study reveals two key findings in market-based system. 
Firstly, there is a significant decline in internal capital markets activity during the financial 
crisis and, secondly, internal capital markets become more efficient at allocating resources 
during the recent financial crisis. We interpret these findings as managers cutting back on 
inefficient cross-subsidisation of resources during the stringent financial environment. 
Interestingly, we do not find a significant change in internal capital markets efficiency 
in bank-based financial system during the crisis. It appears that firms in market-based system 
experience a more stringent environment which, in turn, puts more pressure on management 
to improve their investment policies. For example, we find that firms in bank-based system 
cutback in capital expenditure to a lesser extent compared with firms in market-based system 
during the crisis. It may be that banks are able to provide firms with stable access to external 
finance during the crisis (for example see, Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Baum et al., 2011), as a 
result, managers are not placed under same pressure to increase efficiency. This complements 
the work of Hoshi et al. (1991) who document that in a relationship-based system, banks can 
go out of their way to rescue distressed domestic firms in order to maintain their 
relationships.  
Thirdly, we find that internal capital markets increase firms’ complexity to some 
extent and negatively affect analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. In specific, the size of 
internal capital markets has a significant impact on the long-term growth forecasts. The 
findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, firms operating larger internal capital markets 
have greater long-term growth forecast error. We find no evidence to suggest that internal 
capital markets operation impact short-term growth forecasts errors. Secondly, we find that 
analysts are generally overoptimistic about firms’ future performance, and that analysts’ 
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optimism is positively related to efficiency of internal capital markets. In line with prior 
literature, we find significantly less optimism during the recent financial crisis of 2008. 
Our study differs from prior studies in three many ways. Firstly, recent studies that 
looked at cross-country evidence on internal capital markets focus only on business groups 
(for example, Buchuk et al., 2014). However, our objective is to examine internal capital 
markets within conglomerates. As discussed above, firms can be separately listed on an 
exchange in a business group structure and have the ability to raise finance from external 
markets. Segments are completed owned the firm and do not have direct access to financial 
markets. Thus, segments are more likely to rely on internal capital markets for their financing 
needs. 
Secondly, prior studies examining multiple countries have generally made the 
comparison between developed and developing countries (e.g., Gugler et al., 2013). Our 
study focuses on the differences in the financial system structure of developed countries and 
its affect on internal capital markets. Furthermore, prior studies such as Gugler et al. (2013) 
do not look at the effect of financial crisis on their findings. In this study, we examine the 
impact of the recent financial crisis of 2008 on internal capital markets activity and efficiency 
within two distinct financial systems.  
Thirdly, prior literature has paid significant attention to variables that may affect 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors; however, the literature on internal capital allocation and 
forecasts errors is nonexistent. For example, it is now acknowledged that diversification 
increases firms’ complexity and reduces forecast accuracy (Duru and Reeb, 2002). This study 
is the first to look at the link between internal capital markets within diversified firms, which 
can aggravate problems due to information asymmetry and increase firm complexity, and 
forecast errors. 
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Our findings have several important implications. For example, our research findings 
reveal, in line with prior studies, internal capital markets are inefficient and suggest that 
investors should consider (i) placing more emphasis on information related to investment 
opportunities facing the firm that may enable them to differentiate between profitable and 
non-profitable projects without completely relying on analysis from management, (ii) look at 
placing independent body within the firm that is tasked with analysing and monitoring the 
financing and progress of investment projects, and (iii) better mechanisms that align interests 
of managers with the interests of shareholders.   
Our study also reveals that internal capital markets are more efficient in bank-based 
system. The findings suggest that policy makers in countries where the financial system has 
not yet fully developed such as emerging markets should consider this key advantage of 
banks’ role in financial system. Literature on the role of markets in accelerating the growth of 
industries is sparse; however, banks role as financial intermediaries could itself be a source of 
value. The effect of good governance can lead to good corporate investments which, in turn, 
can support job creation and economic growth. 
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The thesis will consist of eight chapters and begin with a review of key studies on 
internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecasts. We then discuss the data and 
method of determining whether internal capital markets are active and efficient. The results 
are presented in subsequent chapters.  
To begin, we examine the literature on internal capital markets in Chapter 2. It is now 
well documented that a key difference between single segment and multi-segment firms is the 
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presence of internal capital markets in the latter. Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) 
document that diversified firms operate internal capital markets and finance investment 
opportunities of a segment using cash flow of other segments within the firm. Thus, 
investment level of a segment of diversified firm not only depends on its own cash flow but 
also on resources available for reallocation within the firm. 
Furthermore, empirical studies examining the efficiency of internal capital markets 
generally find that they are inefficient (Rajan et al., 2000). Diversified firms tend to prioritise 
lesser profitable segments over high profitable segments when allocating capital resources. 
Additionally, a number of studies have examined the impact of the financial crisis on 
operation and efficiency of internal capital markets and generally report mixed findings (Lee 
et al., 2008; Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). Lastly, we examine 
literature on cross-country evidence on the presence of internal capital markets in this 
chapter.  
In Chapter 3, we examine the literature on financial systems and establish a link with 
internal capital markets. In this chapter, we derive our research hypotheses from these two 
strands of literature. We begin with a discussion on the historical developments of the 
financial system in the UK, France and Germany as well as the key similarities and 
differences between market- and bank-based financial systems. Although the literature on 
financial systems is vast and dates back over a century (Levine, 2002), we focus mainly on 
the key differences that can effect operation and efficiency on internal capital markets. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the literature on analysts’ earnings forecasts and its link with 
internal capital markets. In this chapter, we derive our research hypotheses from these two 
strands of literature. We begin by examining the literature on accuracy, bias and dispersion in 
earnings forecasts. Next, we look at the literature that examines the factors that can affect 
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analysts’ ability to make accurate predictions, particularly focusing on complexity of the 
firm. Additionally, we examine key studies that suggest firms’ decision to raise finance on 
external markets has a significant effect on the level of bias in earnings forecasts. We also 
discuss the literature on firm complexity and external financing in this section. 
Next, Chapter 5 examines the data and method used to determine the operation and 
efficiency of internal capital markets. There are two main methods used in prior literature to 
measure the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets. The first method put forward 
by Shin and Stulz (1998) builds on the investment-cash flow model (Fazzari et al., 1988) by 
examining the link between investment by segment and cash flow of other segments within 
the firm. The second method was put forward by Rajan et al. (2000) which directly measures 
operation and efficiency of internal capital markets through the relative value added model. 
Additionally, in this chapter we look at the data required at firm- and segment-level. 
We also discuss the IFRS 8 (which replaced the IAS 14)4 accounting standards that requires 
the disclosure of operating segments by firms. We obtain this firm and segment level 
information for UK, France and Germany from 2005 to 2010 from Datastream. Furthermore, 
we obtain data on analysts’ earnings forecasts for all firms in the UK, France and Germany 
over 2006 to 2011 from I/B/E/S (Institutional Broker Estimate System).  
As a next step, we present descriptive statistics in this chapter. We examine key 
variables that may indicate diversified firms operate internal capital markets. We also 
examine the variable that determines whether they are efficient or inefficient. Furthermore, 
we present our data in two separate periods to study the impact of the recent financial crisis 
of 2008 on operation and efficiency of internal capital markets in the UK, France and 
                                                          
4 IFRS accounting standards were adopted throughout the EU in January 2005 which requires firms to report 
segment level information, if its segments meet the set of criteria. The IFRS (8), which is mainly concerned with 
segment reporting, came into effect in 2009 replacing the IAS (14). There is no significant difference between 
the IFRS (8) and IAS (14) in terms of how segments financial data items are reported.    
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Germany. For example, we take 2005-2007 as non-recession and 2008-2010 as recession 
period.  
We investigate whether more stringent environment during the financial crisis forces 
management to improve the efficiency of internal capital allocations. Firms in bank-based 
systems tend to have close relationship with investors, and hence, are likely to experience less 
stringent environment compared with the level of constraints faced by firms in market-based 
systems. Thus, we expect firms in market-based systems to improve their internal capital 
markets efficiency to a greater extent than firms in bank-based systems.  
In Chapter 6, we present the results from empirical analysis on internal capital 
markets, financial systems and the financial crisis of 2008. Our objective is to document the 
similarities and difference in the level of activity and efficiency of internal capital markets in 
three countries as well as the impact of the financial crisis on their operations and efficiency. 
Our results indicate, in line with prior studies, internal capital markets are active and 
generally operate inefficiently in all three countries. The size of internal resource allocations 
varies across the three countries, and internal capital markets are inefficient to a lesser extent 
in Germany.  
Furthermore, we find that firms make fewer internal cross-subsidisations of resources 
and become more efficient during the financial crisis in the UK. The results are consistent 
with Hovakimian (2011) who documents that firms improve the efficiency of internal capital 
markets during a recession. On the other hand, we report an increase in internal capital 
markets operations in France during the crisis and more resources flow towards divisions 
with less profitable investment opportunities. We find that operations and efficiency of 
internal capital markets does not change significantly in Germany.  
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 In Chapter 7, we present our results from the empirical study on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and internal capital markets. We follow Bradshaw et al. (2006) and compute 1-year, 
2-year and long term growth earnings forecasts errors. We take the absolute error as a 
measure for Accuracy and signed error as a measure for Bias. Additionally, we take the 
standard deviation in forecasts over mean earnings forecast as a measure of Dispersion in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
In general, we find that firms which operate larger internal capital markets tend to 
have lower accuracy and greater dispersion in earnings forecasts. This is in line with the 
theory that internal capital markets increase firm complexity and reduces forecast accuracy 
and, in turn, increases the level of disagreement amongst analysts about the future 
performance of the firm. In particular, we find that the level of dispersion in long-term 
earnings growth estimates is positively related to the size of internal capital markets in the 
UK. This may be because analysts disagree more on the impact of internal capital markets on 
firms’ profitability in the long-term. 
In line with prior literature, we find that the analysts are generally optimistic and 
become more optimistic when firms operate efficient internal capital markets in Germany. 
Additionally, we find that optimism is significantly reduced during the financial crisis of 
2008 and forecast accuracy significantly decreases during the crisis period compared with the 
non-recession period.  
Finally, in Chapter 8 we summarise the findings of this research. We discuss the 
findings from the empirical analysis on operation and efficiency of internal markets in bank- 
and market-based systems, and its relationship with analysts’ earnings forecasts errors. Our 
research objectives, empirical evidence and contribution to the literature is discussed in the 
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next section. Finally, we discuss implications as well as possible limitations of this research 
and further suggestions for future studies on this subject.   
 
1.4. Summary 
 In this chapter, we introduce internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors literature, and discuss our research contributions. Our main objective is, firstly, to 
investigate whether internal capital markets are active and efficient in the UK, France and 
Germany. Secondly, we document the similarities and differences in the extent of activity and 
efficiency of internal capital markets in market- and bank-based systems. Thirdly, we 
examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on the operation and efficiency of internal 
capital markets in these two distinct financial systems.  
Furthermore, we examine the relationship between analysts’ earnings forecast errors 
and internal capital markets in the UK, France and Germany. In particular, we examine three 
forecast characteristics, namely, the accuracy, bias and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, and 
its link with the extent of activity and efficiency of internal capital markets. 
 This thesis consists of eight chapters. We begin by examining the literature on internal 
capital markets in Chapter 2. Next, we examine the literature on financial systems and 
document its link with internal capital markets in Chapter 3. Similarly, in Chapter 4, we 
examine the literature on analysts’ earnings forecasts and document its link with internal 
capital markets in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we discuss the method to determine the presence 
of internal capital markets and present descriptive statistics. The results from the empirical 
analysis are presented in Chapter 6 and 7. Finally, conclusion and limitation as well as future 
work is discussed in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 2 – INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS: OPERATION AND 
EFFICIENCY  
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2.1. Introduction 
 The finance literature highlights the significance of efficient internal capital markets 
in enabling firms to finance value-enhancing investment projects, especially when these firms 
experience adverse cash flow shocks (Stein, 1997; Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). 
Despite the claims in the literature in relation to the benefits of operating internal capital 
markets (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2007), prior empirical studies have found that they 
operate inefficiently (Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 
2010). On the one hand, internal capital markets may add value by allowing firms to invest in 
“winner-picking” projects (Stein, 1997; 2003). On the other hand, managers may misallocate 
capital resources and destroy firm value (Rajan et al., 2000). 
It is important to note that the prior literature has mainly focused on US 
conglomerates 5  and cross-country evidence on this subject has been limited. The 
development in accounting standards around the world and convergence towards a common 
set of accounting rules6 have enabled researchers to gather international evidence on this 
imperative subject7. In this study, we utilise segment-level data for public listed companies in 
the UK, France and Germany to study the operation and efficiency of internal capital 
markets. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the study contributes to the literature in three important 
ways. First, we examine the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets in two 
distinct financial systems, namely, the bank-based system and the market-based system. 
Second, we examine whether and how the financial crisis of 2008 affected investment 
policies of multi-segment firms within different financial environments. Finally, we examine 
                                                          
5 See, Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) for a review of recent literature. 
6 For an overview of international convergence of accounting standards see, 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156245663  
For the adoption of IFRS accounting standards in Europe in 2005 see, 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/ifrs-topics/europe  
7 For example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) provide an overview of the literature on internal capital markets. 
More recently, Carlin et al. (2008) examine internal capital markets operations in 69 countries. Gugler et al. 
(2013) provide international evidence on the existence of internal capital markets from 90 countries.  
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whether the operations and efficiency of internal capital is related to analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors.  
This chapter forms the foundation of this study by reviewing the literature on internal 
capital markets. In Chapters 3 and 4, we will build upon this review to form a set of testable 
hypotheses regarding the above three research contributions. In the next section, we discuss 
the methods used to determine the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets. Next, 
in Section 2.3, we examine the literature on the operations of internal capital markets. 
Subsequently, literature on efficiency of internal capital markets is discussed in Section 2.4. 
We then discuss cross-country evidence on internal capital markets in Section 2.5. The 
literature focusing on modelling the financial crisis and the efficiency of internal capital 
markets is reviewed in Section 2.6. Finally, we briefly review the literature on the link 
between stock based compensation, diversification discount and the efficiency of internal 
capital markets in Sections 2.7 and 2.8. We conclude this chapter in Section 2.9. 
 
2.2. ICM: Determining Operation and Efficiency 
 There are two main methods used in the literature to determine the operation and 
efficiency of internal capital markets. The first approach was introduced by Shin and Stulz 
(1998) who built upon the investment-cash flow sensitivity model put forward by Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988). This method consists of examining the relationship between a 
segment’s investment and its own cash flow across multi-segment and single-segment firms. 
In particular, Shin and Stulz (1998) examine the relationship between segment investment 
and the sum of cash flow of other segments within multi-segment firms (a proxy for 
resources available for reallocation) to determine whether internal capital markets are active. 
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This approach has been used extensively in recent empirical studies (see for example 
Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein, 2002; Lee, Park and Shin, 2008). In theory, an increase in a 
segment’s cash flow is likely to lead to an increase in the level of resources at headquarters; 
hence, more resources will be available for reallocation to divisions via internal capital 
markets. However, a limitation of this approach is that it can only be applied to multi-
segment firms.  
Moreover, to determine whether internal capital markets are efficient, Shin and Stulz 
(1998) examine the sensitivity of segments’ expenditure to its own investment opportunities 
as well as investment opportunities of other segments within the firm. A segment should 
invest more when it has better investment opportunities and invest less when it does not in 
comparison with other segments. However, a small number of studies claim that the 
inefficiency of internal capital markets reported in Shin and Stulz (1998) may be due to a 
measurement error in Q, the proxy for segment investment opportunities (for example see, 
Erickson and Whited, 2000; Whited, 2001). 
The second approach was introduced by Rajan et al. (2000) which measures the 
efficiency of internal capital markets directly through one of two measures: absolute value 
added (AVA) or relative value added by internal capital allocation (RVA). This approach was 
not subject to the measurement error critique as documented in Erickson and Whited (2000) 
and Whited (2001). The AVA measures the extent to which firms over- or under-allocate 
capital relative to the investment opportunities in their segments’ industries. RVA measures 
capital allocation relative not just to the industry’s investment opportunities but also to the 
firm’s own investment opportunities.  
This method starts by examining the difference in the investment a segment makes 
being part of a diversified firm and the investment it would have made if it was a focused 
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firm. Rajan et al. (2000) compute two additional measures of capital allocations, namely, the 
industry-adjusted investment and the firm- and industry-adjusted investment. The former is 
obtained by subtracting the average investment rate of focused firms in the same industry and 
year from the investment rate of a segment. The firm- and industry-adjusted investment is 
obtained by subtracting the asset-weighted industry-adjusted investment level of all segments 
within the firm from the industry-adjusted investment of a segment. RVA is estimated by 
weighing the firm- and industry-adjusted investment of a segment by the difference between 
the segment’s own Q and the asset-weighted average Q of all segments of the firm.  
Thus, the firm- and industry-adjusted investment indicates whether a segment invests 
more or less being part of a diversified firm than it would have been able to invest if it was a 
focused firm. For example, a positive (negative) value indicates a subsidy (transfer) received 
(made) by a segment. The size of an internal capital market is the absolute sum of the firm- 
and industry-adjusted investment of all segments within the firm (Sautner and Villalonga, 
2010). These variables are discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. 
This approach has also been used extensively in the prior literature (e.g. Rajan et al., 
2000; Duchin, 2010; Hovakimian, 2011; Sautner and Villalonga, 2010; Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga, 2010). The RVA measure can only be computed for diversified firms as it takes 
the investment opportunities of one segment and compares them with the investment 
opportunities of other segments. This means that it is zero by construction for single-segment 
firms (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). As a result, the studies that use RVA restrict their 
sample to diversified firms only (e.g. Peyer and Shivdanani, 2001; Hovakimian, 2011). As 
the focus of our study is on variation in activity and the efficiency of internal capital markets 
across three countries before and during the recent financial crisis, we restrict our analysis to 
diversified firms only and, hence, we use RVA. This measure also allows for the possibility 
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that the crisis may have changed the relative growth opportunities across segments within 
firms during our sample period.  
 
2.3. ICM Operations 
 Unlike single-segment firms, multi-segment firms have the ability to operate internal 
capital markets, which enables them to pool resources at headquarters and finance investment 
projects across the firm (Stein, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). For example, multi-segment 
firms can ensure that the value-enhancing projects of credit-constrained segments are 
financed by tilting the budget in their direction. Thus, the presence of internal capital markets 
can allow multi-segment firms to take action that may not be available to single-segment 
firms due to financial constraints (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Boutin et al., 2013).  
Lamont (1997) examines the segment capital expenditures of oil companies between 
1985 and 1986 using the investment-cash flow sensitivity model put forward by Fazzari et al. 
(1988)8. Lamont (1997) finds evidence that suggests multi-segment oil firms actively engage 
in cross-subsidisation of internal resources. The significant decline in the price of oil in 1986 
resulted in a considerable reduction in the cash-flow of oil based segments; this had a 
significant negative impact on the investment level of non-oil segments of the firm. This 
suggests that cash-rich oil segments of multi-segment firms were subsidising the capital 
expenditures of credit-constrained non-oil segments. When the cash dried up, non-oil 
segments were forced to cut-back on their capital expenditures. 
                                                          
8 The investment-cash flow sensitivity model put forward by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) which 
consists of examining the relationship between a firms’ investment and its cash flow. Lamont (1997) and Shin 
and Stulz (1998) build on this model by examining segments’ own cash flow as well as cash flow of other 
segments within the firm. This idea is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. 
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 Furthermore, the results indicate that, prior to the oil price shock in 1986, segments 
with below average investment opportunities invested industry-average amounts of capital 
expenditure, suggesting that resources were allocated inefficiently. However, after the 
adverse cash-flow shock to the oil segments, firms’ non-oil segments reduced their capital 
expenditure and invested less than their respective industry median level expenditures. There 
was less capital flowing towards weaker segments and away from stronger segments in 1986 
compared with 1985, suggesting that internal capital markets cut back on inefficient 
allocations and a fall in internal capital resources led to reduced overinvestment in below 
average segments. This finding is in line with the principle-agent models as it suggests that 
managers may overinvest when cash flow is freely available (Jensen, 1986).  
 Unlike Lamont (1997), who restricts his study to oil companies, Shin and Stulz (1998) 
examine a large number of non-financial multi-segment firms in the US and find evidence 
consistent with active internal capital markets. Shin and Stulz (1998) find that: (1) segments 
rely on the cash flow of other segments as well as their own cash flow for their investments, 
and (2) segments of diversified firms are less sensitive to adverse shocks to their cash flows 
than single-segment firms.  
Shin and Stulz (1998) build on the investment-cash flow sensitivity argument (Fazzari 
et al., 1988; Lamont, 1997) to examine the relationship between the capital expenditure of 
segments and internal resources available for reallocation. The cash flow of other segments 
within a multi-segment firm in a particular year is taken as a proxy for the resources available 
for reallocation. The study finds that an increase in the level of resources available for 
reallocation at firm level leads to a positive and significant impact on the capital expenditure 
of segments. In addition, capital resources flow from large segments towards smaller 
segments within multi-segment firms, which suggest that larger segments tend to subsidise 
investment projects of smaller segments.  
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Although the evidence suggests that internal capital markets are active within multi-
segments firms in the US, they perform a limited role. For example, Shin and Stulz (1998) 
find that segments rely significantly more on their own cash flow than cash flow of other 
segments within the firm. In contrast, single segment firms appear to be significantly more 
sensitive to their own cash flow in the absence of internal capital markets. This suggests that 
that internal capital markets are successful in reducing segments’ sensitivity to their own cash 
flow; however, not to the extent that the theory suggests. Additionally, single-segment firms 
appear to invest less than comparable segments of diversified firms when they have low cash 
flow but invest more when they have a higher cash flow. This is consistent with the view that 
the presence of internal capital markets reduces the impact of adverse cash flow shocks and 
protects the segments’ from cutback in capital expenditures. 
In line with prior studies, Rajan et al. (2000) argue that the key distinction between 
single-segment firms and multi-segment firms is the presence of internal capital markets in 
the latter. This study examines the level of investment made by multi-segment firms between 
1980 and 1993 and find evidence which suggests that internal capital markets are active. This 
evidence is in line with results reported in Shin and Stulz (1998) indicating that internal 
capital markets are active.  Furthermore, they argue that internal hierarchy and power 
struggles between divisions can affect the size of capital allocations as well the direction of 
the flow of resources within multi-segment firms. In this study, Rajan et al. (2000) develop a 
new approach to determine the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets. As 
discussed in Section 2.2, the size of internal capital market can be estimated by calculating 
the absolute sum of all transfers and subsidies within a firm in a particular year.  
Similarly, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that divisional managers can engage in 
rent-seeking behaviour in an attempt to extract greater resources from the CEO which may 
distort the operations of internal capital markets. The CEO may allocate more resources 
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through internal capital markets to the rent-seeking division in an attempt to realign 
managers’ interests so that divisional managers become more productive. Their study finds 
that internal capital markets allow more resources to flow towards divisions with below 
average investment opportunities. Overall, the study finds that internal capital markets are 
active and tend to allocate a similar level of resources to all segments, i.e. ‘socialism of 
capital resources’ exists within conglomerates. 
Joerg et al. (2005) examine cross-subsidisation of resources within Swiss multi-
segment firms and also document the presence of the socialism of capital resources. 
Socialism appears to be more prominent in large firms. This study finds that Swiss multi-
segment firms operate internal capital markets and that the information on the size of 
division, managerial reputation and past use of resources is taken into account when capital 
allocation decisions are made.  
Scharfstein (1998) examines the segmental capital expenditure of 165 diversified 
firms in the US in 1979 and finds evidence consistent with active internal capital markets. 
This concurs with Shin and Stulz (1998), who report that internal capital markets are active. 
In particular, the study finds more resources flow towards weaker segments of diversified 
firms, which consistently invest more than the industry average. Also, smaller segments that 
have below average investment opportunities invest more than industry average. This 
suggests that smaller segments of diversified firms are likely to have smaller capital 
requirements, which are easily subsidised by the cash flow of larger segments within the firm. 
In contrast, Khanna and Tice (2001) find that internal capital markets allocate more 
resources to more productive segments. The study examines the changes in the capital 
expenditure of segments within multi-segment firms between 1975 and 1996 in response to 
Wal-Mart’s entry into their industry. Khanna and Tice (2001) suggest that this time period is 
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particularly important as Wal-Mart expanded dramatically in many industries during this 
period and thereby “permanently changing the competitive landscape” (page 1491). During 
this time period, multi-segment firms were either quick to exit the industry or they stayed in 
and fought. Multi-segment firms that chose to stay in and fight allowed their segments to 
invest significantly more than single-segments firms.  
Furthermore, multi-segment firms that chose to exit the industry were able to do so 
much quickly than single-segment firms as a result of Wal-Mart’s entry into their market. 
This is in line with a study by Stein (1997) who argues that headquarters have greater control-
rights and are able to redeploy segments’ assets in other related industries more efficiently. 
Khanna and Tice (2001) find that multi-segment firms were able to utilise internal capital 
markets to allocate more resources to productive divisions as a result of Wal-Mart’s entry 
into the market. This highlights an important benefit of internal capital markets within multi-
segment firms and the advantage they have over single segment firms (Stein, 1997).  
On the whole, the evidence in the literature suggests that internal capital markets are 
active. The presence of internal capital market enables multi-segment firms to invest in 
projects across the firm by allowing headquarters to shift resources from cash-rich segments 
towards credit-constrained segments. Overall, the empirical findings on the activity of 
internal capital markets appear to be consistent, whereas efficiency of internal capital markets 
have produced mixed findings. In the next section, we examine the literature on the efficiency 
of internal capital allocations within multi-segment firms. 
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2.4. The Efficiency of Internal Capital Markets 
 Despite the literature highlighting the benefits associated with operating internal 
capital markets (Stein, 1997; Khanna and Tice, 2001; Stein, 2003), there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that internal capital markets operate inefficiently (Shin and Stulz, 1998; 
Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). Whilst internal 
capital markets may add value by enabling credit-constrained segments to finance value-
enhancing investment projects, they may destroy value if internal resources are misallocated 
within multi-segment firms. Thus, the literature on the efficiency of internal capital markets 
and the causes of inefficiency has grown substantially over the last two decades (Maksimovic 
and Phillips, 2007).  
In the absence of information asymmetries and agency problems, internal capital 
markets are expected to ensure that segments with good investment opportunities are 
allocated more resources and firms’ value enhancing investments remain protected during 
adverse cash flow shocks. However, Shin and Stulz (1998) find that internal capital markets 
operate inefficiently, suggesting that resources are often misallocated within multi-segments 
firms in the US. Internal capital markets are considered to be efficient if: (a) resources are 
directed towards divisions with best investment opportunities; (b) segments with good 
investment opportunities are protected against adverse cash flow shocks; and (c) resources 
allocated to a division increase or decrease in accordance with improving or deteriorating 
investment opportunities. This study concludes that internal capital markets operate 
inefficiently in general.  
In particular, Shin and Stulz (1998) find that internal capital markets are not sensitive 
to changes in investment opportunities of segments within a firm. For example, segments 
continue to receive resources via internal capital markets even if they no longer have good 
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investment projects. To determine whether capital allocations are efficient, Q is used as a 
proxy for segments’ investment opportunities. However, it is important to note that Q cannot 
be computed at segment level due to lack of segment-level data. Consequently, studies 
usually employ the median Q of single-segment firms operating within the same industry as a 
proxy (as discussed in Section 5.2). In general, the evidence suggests that firms allocate more 
resources to low-Q divisions.  
Additionally, smaller segments receive more resources via internal capital markets 
than larger segments, regardless of their investment opportunities. This is likely to be the case 
due to smaller segments having small capital requirements in the context of the total 
investment budget of the firm. Furthermore, Shin and Stulz (1998) find that the investment 
level of larger segments is not significantly sensitive to the cash flow of other segments, 
suggesting that larger segments usually make transfers rather than receive subsidies through 
internal capital markets. The study finds some evidence that suggests internal capital markets 
lower the investment-cash flow sensitivity of smaller segments with good investment 
opportunities.  
Rajan et al. (2000) find that internal power struggles within multi-segment firms 
distort internal capital markets operations and lead to higher inefficiency. Furthermore, 
internal capital markets appear to be more inefficient when firms are highly diversified. For 
example, increased diversity in opportunities and resources within multi-segment firms leads 
to the alteration of the power structure in the corporate hierarchy, which then affects the 
capital allocation process. Within this context, Rajan et al. (2000) finds that one standard 
deviation increase in diversity leads to a reduction in value added by reallocation of resources 
of almost 10 percent of the standard deviation.  
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In addition, the decisions made in the multi-segment structure depend on the internal 
hierarchy and the presence of internal capital markets. Rajan et al. (2000) examine the value 
added by internal capital markets and find that they generally reduce the value of the firm. If 
resources are being allocated efficiently, then we would expect segments with high-Q to be 
the recipients of resources and, in turn, to invest more than the industry average. However, 
this is not the case as capital resources usually flow towards low-Q segments and away from 
high-Q segments.  
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a model to investigate the internal workings of a 
multi-segment firm to determine whether and how the investment opportunities of segments 
are systematically ranked. For example, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) consider a firm with 
two-segments (segment A and segment B) where resources are centralised at the headquarters 
but the decisions to invest in projects are decentralised at segment level. The CEO allocates a 
portion of capital resources to both divisions at a point in time t-0 by ranking investment 
projects according to their net present value. At this point, the internal capital markets may be 
functioning well and the CEO may allocate resources well.  
Thereafter, each divisional manager (manager A and manager B) has the option to 
invest in one of the two types of projects at t+1: an optimal project (high return) or a 
defensive project (low return). Investment in the optimal project is desirable as it will provide 
the greatest return and increase shareholder value; however, if a divisional manager is 
worried about resources generated at t+2 by his or her division being shared among other 
divisions and expects nothing in return, then the defensive project may appear more desirable 
to the manager.  
Rajan et al. (2000) show that the type of investment chosen affects the extent of the 
claim a division has on the cash flow produced because, depending on the cash flow 
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generated, one division may have the opportunity to poach the surplus created by the other 
division. In this state, the CEO may allocate greater resources to the concerned manager in an 
attempt to realign their interests. However, allocating greater resources to one division may 
leave other divisions with fewer resources.  
Suppose at t+1 manager A makes an investment that will maximise firm value (i.e. 
the optimal investment is chosen by manager A not knowing the investment decisions of 
manager B), then at t+2 both manager A and manager B will share some of the surplus 
created. If manager B also makes an efficient investment, then both managers will get part of 
the surplus created by the other division (surplus will be shared among both divisions). Even 
if the surplus created by manager B is smaller than what manager A is giving up, manager A 
will still prefer the efficient investment. Therefore, in this ideal situation appropriate 
incentives are created for both divisions when the surplus generated by the investment does 
not differ too much. 
However, not all managers may choose to invest in the optimal project. The manager 
of a division with low productivity may choose the defensive investment and engage in rent-
seeking no matter what the manager of the other division does. In contrast, the manager of a 
division with high productivity will avoid rent-seeking as the benefits of rent-seeking do not 
outweigh the benefits derived from the optimal project. Therefore, to realign the interests of 
the manager of a low productivity division, the CEO may offer cash compensation or tilt the 
capital budget in their direction. In this state, some of the resources are being misallocated 
through internal capital markets as weaker divisions will receive more than their due share of 
the resources. 
Finally, it may be the case that both divisions have low productivity and may face 
financial constraints. In that case, it may not benefit the CEO to shift capital from one 
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division to the other. If the CEO was to tilt resources in favour of division-manager A, this 
would lower the utility of manager B by at least as much as the utility of manager A was 
raised. Hence, retaining both managers is not the cheap option for the CEO. Instead, the CEO 
may choose to pay off both rent-seeking managers with cash in order to retain them. 
However, this will result in inefficient internal capital markets. 
If manager A attempts to extract more resources from the CEO and obtain another 
division’s resources, then manager B is likely to resort to the same methods of rent-seeking, 
possibly leading to a more serious internal problem. When internal power struggles are at 
their peak, it is also likely that managers will engage in unproductive outside activities in an 
attempt to enhance their image and reputation in the market. In this instance, internal capital 
markets are operating inefficiently and may lower the value of the firm. In this situation, even 
if one manager wants to invest in value maximising projects, he or she may be reluctant to do 
so if they believe that other division-managers will not do the same. This is because at t+2 
the headquarters will split the total surplus according to the division’s relative power.  
Rajan et al. (2000) argue that the optimal scenario would be when all division-
managers invest their resources in the most efficient way and, thus, maximise the firm’s 
value. In this case, both managers are satisfied with their levels of capital allocation. Hence, 
as managers will be fully occupied with their projects they will not waste resources and try to 
obtain additional resources from other divisions or engage in unproductive outside activities. 
In this scenario, there are no attempts to distort the function of internal capital markets.  
In order to ensure internal capital markets operate efficiently, the CEO must provide 
strong incentives for managers to select optimal projects to make the personal gains from 
investing in the weaker project and rent-seeking appear less attractive (Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000; Rajan et al., 2000). Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that the final payoff from the 
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optimal investment must be more than the payoff from the defensive investment to ensure 
that sufficient incentives are in place so that optimal investments are always chosen for 
investment.  
Suppose the end of the year payoff to the manager if the optimal project is chosen for 
investment is their salary x1 plus any private benefits associated with investment in the 
optimal project x2. If the defensive project is chosen for investment, then the private benefits 
associated with this investment will be x3, where x2 > x3. Alongside the defensive project, the 
division-manager has the opportunity to engage in unproductive rent-seeking activities to 
extract more resources from the CEO. The private benefits to the division-manager from 
engaging in rent-seeking and outside image building may be y1. Now, if they choose to invest 
in the weaker project, then their final compensation will be their salary, private benefits from 
rent-seeking and any outside benefits: x1 + x3 + y1.  
For this reason, the CEO must ensure that optimal incentives are in place to prioritise 
strong investment projects over weaker investment projects, i.e. the benefit from investing in 
optimal project outweighs the benefits from defensive project and rent-seeking. If the final 
compensation from investing in the optimal project is less than the compensation from 
investing in defensive projects, then managers will have an incentive to choose the latter and 
engage in unproductive activities. Additionally, over time the division-manager is likely to 
have acquired some specific human capital, which makes him or her particularly valuable and 
powerful. This means that the division-manager may be able to bargain for increased 
compensation and force the CEO to tilt the budget in their favour (Wulf, 2009). For example, 
if the division-manager leaves immediately, then he or she will have to be replaced, the total 
output will be reduced and the surplus will be reduced by a greater amount. The CEO must 
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provide incentives not only to retain the manager but also to ensure that the efficient 
investment projects are prioritised and are the most rewarding option for managers. 
Wulf (2009) documents that divisional managers are able to distort the signals 
headquarters receives about divisions’ investment opportunities. For example, the CEO 
receives two types of signals about segments’ investment opportunities on which the capital 
allocation decision will be made; a highly noisy public signal and a private signal that can be 
distorted by managers. The public signal, i.e. segment Tobin’s-Q, is a noisy measure, but it is 
free from distortion by division-managers. The private signal, which includes assessments 
about new product development, the adoption of a division’s product as a standard or a 
pending sale to a large customer, can be distorted by the division-manager in order to extract 
greater resources from the CEO.  
The CEO may verify the value of the private signal but at a cost. Thus, headquarters 
face a trade-off between the cost of an accurate private signal and the value of the 
information the signal provides. If the CEO believes the private signal may be distorted, then 
he or she may pay more attention to the public signal. For this reason, Wulf (2009) argues 
that instead of being a measure of efficient capital allocation, increasing sensitivity to 
Tobin’s-Q may be the firm’s attempt to mitigate division-manager incentives to distort 
informative private signals (i.e. managerial recommendations). This is in contrast to much of 
the internal capital markets literature that implicitly assumes that efficiency increases with 
divisional investment sensitivity to industry Tobin’s-Q (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 
2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).  
More recently, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) have examined the impact of social 
connections between divisional managers and the CEO on the efficiency of internal capital 
markets within S&P 500 firms. Social connections are defined by three types of social 
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networks: connections via education, connections via previous employment and connections 
via non-profit organizations. Following Shin and Stulz (1998), efficiency of internal capital 
markets is measured by the relationship between a division’s capital expenditure and its 
relative investment opportunities (the imputed Tobin’s-Q of the division relative to the 
imputed Tobin’s-Q of the other divisions). If social connections between the CEO and the 
divisional managers improve the quality of information about divisions’ investment 
opportunities, then they are likely to improve investment efficiency in the firm.  
Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that a one standard deviation increase in a divisional 
manager’s social connections to the CEO is associated with 9.2% more capital being 
allocated to his or her division. This is equivalent to approximately $5.3 million in additional 
annual capital expenditure in a division with median characteristics. Firms with weaker 
governance (as proxied by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index of low managerial 
ownership, low institutional holdings and the social connections between divisional managers 
and the CEO) are associated with lower investment efficiency and lower firm value. Firms 
with high information asymmetry (measured by industry relatedness across divisions, the 
dispersion of operations across divisions (the Herfindahl index), the distance from the 
headquarters to divisions and the social connections between divisional managers and the 
CEO) are positively related to investment efficiency and firm value.  
Xuan (2009) investigates how the employment history of the CEO can influence the 
capital allocation decisions made within multi-segment firms in the US. The study finds that 
divisions the new CEO has advanced through receives fewer resources compared with 
divisions not previously been affiliated with the CEO. If the CEO of the firm was a former 
division manager, has advanced through the ranks and has not worked in other businesses, 
then he or she is likely to allocate more resources to the divisions he or she has least 
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knowledge about. This pattern of reverse favouritism in capital allocation is more pronounced 
if the new CEO has less authority or if the unaffiliated divisions have more bargaining power.  
In addition to this, Xuan (2009) finds that having a specialist rather than generalist 
CEO has a negative impact on the efficiency of internal capital markets. Generalists are 
defined as new CEOs who have either rotated through all the divisions in their firms before 
being appointed as CEO or who have always worked in a general role. On the other hand, 
specialists are defined as new CEOs who have advanced through the ranks from certain 
divisions in their firms. Overall, this study investigates the reason behind diversification, and 
concludes that it is a strategy pursued by managers who aim to control large corporations 
(Xuan, 2009). 
These findings are in line with Shleifer and Vishny (1989), who argue that managers 
are more likely to be interested in investments that require their specific human capital, 
thereby protecting themselves against possible future replacement. If they are successful in 
building specific human capital over time, it will be harder to remove them and difficult for 
their successor to take over their role. This study shows that the new CEO is likely to tilt the 
capital budget toward the division formerly under his or her control, effectively empire 
building, which will increase the job security of the CEO. Additionally, CEOs are likely to be 
overconfident about projects to which they are highly committed to or about which they are 
highly knowledgeable (Weinstein, 1980), and this could lead to overinvestment in the 
division the CEO has progressed from. If the CEO displays favouritism, then the internal 
capital market may fail to allocate resources efficiently.  
Lastly, Geddes and Vinod (1997) find that young CEOs are more concerned about 
reputation then senior CEOs and, hence, more likely to engage in diversification. Their ability 
to control large multi-segment firms may enhance their image and lead to more rewarding 
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opportunities in the future. Narayanan (1985) finds that more experienced managers are less 
likely to opt for short-term profits. An experienced manager has already proved his or her 
worth and this reduces the manager's incentive to choose short-term profits over long-term 
growth. Geddes and Vinod (1997) find that the longer the duration of the manager's contract 
the less probability there is that he or she will choose sub-optimal investment projects.  
 
2.5. ICM and the Financial Crisis 
 While substantial progress has been made in modelling internal capital markets and 
financial crises, prior empirical findings on this subject have been mixed. On the one hand, 
internal capital markets allow managers to “winner-pick” investment projects and enable 
segments to finance those projects during financially constrained states such as a financial 
crisis (Hovakimian, 2011). On the other hand, Lee, Park and Shin (2009) find that internal 
capital markets were functioning well prior to the 1997 financial crisis in Korea and ceased to 
operate after the crisis. It has now been documented that capital expenditures, sales and assets 
fall significantly during a crisis (Kahle and Stulz, 2013) and external finance becomes more 
difficult to obtain during economic downturns (Hovakimian, 2011). In turn, internal capital 
markets add value by enabling credit-constrained segments to finance good investment 
projects, thereby filling the role of external markets (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010).  
 Unlike prior empirical studies that focus primarily on US diversified firms, Lee, Park 
and Shin (2009) focus on the investment policies of Korean business groups before and after 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The study finds evidence to suggest that internal capital 
markets were active only before the crisis. Following Shin and Stulz (1998), Lee, Park and 
Shin examine the relationship between cash flow and capital expenditure of group-affiliated 
firms. The cash flow of other group-affiliated firms is taken as a proxy for the internal 
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resources available for reallocation. The study finds a positive and significant relationship 
between investment of a firm and cash flow of other group-affiliated firms. This suggests that 
group-affiliated firms rely significantly on the cross-subsidisation of resources for financing 
their investment projects.  
Furthermore, high profitable investments are prioritised over less profitable 
investments prior to the crisis, indicating that internal capital markets were operating 
efficiently. For example, Lee, Park and Shin examine the relationship between proxy for 
investment opportunities (Tobin’s-Q) and capital expenditure, and find more resources are 
allocated to divisions with high investment opportunities. Unlike Shin and Stulz (1998), who 
take median Tobin’s-Q of single-segment firms as a proxy for a segment’s investment 
opportunities, Lee, Park and Shin are able to compute Tobin’s-Q for each of the group-
affiliated firm. Unlike segments within conglomerates, group-affiliated firms in Korea are 
listed separately on the exchange and have the ability to access external markets for finance. 
In the study, the coefficient of Tobin’s-Q turns out to be positive and highly significant, 
showing that diversified firms pay attention to the investment opportunities of firms within 
the group when allocating resources. Firms with good investment opportunities receive more 
resources for investment via the cross-subsidisation of resources in Korea, which contrasts 
with the inefficient internal capital markets in the US as reported by Shin and Stulz (1998).  
 Lee et al. (2009) suggest that despite the efficient cross-subsidisation of resources 
prior to 1997, internal capital market operations contracted significantly after the crisis. Their 
findings show that internal capital markets were barely functioning during the post crisis 
period. This suggests that group affiliated firms which suffered an adverse cash flow shock 
after the crisis bore the full impact of that shock and internal capital markets failed to protect 
even the best investment opportunities of credit-constrained firms. After the crisis, group 
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affiliated firms rely more on external finance for financing investment projects and, thus, 
appear to have operated more like non-group affiliated firms.  
The contraction in internal capital markets has mainly been linked to government 
intervention during the crisis, which discouraged group-affiliated firms from engaging in the 
cross-subsidisation of internal resources. Prohibitions, such as restricted cross-holdings and 
cross-debt guarantees, closed some of the important channels of internal capital distribution. 
Instead, external capital markets, such as bonds issues, replaced the role of internal capital 
markets. In this instance, diversified firms that operated efficient and value-enhancing 
internal capital markets are likely to have suffered the most. In turn, diversified firms that 
operated inefficient and value-diminishing internal capital markets are likely to have 
benefited indirectly from the new regulations.  
Furthermore, research examining the financial crises and internal capital markets in 
the US finds that resources are allocated inefficiently prior to a crisis (in line with Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000) and more efficiently during recessionary periods 
(Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). In particular, managers cut back on 
unnecessary capital allocations and prioritise good investment projects during recessionary 
periods.  
Hovakimian (2011) examines the investment policies of US multi-segment firms from 
1980 to 2008 across business cycles and finds that internal capital markets become more 
efficient during an economic downturn. The business cycles are classified as recessionary and 
non-recessionary based on the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business 
Cycles Expansions and Contractions data. The study indicates that capital allocation policies 
improve when external credit becomes more difficult to obtain in financially constrained 
states compared with financially relaxed states. With limited access to external capital, 
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diversified firms protect the budgets of divisions with more valuable investment opportunities 
by decreasing the capital allocation to divisions with less valuable investment opportunities. 
Thus, external shocks to their credit supply lead to tighter control over existing 
resources. Conglomerates that are more constrained or bank-dependent are more vulnerable 
to credit supply shocks, and they are identified by dividend payout, firm size, commercial 
paper rating and the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index. The three measures of internal capital 
allocations, namely, capital expenditure, industry-adjusted capital expenditure and firm- and 
industry-adjusted capital expenditure, indicate that significantly more resources flow towards 
high-Tobin’s-Q segments and fewer resources flow towards low-Tobin’s-Q segments during 
financially constrained periods. However, the efficiency gained during financially 
constrained periods reverts back to the pre-constrained level after the economic downturn. 
For example, RVA is negative prior to the recessionary period, but significantly improves 
(although still negative) during financially constrained periods and then reverts back to pre-
recession level.  
In addition to this, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) examine the impact of the 
2008 financial crisis on the value of multi-segment and single-segment firms and find that the 
diversification discount decreases significantly during a crisis in the US. This is related, 
firstly, with the ability of multi-segment firms to offer insurance benefits of diversification. 
Secondly, multi-segment firms have the ability to reallocate resources in order to finance 
valuable investment projects, i.e. engage in “winner-picking” of investment projects (Stein, 
2003). Focused firms do not operate internal capital markets and, therefore, are more 
sensitive to credit- and cash-flow shocks.   
Furthermore, the study examines the relationship between the value of conglomerates 
and internal capital markets efficiency using quarterly data between 2005 and 2009 and find 
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that multi-segment firms improve the efficiency of their internal capital markets during a 
crisis which is associated with increase in firm value. These findings are generally in line 
with Hovakimian (2011). The three measures that are used to identify the period and 
magnitudes of the financial crisis are time dummy variables, TED (difference between three-
month LIBOR and the yield on three-month Treasury bill) and the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX).  
Following Rajan et al. (2000), Kuppuswamy and Villalonga compute the absolute 
value added by allocation (AVA) and report a significant increase in efficiency of internal 
capital markets during a recession compared with the pre-recession level. However, internal 
capital market efficiency reverts back to non-recession level after the crisis (in line with the 
findings of Hovakimian (2011)). Overall, the results are consistent with the existence of an 
internal capital market channel through which the value of diversification increased during 
the financial crisis. While diversified firms were able to utilise their internal capital markets 
to ensure good opportunities were getting financed, single-segment firms were not. 
 
2.6. ICM: Cross-Country Evidence 
 Gugler et al. (2013) examine the investment-cash flow relationship within large 
business groups across 90 countries between 1995 and 2006. In line with the main findings of 
Shin and Stulz (1998), their study finds that the investments of subsidiaries are generally 
positively related to the parent firms’ cash flow and negatively related to the parent firms’ 
investment opportunities. This suggests that diversified firms across countries operate 
internal capital markets and transfer resources which enable group affiliated firms to finance 
investment projects. However, the evidence on active internal capital markets varies by 
country as large and significant parent firms’ cash flow coefficients are found in some 
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countries and insignificant cash flow coefficients are found in others. Such mixed findings 
indicate signs of working/non-working internal capital markets within different firms and 
financial environments.  
Furthermore, whilst analysing the factors which lead to active or inactive internal 
capital markets, Gugler et al. (2013) find that internal capital markets are more active when 
(i) the parent firm has a high controlling stake in the subsidiary, (ii) parent firms’ are from a 
country with “strong” institutions and subsidiaries are from a country with “weak” 
institutions and (iii) unlisted subsidiaries are much more dependent on internal capital 
markets than listed subsidiaries. The measure of financial development of a country is based 
on the World Bank WGI index of institutional development as well as direct measures, such 
as private credit to GDP ratio of the country. The findings appear to suggest that well-
functioning internal capital markets may be costly as only parent firms with a large 
ownership stake are able to ensure they work efficiently. Moreover, parent firms from a well-
developed country with strong institutions, possibly due to their superior monitoring and 
experience, are better able to operate internal capital markets. In turn, parent firms with a low 
ownership stake and/or from a less-developed country are less likely to have well-functioning 
internal capital markets. 
Internal capital markets can be used in an attempt to alleviate cash constraints when 
external capital markets are unavailable, such as in under-developed countries. Consequently, 
firms in such countries engage in the cross-subsidisation of internal resources by 
systematically ranking investment opportunities across divisions/subsidiaries. For example, 
Gugler et al. (2013) find evidence that headquarters pay attention to the investment 
opportunities of the subsidiary (Tobin’s-Q) when allocating resources. Additionally, the 
investments of unlisted subsidiaries are much more sensitive to parent firms’ cash flow than 
the investments of their listed counterparts. Subsidiaries from countries with weak institutions 
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and/or less well-developed financial markets are more dependent on internal capital markets 
than their counterparts in countries with strong institutions and/or well-developed financial 
markets.  
Carlin et al. (2008) examine the investment-cash flow sensitivity of diversified firms 
in 60 countries. In particular, their study focuses on the investments of foreign subsidiaries 
that are listed on the local exchange and the cash flow of the parent firm. They find that 
internal capital markets exist and parent firms appear to have a financing relationship with 
their separately listed subsidiaries. The findings suggest that parent firms actively engage in 
the cross-subsidisation of resources, and investment opportunities (measured by Tobin’s-Q) 
of subsidiaries play a key role in determining the direction of the flow of resources. There is 
evidence suggesting that foreign affiliates often substitute internal borrowing for external 
borrowing when operating in environments with poorly developed financial markets. 
Moreover, this transfer is negatively related to the investment opportunities of the parent 
firm, suggesting that finance is allocated in response to the relative profitability of projects 
within the group.  
Further international evidence on the existence of internal capital markets is provided 
by Buchuk et al. (2014), who examine the intra-group lending of business groups in Chile 
from 1990 to 2009. Unlike conglomerates with fully owned subsidiaries, firms affiliated with 
business groups in Chile can be separately listed on the stock market and issue debt or equity 
independently. As a consequence, the internal capital markets of business groups can have an 
effect on capital structure that is absent from conglomerates. The study finds that lending 
relationships are more likely to be formed by firms that are (i) close to each other in the 
control pyramid, (ii) belong to the same industry and (iii) are in more integrated industries. 
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Moreover, there exist two hypotheses related to the direction of capital flow 
representing two opposing views: the tunnelling hypothesis and the financing advantage 
hypothesis. The former predicts that loans go from firms in which the controlling 
shareholder(s) has low cash flow rights to firms in which the controlling shareholder has high 
cash flow rights. Whereas, the latter predicts that the direction of loans depends on the 
financial constraints of firms within the group (the difference between investment 
opportunities and the cost of funding in each firm) regardless of whether the controlling 
shareholder has high control rights. The study finds that firms that are net receivers of intra-
group loans have higher cash flow rights than firms that are net providers of intra-group 
loans. Furthermore, the receivers of intra-group loans are typically small, capital-intensive 
firms with higher investment rates than providers. 
Similarly, Gopalan et al. (2007) investigate the intra-firm allocation of capital 
resources in Indian business groups and find evidence of well-functioning internal capital 
markets. Internal capital markets allow group-affiliated firms to raise finance internally when 
external markets are not fully developed and costly. In particular, the cross-subsidisation of 
resources plays an important role in transferring resources and is mainly used to financially 
support weaker firms.  
For example, the evidence indicates that groups extend loans to financially weaker 
firms and significantly increase the extent of the loans when member firms are hit with a 
negative earnings shock. Meanwhile, there is little evidence to suggest that group loans 
finance good investment opportunities as the receivers of internal resources tend to 
underperform significantly. Moreover, business groups provide more loans to firms with 
higher insider holding. However, in contrast to prior studies that find resources flow from 
high-Tobin’s-Q segments to low-Tobin’s-Q segments, Gopalan et al. (2007) find that internal 
capital markets are mainly used to support member firms in trouble. 
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 In addition to this, Boutin et al. (2013) investigate whether entry into manufacturing 
industries in France is affected by the cash reserves accumulated by firms affiliated with 
business groups. For example, cash-rich business groups may use internal capital markets to 
alleviate financial constraints and enhance a firm’s competitive strength. Moreover, potential 
entrants could be wary of markets dominated by cash-rich groups if internal capital markets 
are perceived as very efficient. By examining the relationship between entry rate into an 
industry and the cash holding of group-affiliated firms in the market as well as the cash 
holding of other firms in the affiliated business group, Boutin et al. (2013) find evidence that 
is consistent with the theory of active internal capital markets. In particular, internal capital 
markets operated by cash-rich groups relax the financial constraints affecting group affiliated 
firms by providing them with more resources via the cross-subsidisation of resources 
compared with other potential entrants who do not have access to such financial 
infrastructures.  
Furthermore, the effect of a group’s deep pockets on entry is amplified in markets 
where group affiliated firms are more efficient. The efficiency of group-affiliated firms in a 
market during a particular year is taken as the weighted average of the incumbents’ total 
factor productivity. The total factor productivity is estimated by taking the deviation between 
the observed output and the predicted output over a period of time, the predicted output being 
obtained from a direct estimation of a production function. The results indicate that internal 
capital markets are successful in reducing the financial constraints of the more productive 
group firms. Hence, efficiency and financial constraints interact in determining the 
competitive strength of group-affiliated firms in France.  
Furthermore, Sautner and Villalonga (2010) examine the exogenous shock to 
corporate ownership structures resulting from the German tax reform of 2002 and its link to 
the efficiency of internal capital markets. In 2002, the prevailing 52 percent corporate tax on 
– 57 – 
 
capital gains from investments in other corporations was abolished in Germany. This led to a 
significant reshuffling of corporate ownership structures and affected most large shareholders 
of major corporations. Sautner and Villalonga (2010) find evidence of active internal capital 
markets and multi-segment firms with highly concentrated ownership having more efficient 
internal capital markets in Germany.  
 Following Rajan et al. (2000), Sautner and Villalonga use relative value added by the 
capital allocation (RVA) measure to determine the efficiency of internal capital markets and 
the relationship with ownership concentration of the firm. Internal capital markets are taken 
to be efficient if funds are allocated to divisions with good investment opportunities (Shin 
and Stulz, 1998), thus increasing shareholder wealth. German firms, much like US diversified 
firms, are required to disclose segment level information as well as information on 
shareholders who have more than a 5 per cent stake in the firm. A novel finding is that 
concentrated ownership improves corporate governance mechanisms, which in turn put 
pressure on managers to select good investment projects thus improving the efficiency of 
internal capital markets.  
 Moreover, consistent with prior literature, Sautner and Villalonga (2010) find that 
multi-segment firms that have highly concentrated ownership are less diversified and more 
efficient than firms with less concentrated ownership. These findings are consistent with the 
theoretical arguments in Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000), 
which suggest that capital misallocations are partly a result of poor corporate governance. As 
corporate diversification has benefits and costs (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lins and Servaes, 
1999; Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Schwetzler and 
Rudolph, 2011), the finding that firms with high concentrated ownership are less diversified 
and have more efficient internal capital markets may indicate that the presence of large 
investors counteracts some of the agency costs involved with diversification (Jensen, 1986). 
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This suggests that diversification is value-destroying in general because if diversification is 
value-enhancing and internal capital markets are efficient, the net benefits of ownership 
concentration are likely to be zero or negative. 
 
2.7. ICM Efficiency and Managers’ Compensation 
It is well documented that the internal capital allocation process can be distorted by 
internal power struggles within multi-segment firms (Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and 
Stein, 2000). For this reason, prior empirical studies have examined the role of stock-based 
compensation to realign the interests of managers and create strong incentives for the CEO 
and division managers to invest in good projects. For example, Datta et al. (2009) examine 
the internal capital allocations and CEO compensation within multi-segment firms in the US 
between 1992 and 2003 and find that CEO compensation plays a key role in determining 
whether internal capital markets are efficient or inefficient. The literature suggests that if the 
cost to managers for misallocating capital resources is significant or greater than the 
associated private benefits, then the managers are much less likely to misallocate resources.  
Furthermore, Datta et al. (2009) find that there is a positive link between the value of 
the firm and CEO compensation. Given the significant relationship between the financing of 
good corporate investments and a firms’ value, inefficient internal capital markets were partly 
held responsible for the diversification discount (see Maksimovic and Phillips’, 2007 
literature review on diversification). Thus, Datta et al. (2009) argue that having stock options 
as part of CEO compensation packages can increase the efficiency of internal capital markets 
and, in turn, increase the value of diversified firms. 
– 59 – 
 
Aligning the interests of managers and shareholders has been the focus of recent 
corporate governance literature. Stock-based compensation remains an active research area 
(Wulf, 2002; Datta et al., 2009), the main aim being to design compensation packages that 
minimize agency costs. Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) argue that compensation plans including a 
stock option can help mitigate the effects of avoiding excessive risk by giving managers 
incentives to adopt rather than avoid particular risky projects. During the past two decades, 
there has been a record rise in the number of firms using stock options and stock ownership 
to reward managers and most firms now require CEOs to own a certain level of stock in their 
firm, and CEO compensation is now comprised of almost 40% stock options (Forbes, 1998). 
 
2.8. ICM and Firm Value 
 The costs and benefits of corporate diversification have now been well documented in 
the prior literature (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2007). It is now acknowledged that the 
efficiency of internal capital markets can have an impact on the value of the firm and the so 
called “diversification discount” (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan et al., 2000; Kuppuswamy 
and Villalonga, 2010). On the one hand, internal capital markets can allocate resources 
efficiently (Stein 1997; 2003), which in turn, may enhance firm value. On the other hand, 
internal capital markets may destroy value if capital resources are allocated inefficiently e.g. 
due to empire-building (Jensen, 1986), agency behaviours (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) or 
managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
 In general, the literature on the value of diversified firms compared with the value of a 
portfolio of single segment firms has reported that the former trade at a significant discount 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995). Lins and Sarvaes (1999) provide international evidence by 
examining the value of diversified firms in the UK, Germany and Japan, and find that 
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diversified firms trade at a significant discount in the UK and Japan, but this is not the case in 
Germany.  
 In relation to this, Rajan et al. (2000) examine the relationship between firm value and 
the efficiency of internal capital markets between 1980 and 1993. In their analysis, the 
dependent variable is the excess value of diversified firms compared with portfolio of 
focused firms. Efficiency of internal capital markets is measured using RVA and AVA. The 
findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between efficiency and firm value. A 
well-functioning internal capital market requires resources to be allocated based on 
opportunities which can lead to enhanced firm value; however, firms appear to misallocate 
resources in general, which can lead to lower value.  
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) examine the relationship between firm value and 
internal capital markets before and after the financial crisis of 2008. Their findings suggest 
that value of diversification increases during the financial crisis which is mainly due to the 
debt coinsurance provided by diversified firms and internal capital markets becoming more 
efficient when external credit become more constrained during the crisis. The authors 
document that shareholders may accept the costs of internal capital markets during stable 
period in return for the ability to reap its benefits when external capital becomes constrained.    
 
2.9. Summary 
Corporate investment decisions are amongst the most important decisions a firm 
makes (Wulf, 2002). Internal capital markets facilitate the allocation of resources and, in turn, 
enable the financing of investment projects within multi-segment firms (Lamont, 1997; Stein, 
1997). Thus, it is well documented that a key distinction between single-segment firms and 
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multi-segment firms is the presence of internal capital markets in the latter (Stein, 2003). 
Despite the extensive literature that disputes the benefits and costs of internal capital markets 
(Khanna and Tice, 2001; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010), it is now widely agreed that internal 
capital markets allow resources to be directed towards segments with weak investment 
opportunities and away from segments with strong investment opportunities (Rajan et al., 
2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). 
On the one hand, internal capital markets can add value by facilitating the allocation 
of resources so that segments with good investment opportunities are able to finance their 
projects. For example, Lamont (1997) finds that capital resources from cash-rich oil segments 
are used to finance investment projects in other non-oil segments within multi-segment firms. 
Unlike external investors, headquarters has greater control-rights over segments, which 
allows “winner-picking” of investment projects and enables managers to finance those 
projects by cross-subsidising resources (Stein, 1997, 2003). In line with this theory, Khanna 
and Tice (2001) find that internal capital markets enabled productive segments of the firm to 
finance more investment projects in response to Wal-Mart’s entry into their market. 
On the other hand, prior empirical studies have found that managers do a poor job of 
allocating resources (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) 
and, engage in value-diminishing activities and misallocate internal resources. For example, 
Shin and Stulz (1998) find inefficient internal capital markets in US multi-segment firms. 
Similarly, Rajan et al. (2000) argue that internal power struggles lead to the misallocation of 
internal resources. In addition to this, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) find evidence of the 
socialism of capital within internal capital markets.  
Furthermore, Hovakimian (2011) argues that easy access to external capital and free 
cash flow aggravates the allocation inefficiencies that exist within the conglomerate structure. 
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For example, in the presence of free cash flow and the absence of appropriate incentives and 
monitoring, managers are likely to invest in both positive net present value projects and 
negative net present value projects that are of special interest to them (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 
1990), which can lower the efficiency of internal capital markets. In line with this theory, 
Hovakimian finds evidence suggesting that managers improve internal capital allocation 
policies only when faced with adverse shocks to their credit supply, for example during a 
recession. Similarly, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010) report a significant decrease in the 
inefficiency of internal capital markets and, in turn, an increase in the value of multi-segment 
firms during the recent financial crisis of 2008 in the US.  
However, prior empirical studies focusing on other economies have not always 
reached a similar conclusion. Gugler et al. (2013) find that internal capital markets are active 
in some countries and inactive in others. Lee, Park and Shin (2008) find that internal capital 
markets in Korea operated efficiently prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and ceased to 
operate after the crisis. Similarly, Sautner and Villalonga (2010) find that internal capital 
markets are efficient in firms with highly concentrated share ownership. In this study, we 
examine the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets within diversified firms in 
three of the largest economies in the EU, namely, the UK, France and Germany. Furthermore, 
we examine the impact of the recent financial crisis of 2008 on the operation and efficiency 
of internal capital markets in these three countries with two distinct financial systems, 
namely, the market-based and bank-based system.  
In Chapter 3, we begin by discussing the literature on market-based and bank-based 
financial system in the UK, France and Germany. In particular, we examine the literature on 
the differences and similarities between the two opposing financial systems. We then discuss 
our research questions on how these differences may affect operation and efficiency of 
internal capital markets within multi-segment firms.  
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3.1. Introduction 
 The finance literature pays considerable attention to the significance of the country’s 
financial system architecture on the financing and investment decisions of firms (see for 
example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). This literature suggests that the design of 
a financial system not only affects the availability of capital (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003) 
but also the capital allocation decisions within the firm (e.g. Chakraborty and Ray, 2006). A 
number of studies have documented that there are key distinctions between the market- and 
bank-based financial systems (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Tadesse, 2002; 2003), namely, the 
importance of bank and market finance, relationship-based against arm’s-length financing 
and the supervisory role of markets and banks which may affect the capital allocation 
process. 
The present chapter builds upon this literature and derives hypotheses regarding the 
link between the financial system and internal capital markets in the UK, France and 
Germany. The discussion in this chapter (and in the rest of the thesis) builds upon the 
literature that considers the UK to have a market-based financial system and France and 
Germany to have a bank-based financial system (e.g. Franks and Mayer, 1997; Allen and 
Gale, 2000). The literature review presented in this chapter aims to produce testable 
predictions relating to the following research question: does the design of the financial 
system affect the operations and the efficiency of internal capital markets?  
In Section 3.2 we review the literature on the key distinctions between bank-based 
and market-based financial systems. In particular, we focus on the importance of market and 
bank finance, supervisory role of markets and banks and the ownership structure of firms in 
these two systems. Next, we derive predictions from the literature on internal capital markets 
and financial systems in Section 3.3. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 3.4. 
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3.2. Comparison of Bank-based and Market-based Financial Systems 
The development of the financial system of a country is essential for economic 
growth, risk sharing, allocation of resources, diversification and regional and international 
trade (Tadesse, 2003). A well functioning financial system facilitates the efficient transfer of 
resources from units in surplus to units in deficit (Boot and Thakor, 1997). In addition, prior 
research documents that markets and banks perform supervisory roles (Tadesse, 2003), which 
can affect the investment decision of firms (Chakraborty and Ray, 2006).  
The UK, France and Germany all have well-developed financial systems, but there are 
notable differences in the role and importance of banks and markets (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
Consequently, we discuss (i) historical developments of the financial system in the UK, 
France and Germany, (ii) the importance of market- and bank-finance, (iii) design of 
financial systems, and (iv) the key differences in monitoring as well as ownership dispersion 
of firms in these two systems.  
 
3.2.1. Historical Developments: An Overview 
It is argued that the years 1719 and 1720 were critical to the development of the UK’s 
financial system, as well as that of France, because of two interlinked events: the South Sea 
Bubble in England and the Mississippi Bubble in France (Allen and Gale, 2000). In the UK, 
for example, the intense speculation and the swift rise and fall of the South Sea Company in 
1720 which caused great uncertainty led the government to put in place tighter regulation 
(e.g. the Bubble Act of 1720) creating barriers to company formation for many years.  
The London Stock Exchange was established in 1802 and the Bubble Act was 
abolished. The abolishment of the Act resulted in a significant increase in the number of 
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publicly listed companies in London. The development of Britain’s infrastructure and a large 
amount of capital flowing through the system increased the importance of the Exchange. In 
specific, the government’s intervention in response to the South Sea Company crisis and the 
long-term framework put in place thereafter shaped the financial system in the UK. A well-
developed market orientated financial system emerged in the UK (the Anglo-Saxon model).  
 The Mississippi Bubble, which occurred around the same time as the South Sea 
Bubble in England, affected the development of the stock market and banks for many years in 
France. It began with Bank Generale, established in 1716, which became the first institution 
to issue notes without 100 percent reserves. The bank later merged with another company to 
form the Mississippi Company, which became the subject of intense speculation between 
1719 and 1720. The rise and fall of the Mississippi Company due to this intense speculation 
led the French government to impose tighter regulations on the formation of the stock 
markets. 
 The Bank of France was established in 1800, and there was also a stock exchange in 
Paris at this time. However, there were only a few listed companies, and the majority of 
trading was in government debt (Rousseau and Sylla, 2003). Hoffman et al. (2000) document 
that the loans being arranged by notaries in the absence of loan markets during the 1800s in 
France show the lag in financial development. In the 1850s, the French opened another bank 
to fund the development of the country’s infrastructure. Soon after its success, other banks 
were formed to provide funding for specific sectors, for example, construction and 
agriculture. As a result, banks performed a vital role in providing finance to firms, while 
markets played a lesser significant role (Allen and Gale, 2000). As a result, a well-developed 
bank-based model emerged in France (the continental European model). Prior to the 1990s, 
there were six regional stock exchanges and the most important of them all was the stock 
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exchange located in Paris. During the 1990s, reforms introduced by the French government 
created a single national market so that stocks could be traded at any exchange. 
 While financial development was occurring in the UK and France, Germany was still 
politically fragmented, with many states having their own rulers (Rousseau and Sylla, 2003). 
In terms of its financial system, Germany was lagging behind even France until its unification 
in 1871, which led to the formation of new banks. Allen and Gale (2000) document that many 
Germans had spent time in France and witnessed the formation of Credit Mobilier and other 
financial institutions. This led to the formation of Dresdener Bank in Germany by those 
influenced by the French situation to provide funds for industrial firms. Commerzbank and 
Deutsche Bank soon appeared to help fund foreign trade. 
 German banks soon formed a nationwide network akin to those in the UK and France. 
A noticeable difference was the links between banks and firms, which became substantially 
stronger. These relationships led to the formation of the Hausbank system by which firms 
have a close relationship with banks that are their primary source of external finance (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). The control that the banks had over the firms also grew substantially. The 
majority of the firms were privately held, with bank-based finance remained the primary 
option and only a small percentage of firms were publically listed. After the Second World 
War, there were many regional stock exchanges in Germany, and the Frankfurt stock 
exchange established as the leading stock exchange in the country. However, there are fewer 
firms are listed on the German stock exchange than in the UK or the US. 
More recently, Rajan and Zingales (2003) report a trend towards a market-based 
system within Europe. Many countries in Europe now have more firms listed on the stock 
exchanges than they did two decades ago and government initiatives and reforms have led to 
increased competition. In particular, the growth in the derivatives market across Europe from 
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$2.7 billion in 1986 to $2.4 trillion in 2001 has been particularly astonishing (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003). The derivatives market in Germany that opened in the 1990 continues to lag 
behind those in the UK and the US in terms of trade volume (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
Thus, despite the trend towards the market-based system in Europe, banks still play a 
significant role in continental Europe compared with the UK or the US. For example, Baum 
et al. (2011) document that in 2006 the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
is 2.5 times higher in Germany than in the US, whilst stock market capitalisation to GDP is 
lower in Germany than in the US.  
The Paris Bourse, which is now part of Euronext, became a major stock exchange and 
one of the most important in Europe. In addition, other markets, such as the derivatives 
market was also set up in the 1980s to rival the UK’s derivatives exchange. Despite the 
significant increase in activity in the stock exchange in France and market capitalisation, 
loans remained much more important than shares as a new source of funds (Allen and Gale 
2000). 
 
3.2.2. The Role of Market and Bank Finance 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004) distinguish between market-based and bank-based 
financial systems of the country by examining the ratios of banking sector development 
relative to stock market development. In particular, by grouping countries in terms of the 
size, activity and efficiency of their banking sector and stock market, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine classify a system as bank-based or market-based financial system. In line with prior 
literature (Franks and Mayer, 1997; Allen and Gale, 2000), the study finds that the UK is 
more market orientated whereas France and Germany appear to be more bank orientated. In 
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general, the study finds that stock markets tend to become more active and efficient at 
allocating resources relative to domestic banks in higher income countries.  
Similarly, Franks and Mayer (1997) document that in the UK around 80% of the 
largest 700 companies are listed on the stock exchange, which account for around 81% of 
GDP. In contrast, Germany and France can be described as bank-based economies, with 700 
and 500 quoted companies, respectively, accounting for only 25% or less of GDP. This 
shows that quoted companies (i.e. companies raising capital in the stock market) in Germany 
and France are responsible for a much smaller fraction of total national corporate activity 
than those in the UK. Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics on the importance of markets 
and banks financing in the UK, France and Germany in 2005. The size of equity markets is 
usually represented by stock market capitalization to GDP ratio. Whereas, the size of the 
credit sector is measured, alternatively, by (a) the size of total domestic credit relative to GDP 
and (b) the size of total credit to the private sector relative to GDP.     
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Table 3.1 
Importance of Markets and Banks. 
 
 GDP ($) Banking Assets ($) 
Equity Market 
Capitalisation 
($) 
Banking 
Assets / GDP 
(%) 
Equity 
Market Cap / 
GDP (%) 
Stock 
Traded / 
GDP (%) 
U.K. 2,321 3,625 3,057 156.2 131.7 179.5 
France 2,136 1,980 1,758 92.7 82.3 71.4 
Germany 2,766 3,115 1,220 112.6 44.1 63.7 
This table shows the importance of markets and banks in UK, France and Germany in the year 2005. Banking 
Assets is the domestic credit to private sector by banks. Equity Market Capitalisation shows the market value of 
the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock exchange. Stock Traded is the total value 
of shares traded during 2005. All amounts are in billions of US dollars.  
 
Source: World Bank. 
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As shown in Table 3.1, markets appear to be more active and play a key role in 
allocation of resources in the UK compared with France and Germany. In line with this, 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that the difference in bank deposits between market-based 
and bank-based systems is significant; in fact, deposits relative to GDP are 60% greater in 
continental Europe than in the UK. The reverse is true regarding the importance of stock 
markets. Additionally, this study documents that the US companies issued equity equivalent 
to 1.2% relative to GDP between 1991 and 1995, compared with German corporations which 
issued equity amounting only to 0.04% of GDP during the same period.  
Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (2003) document that the financial markets in the 
UK remain highly important for new IPO’s as well as existing domestic and international 
companies. The Eurobond market, based in London, provides governments and banks with 
the ability to raise finance through bonds. Other markets, such as the derivatives and 
commodities markets, are also active and play a more significant role in the UK compared 
with France or Germany.  
In contrast, banks appear to play a more important role compared with stock markets 
in Germany and France. Allen and Gale (2000) also document that in 1993 the ratio of 
banking assets to GDP was 152 percent, whereas the ratio of equity market capitalisation to 
GDP was only 24 percent at that time in Germany. Additionally, Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
document that 16% of borrowing by firms in the US was from banks in 1994, compared with 
80% of corporate borrowing in Germany was from banks during the same period.  
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3.2.3. The Role of the State in Financial Systems 
Stiglitz et al. (1993) argue that possibility of disruption to the financial system 
through macroeconomic shocks is one of the more important reasons for government 
intervention in the corporate sector. The collapse of a financial institution can have adverse 
effect on other institutions and governments cannot sit idly by when faced with such a 
situation. Therefore, the government can perform the role of an insurer. However, the 
insurance provisions may alter behaviour of managers, giving rise to problem of moral 
hazard. Managers of the insured firm have reduced incentives to avoid the insured-against 
event. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) document that government intervention in 
corporate sector can distort market incentives and enable firms to raise finance on favourable 
conditions because of explicit/implicit guarantees by the government. In addition to banks 
and markets, government in France has played a key role by (i) controlling companies via 
nationalisation (Allen and Gale, 2000; La Porta et al., 1998, 2002), and (ii) nationalising 
banks that provide credit to non-financial domestic firms (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
For example, the government in France has significant ownership in some of the 
largest firms and banks in the country.9 However, there has been a recent trend towards 
privatisation of some of the major corporations that were under the control of the state and it 
shows that the government made an enormous effort to reform the financial and industrial 
sectors. Table 3.2 shows the government subsidies relative to GDP in the three countries in 
our analysis. 
                                                          
9 At the beginning of 2005, the French government had 100% ownership in GDF and EDF, and 95% ownership 
in Areva. GDF and EDF were privatised in 2005 and Areva was privatised in 2006. The government had 10.17% 
stake in Areva, 84.48% in EDF and 36% in GDF in 2010.  
Source: Company Annual Reports.  
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Prior empirical literature documenting the effects of privatisation on the efficiency 
and profitability of firms generally report significant improvements in the performance of 
firms after divestiture (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999). This 
strand of literature claims that the improvements in the efficiency and profitability of firms 
were at the highest when the transfer of ownership from the state to private shareholders 
increased competition in the market. In addition, banks have become less regulated in France 
following the 1984 Banking Act, which created a new legal framework encompassing all 
credit institutions, subjecting them to the same regulatory and supervisory authorities 
(Mehran, 2001).  
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Table 3.2  
Role of the State in Financial Systems. 
 Growth Rate (%) Inflation (%) Law and Order 
Indicator 
Government 
subsidies (% of 
GDP) 
UK 2.3 5.8 4.5 1.5 
France 1.8 5.7 5.0 2.4 
Germany 1.8 2.8 5.5 2.0 
The table shows the average economic and institutional factors between 1980 and 1991 in the UK, France and 
Germany. Law and Order Indicator are scored between 0-6 and a higher score indicates strong court systems 
and political institutions. Government subsidies (as a percentage of GDP) show grants on current account by the 
public authorities to private and public corporations as well as government enterprises. 
 
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). 
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3.2.4. Ownership Dispersion 
Prior literature documents a significant difference in the level of dispersion in 
ownership of firms in these two financial systems (La Porta et al., 2002). Modern 
corporations in developed countries usually have a large degree of separation between 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). However, the separation is 
to a lesser extent in bank-based systems as shown in Table 3.3. This table shows the 
significant difference in ownership structure of firms in the three countries.  
While ownership can be dispersed among many shareholders (La Porta et al., 2002), 
control is usually concentrated among managers (Berle and Means, 1932, 1991). The 
separation of ownership and control coupled with high dispersion in shareholding can lead to 
agency problems. For example, managers with substantial free cash flow may misallocate 
capital resources, causing a range of problems, such as the firm may grow beyond optimal 
size (Jensen, 1986).  
Rajan and Zingales (2003) document that, in 1994, top 5 shareholders held 42% and 
25% shares of large corporations in Germany and the US, respectively. Furthermore, 
individuals held 50% (17%), non-financial companies held 14% (42%) and banks held zero 
(10%) outstanding shares in the US (Germany). The significant stake in large companies by 
other non-financial companies resulted in ownership that is much more concentrated in 
Germany than it is in the UK or the US.  
 
  
– 76 – 
 
Table 3.3  
Ownership Dispersion in the UK, France and Germany. 
 Widely held Family State Anti-director 
rights 
UK 
 
1.00 0.00 0.00 High 
France 
 
0.60 0.20 0.15 Low 
Germany 0.50 0.10 0.25 Low 
This table shows the ownership structure of publicly listed firms in the UK, France and Germany in 1995. The 
widely held variable equals 1 if there is no controlling shareholder (20% or more). Family and State variables 
equal 1 if a family or state is the controlling shareholder (20% or more). The anti-director rights index is formed 
by adding 1 when: (i) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (ii) shareholders are 
not required to deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting; (iii) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (iv) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place; (v) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call an 
Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent; or (6) shareholders have pre-emptive 
rights that can only be waived by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6 and a country is classified 
as having High or Low anti-director rights if its score is above or below the median, respectively.  
 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998, 2002). 
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3.2.5. Corporate Governance 
Good corporate governance mechanisms may counteract the problem created by lack 
of monitoring by shareholders. This is precisely where board of directors can play an 
important role in overseeing the firms’ activities. There are notable differences in the set-up 
of the board of directors in these three countries (Adams et al., 2009). For example, in the UK 
(like the US) the main internal and external controls for corporate governance are the board 
of directors and the market for corporate control, respectively (Scharfstein, 1998; Tadesse, 
2003). The primary role of the board is to provide guidance and oversee management 
activities and, in turn, the role of management is to implement the policies set by the board. 
The board members are elected by the shareholders, and, thereafter, responsible for making 
decisions in the interest of those shareholders and it usually consists of internal and external 
members.  
In France and Germany, publicly listed firms have much more concentrated 
ownership of securities compared with firms in the UK. Corporations are just one type of 
economic organisation; most firms in these countries are family owned, state owned, worker 
cooperatives and non-profit organisations (Allen and Gale, 2000). Corporate governance in 
Germany is very different from the UK and US, with the Co-determination Act of 1976 being 
one of the most important relative regulations (Pistor, 1999). Firms in Germany usually have 
two boards, namely, the supervisory board and the management board. The supervisory board 
is the controlling board, half of its representatives being elected by the shareholders, and the 
other half by the employees. This board is responsible for supervising the firm’s activities. 
The management board is appointed by the supervisory board, and it is responsible for the 
operations of the company. The dual-board structure is a key distinction of German firms 
from firms in the UK and US which have a single board structure. 
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Lastly, French firms may have a single-board or a dual-board structure (Allen and 
Gale, 2000). In firms with a single-board structure, the shareholders elect a board, which then 
selects the CEO. The board consists of internal and external directors representing the 
interests of the shareholders. In firms with a dual-board structure the shareholders elect the 
supervisory board, which then elects directors. Their role is to oversee the firm’s activities 
and the management of the company. As state ownership is more common in France than 
other countries, government representatives may also be on the board.     
 
3.2.6. Supervisory Role of Markets and Banks 
Jensen (1986) argues that in a world of uncertainty and incomplete information, the 
problems associated with imperfect information and moral hazard may affect first-best value-
maximising investment behaviour. Thus, it is argued that increased monitoring can counteract 
some of the problems associated with moral hazard (Sautner and Villalonga, 2010). However, 
prior literature documents that monitoring by market- and bank-based systems differs 
significantly (Chakraborty and Ray, 2006).  
A key distinction between bank-based and market-based financial systems is the 
importance of relationship-based and arm’s-length based financing in these two systems 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In the former structure, both parties (borrower and the lender) 
work to maintain their relationship which ensures the steady stream of future cash flows 
within the same group of firms. In the latter, investors have little interference with firms’ 
operation (Chakraborty and Ray, 2006) and enforcement of contracts may be left more on the 
court system in the country.  
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Charkaborty and Ray (2006) suggest that banks and markets mainly differ in their 
involvement in the decision making process of the firm. On the one hand, banks typically 
adopt a “hands-on” approach and are actively involved in investment project selection 
process and monitoring of firms. On the other hand, market finance is more of an arm’s-
length situation and presumes little involvement in a firm’s internal decisions. Banks have a 
comparative advantage in terms of monitoring in that they are able to keep an eye on 
managers’ activities and enforce contractual agreements (Holmstorm and Tirole, 1997). It is 
precisely here that our research aims to contribute to the literature. Our objective is to 
investigate whether increased monitoring in bank-based systems compared with market-
based systems results in higher internal capital markets efficiency. 
Markets and institutions mitigate the consequences of imperfect information and 
moral hazard by producing information about the firm and its management (Tadesse, 2003). 
In addition to information production, markets and institutions facilitate the monitoring of 
firms’ decision-makers in various ways. Tadesse (2003) documents that the capital market 
performs two key functions, namely, facilitating the allocation of capital resources from units 
in surplus to units in deficit (Boot and Thakor, 1997) and facilitating good governance 
through information production and monitoring (Chakraborty and Ray, 2006).  
Furthermore, Tadesse (2003) finds that the efficiency of capital allocation and 
governance in financial systems are both significant determinants of firms’ growth and 
productivity, and that the impact of governance is more significant on productivity. This 
suggests that monitoring and good governance have a significant impact on how resources 
are allocated within the firm. Chakraborty and Ray (2006) document that while good 
governance improves efficiency, the allocation of capital helps to accelerate technological 
advances.  
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In general, these results suggest that increased monitoring facilitates responsible 
governance within firms and, in turn, puts pressure on managers to make good investment 
decisions (Sautner and Villalonga, 2010). Scharfstein (1988) argues that the threat of 
takeover via capital markets can also help to reduce managerial inefficiencies. Inefficient 
management gets forced out or taken over through the mechanism of the market for corporate 
control which can help align managerial incentives and prevent managerial actions that waste 
a firm’s resources.  
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) distinguish between bank- and market-finance 
according to the information content. The study suggests that bank monitoring resolves 
moral-hazard problems at the level of the firm. Firms with low marketable collateral and high 
incentive problems borrow from banks, while wealthier firms rely on unintermediated 
market-finance. Hence, as Boot and Thakor (1997) point out, bank lending is likely to be 
important when investors face ex post moral hazard problems, with firms that have higher 
observable qualities borrowing from the capital market. 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Thakor (1995) document that banks play an 
important role in screening investment and credit worthiness of potential borrowers. Banks 
are more likely to have greater information due to their close relationship with the firm. 
Whereas, in market-based systems investors rely more on market or price signals for 
investment decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Capital markets play a more significant role 
when borrowers raise finance for optimal decisions and, market and price signals provide 
valuable guidance for their performance (Allen, 1993). 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) investigate the borrower’s choice of obtaining 
finance from banks and markets, and find that market-based systems deter poor projects but 
can also pass good investment projects. In contrast, bank-based systems have soft budget 
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constraints and suffer from unprofitable projects. These findings are in line with the literature 
on the impact of relationships on distortion of capital allocation process within systems. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) document that the role of banks in a model in which the 
superiority of bank financing over financial market funding is due to the superior risk sharing 
provided by the bank-based systems. 
Additionally, the length of time a firm-bank relationship has been established is 
another key factor in borrower’s choice of obtaining financing from the bank (Allen and 
Gale, 2000). An advantage to the banks is that the terms of the contract may be negotiable 
and banks have the option to insert clauses in the contract, such as extract payments in the 
event of a firm not being able to meet its obligations. However, the information about the 
firm and its investment opportunities may be restricted only to the bank or a few lenders, and, 
therefore, financing will reflect the bank’s view and to what extent it values the project.  
For example, banks in Germany specialise in a range of services (Allen and Gale, 
2000), and clients do not need to go anywhere else for their banking needs as the bank 
represents a “one-stop shop”. On the upside, Hoshi et al. (1991) show that in the 1980-1990s 
banks went out of their way to assist financially distressed clients in order to maintain their 
relationship. However, a limitation of this model is that firms could be restricted to limited 
number of lenders. If a bank loan is the main source of funding for a project, and a business is 
unable to secure a loan because the bank considers the project to be too risky or does not fully 
understand the client’s new business, then the project may not get financed.  
Another key advantage for banks is that having close relationships with firms can help 
mitigate the problem of information not being immediately available in public markets (Boot, 
Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993). Lastly, Boot and Thakor (1997) argue that banks ability to 
coordinate a large number of small investors is a better approach than uncoordinated markets 
– 82 – 
 
in terms of their ability to be actively involved in the firms’ decision making process and 
supervising firms. 
In contrast, market-based systems allow publicly listed firms to reach out to a wide 
range of investors (Levine, 2002). As the information about listed firms is publicly available 
in this system, investors are able to price the securities using the information currently 
available. These securities usually have highly liquid secondary markets, which investors can 
buy into or, alternatively, sell their stock (Bhide, 1993). In addition, market-based systems 
may also enhance corporate governance, assisting takeovers, making it easier to tie 
managerial compensation to firm performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and facilitating 
risk management (Levine, 1991; Obstfeld, 1994). 
Finally, Rajan and Zingales (2003) document that relationship-based financing and 
arm’s-length financing are sensitive to different types of shocks. For example, in a 
relationship-based system the entire firm- and project-specific knowledge is likely to be 
embedded within the one or a small group of banks, and in the event of severe crisis, it is 
more difficult to transfer to other unaffected outsiders. In contrast, market and price signals 
are likely to indicate the health of market-based systems before the crisis becomes too severe 
and can be dealt with differently.  
In the next section, we draw on the literature on key distinctions between these two 
systems and internal capital markets to derive our research questions. 
 
3.3. Financial Systems and ICM 
 In this section, we rely on the literature on internal capital markets and financial 
systems to derive a set of research questions. In particular, we focus on key distinctions 
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between market- and bank-based systems, and how they may have an impact on the activity 
and efficiency of internal capital markets. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the 
financial crisis of 2008 on internal capital market activity and efficiency in these two distinct 
financial systems. 
 
3.3.1. ICM Operations and Financial Systems 
It has now been acknowledged that internal capital markets operations are affected by 
both the availability of internal capital and access to external finance (e.g. Hovakimian, 
2011). On the one hand, firms may raise finance by approaching capital markets directly, and 
on the other hand, they may borrow from the bank (i.e. relationship loan). Song and Thakor 
(2008) argue that certification to verify creditworthiness and cost associated with 
approaching external markets are two key frictions that impede borrowers’ ability to raise 
finance.  
Rajan and Zingales (2003) document that relationship-based financing in bank-based 
system works very differently from arm’s-length financing in market-based system. In the 
latter, firms can reach wider circle of investors and obtain finance at a competitive rate. 
Whereas, in the former structure, firms raise finance from a single or few banks and 
information in such a structure is generated by contracts rather than posted publicly. Lenders 
are likely to communicate between each other and collectively have more information about 
the investment project.  
Additionally, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) investigate the borrower’s choice of 
obtaining finance from banks and markets, and find that market-based systems deter poor 
projects but can also pass good investment projects. In contrast, bank-based systems have soft 
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budget constraints and suffer from unprofitable projects. This evidence suggests that firms 
may be able to finance projects through bank-finance which may have not been possible 
through financial markets.  
On the other hand, Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic (2002) examine the firms’ access 
to external finance in market- and bank-based system and find that there is no significant 
difference. The stock market and banking system affect firms’ ability to obtain finance 
differently, but only in less developed countries. The differences in market- and bank-based 
financing appear to be related to the level of development of country’s contracting 
environment.  
Taken together, the discussion suggests that there are merits and costs of having stock 
markets and banks as the organisers of transfer of capital from savers to investors. On the one 
hand, the literature suggests that banks may perform better in situations where there is high 
information asymmetry (e.g. Song and Thakor, 2008). On the other hand, market-based 
system can create financial innovation incentives and accelerate industry growth (Tadesse, 
2001). Nevertheless, firms in bank-based system may have an advantage from their close 
relationship with banks when obtaining external finance and, as a result, may be able to 
finance projects that may not have been financed on capital markets. From agency 
perspective to financial system, active monitoring can provide reassurances to banks about 
future prospects of the firm. Firms’ ability to raise external finance more easily is likely to 
result in more resources available for reallocation within the firm. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: Internal capital markets are more active in bank-based system than in 
market-based system. 
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3.3.2. ICM Efficiency and Financial Systems 
An efficient internal capital market should enable capital resources to be directed 
towards segments with strong investment opportunities and away from segments with weak 
investment opportunities (Shin and Stulz, 1998). Despite the benefits of internal capital 
markets (Stein, 2003), prior literature finds that they are inefficient (Rajan et al., 2000; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). Prior studies have shown that 
failures in corporate governance can lead to inefficient internal capital markets (e.g. Sautner 
and Villalonga, 2010).  
The question which then arises is that, to what extent does the financial system 
structure that differs in its ability to monitor firms affects the efficiency of internal capital 
markets? For example, Holmstorm and Tirole (1997) suggest that banks have a comparative 
advantage in terms of monitoring in that they are able to keep an eye on managers’ activities 
and enforce contractual agreements. Similarly, Chakraborty and Ray (2006) document that 
banks play more active role in investment project selection and monitoring firms.  
Thus, the role of banks in a financial system may be a source of value by itself. The 
presence of banks and their involvement in firms’ decision making process may lead to more 
efficient investment policies and, therefore, reduce the misallocation of resources. This, in 
turn, is likely to improve the efficiency of internal capital markets. In the absence of active 
monitoring, managers are more likely to misallocate resources. This will, in turn, reduce the 
efficiency of internal capital markets.  
However, it has also been documented that markets can also play a key role in 
improving governance of firms in three main ways. Firstly, literature suggests the threat of 
being acquired and replaced through M&A can discipline managers and improve governance 
by putting more pressure on managers to improve their capital allocation process 
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(Scharfstein, 1998). Secondly, markets can provide valuable signals to managers through the 
feedback effect of prices (Boot and Thakor, 1997). Thirdly, institutional investors, armed 
with more advanced technologies, can also participate in the monitoring of firms and 
management (Stulz, 1999).  
The above discussion suggests that banks and markets both play a key role in 
monitoring firms. However, there are important distinctions in how firms are monitored in 
these financial systems. Our next objective is to determine whether banks active role in firms’ 
decision making process leads to more efficient internal capital markets. 
 
Hypothesis 1.2: Internal capital markets are more efficient in bank-based system than in 
market-based system. 
 
3.3.3. Financial Systems, ICMs and the Financial Crisis 
It is well documented that firms’ cash flow, investment opportunities and capital 
expenditure decline significantly during a financial crisis (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). In addition 
to this, external finance becomes more expensive and difficult to obtain during financially-
constrained periods compared with financially-relaxed periods (Hovakimian, 2011), which 
can put managers under more pressure to improve efficiency of internal capital markets.  
However, firms’ ability to access external markets may differ during a crisis in 
market- and bank-based system. It has been well-documented that, in relationship-based 
system, banks can go out of their way to organise a rescue and recovery for firms’ in financial 
distress (Hoshi et al., 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). For example, prior studies on 
Japanese Keiretsus show that main banks went out of their way to help financially distressed 
– 87 – 
 
firms by first providing debt guarantees and then planning a rescue. Rajan and Zingales 
(2003) suggest that the incentives to help would have been much weaker if a firms’ business 
was not concentrated within one or few banks.  
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) examine investments by Japanese firms that 
had close ties to banks and compared their investment behaviour with a sample of firms that 
had no such ties. The study finds that the investments of firms that had no bank ties were 
more sensitive to the cash flow generated from their operations and a negative shock to their 
cash flows led to significant decline in investment spending. By contrast, the investments of 
firms with strong relationship with the banks were significantly less sensitive to adverse 
shocks to their cash flow.   
Hoshi et al. (1991) and Peek and Rosengren (1998) also find that banks went out of 
their way to maintain their domestic relationships, even when they appear to be less 
profitable. For example, during the period of rising real estate prices in Japan and the US in 
the 1990s, Japanese banks increased their lending to Japanese and the US commercial real 
estate market. When the real estate prices declined in Japan, the Japanese banks cut back on 
their lending in the US, even though the prices were still increasing in the US. During this 
time, they significantly increased their lending in the domestic market where prices were 
plummeting. This suggests that rather than cutting back on losses, Japanese banks poured 
more resources into unprofitable relationships at home and even bypassing good investment 
opportunities overseas.  
Thus, we argue that, on the one hand, if external markets become more expensive and 
firm-wide sales falls during recessionary period (Campello et al., 2011; Hovakimian, 2011; 
Kahle and Stulz, 2013) then firms are likely to finance less investment projects via internal 
capital markets. This is because there are likely to be fewer resources available to reallocate 
– 88 – 
 
at firm level during the crisis. On the other hand, if firms’ experience a less stringent 
environment due to their close relationship with lenders, such as banks, and then their access 
to external resources are likely to be affected to a lesser extent. We are less likely to see a 
significant difference in the internal capital markets operations.  
 
Hypothesis 1.3: Internal capital markets operations become less active during the financial 
crisis in market-based system than in bank-based system. 
 
Lastly, Campello et al. (2010) report that financially constrained firms planned deeper 
cuts and relied more heavily on lines of credit, having to bypass valuable investment 
opportunities during the crisis. Under these conditions, Hovakimian (2011) reports that multi-
segment firms in the US improve the efficiency of internal capital markets during crisis, 
hence, enable good segments to finance their investment projects. The study finds that the 
increase in efficiency is mainly a result of managers improving the quality of project 
selection due to the reduction in free cash flow.  
Although the literature on the link between internal capital markets and financial 
crisis is now well developed, the link between financial system architecture and efficiency 
internal capital markets remains largely unexplored. Whilst the recent financial crisis is likely 
to have created a stringent environment and put managers under more pressure to make the 
best use of existing resources, the level of pressure on managers to improve efficiency may 
differ in difference financial systems. This is because firms in bank-based system are likely to 
have closer relationship with lenders and, as a result, have stable access to bank-finance (e.g. 
Hoshi et al., 1991). Thus, from a financial constraints perspective, managers are less likely to 
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significantly improve the efficiency of internal capital markets in the absence or weaker 
external credit constraints.  
 
Hypothesis 1.4: Internal capital markets efficiency improves more in market-based system 
than in bank-based system during the financial crisis. 
 
3.4. Summary 
 The market-based and bank-based systems are two opposing financial systems (Boot 
and Thakor, 1997; Allen and Gale, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The two key distinctions 
which have been linked to the efficiency of internal capital markets are the supervisory role 
of banks and markets (Chakraborty and Roy, 2006) and the level of ownership dispersion (La 
Porta et al., 2002; Sautner and Villalonga, 2010). Despite the recent trend towards market-
based system in Europe, the UK is a good example of a market-based system, and France and 
Germany are good examples of bank-based systems (Franks and Mayer, 1997).  
 Gugler et al. (2013) find that the operation of internal capital markets depends on 
country characteristics as well as firm characteristics, while Sautner and Villalonga (2010) 
find that the efficiency of internal capital markets is positively related to firms’ ownership 
concentration. In this section, we put forward our research questions on the operation and 
efficiency of internal capital markets in two distinct financial systems across three countries. 
If internal capital markets are active and efficient, then we expect segments with good 
investment opportunities to be the receivers of capital resources. Furthermore, we determine 
the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on the operation and efficiency of internal capital 
markets in these three countries. 
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 In Chapter 4, we review the literature on analysts’ earnings forecast errors and 
establish a link with the operations and efficiency of internal capital markets. We examine 
three forecast characteristics, namely, accuracy, bias and dispersion. In particular, we argue 
that internal capital markets increase the complexity of firms and, hence, positively related to 
forecast errors.   
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CHAPTER 4 – ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECAST ERRORS AND 
INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS: RELATED LITERATURE AND 
HYPOTHESES  
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4.1. Introduction 
It is now well documented that financial analysts play a key role in the capital 
resources allocation process in an economy by producing research reports which help to 
reduce information asymmetry between firms’ management and external market participants 
(Ramnath et al., 2008; Hall and Tacon, 2010). Hall and Tacon (2010) document that analysts 
provide investors with valuable information about the profitability and investment 
opportunities facing firms and enable them to make profitable investment decisions. Thus, the 
quality of the information produced by analysts has been of significant importance to 
investors as well as regulators (Hilary and Hsu, 2013).  
A number of studies find that firm complexity is negatively related to the accuracy of 
the earnings forecasts issued by analysts (Plumlee, 2003; Duru and Reeb, 2002). For 
example, Duru and Reeb (2002) find that diversified firms that operate in multiple industries 
and geographical locations have lower accuracy and higher dispersion in earnings forecasts in 
comparison with focused firms in their industry. Building on the literature on internal capital 
markets, the aim of this chapter is to determine whether the presence of internal capital 
markets within diversified firms increases firm complexity and, in turn, effect analysts’ 
forecast errors. 
 In Section 4.2, we review the literature on analysts’ earnings forecasts errors, namely, 
accuracy, bias and dispersion. Next, we briefly discuss the literature on buy/sell 
recommendations in Section 4.3. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we examine the literature on the 
relationship between forecast errors and firm complexity as well as external financing. 
Finally, in Section 4.6, we develop our research questions relating to forecast errors and the 
internal capital markets within multi-segment firms. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2. Analysts’ Forecasts: An Overview 
 Analysts’ usually provide three key measures in their research reports, namely, 
earnings forecasts, target price and buy/sell recommendations. These research reports can 
assist investors in identifying profitable investment opportunities and, not surprisingly, the 
quality of this information has been the subject of many prior empirical studies.10 Boni and 
Womack (2006) examine the role of analysts as industry specialists and find that they create 
value mainly as a result of their superior ability to rank stocks within industries. The study 
finds that analysts’ recommendations can lead to profitable trading strategies.  
Prior empirical studies examining the impact of analysts’ research reports on stock 
prices find that markets respond within 15 minutes to buy/sell recommendations issued by 
analysts (Kim, Lin and Slovin, 1997). Brav and Lehavy (2003) also find that markets react 
incrementally to target price revisions while controlling for market reaction to stock 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. In line with this evidence, several other 
studies have shown that forecast revisions and recommendations have a significant impact on 
security prices, and these prices tend to move in the direction of forecasts (e.g. So, 2013). 
 Sinha et al. (1997) suggest that some analysts’ forecasts should carry more weight 
than others when formulating market expectations because some analysts provide better 
forecasts than others. The authors argue that prior literature has relied upon the average 
forecast as a proxy for market perception. However, this may not be an accurate perception of 
the market because if investors are aware that the forecast accuracy of some analysts is better, 
they are likely to pay more attention to those forecasts. Therefore, investors should consider 
analysts’ past performance and more weight should be placed on the forecasts of analysts 
who are consistently more accurate than others.  
                                                          
10 See Ramnath et al. (2008) for a review of current literature on analysts’ earnings forecast errors. 
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A number of studies have looked at the factors that enable some analysts to perform 
better than others (e.g. Clement, 1999). This area of research has not only received 
considerable attention from academics but also from regulators who have scrutinised the 
factors that may lead to systematic errors by analysts (Hilary and Hsu, 2013). This is because 
systematic errors may distort the capital allocation process within financial markets. Prior 
empirical studies have examined the type of information used to make the forecasts i.e. firm- 
and industry-level information (Berger et al., 2003), the differences in incentives to issue 
more accurate forecasts (Clement, 1999) and the institutional and regulatory setting that 
could impede their ability to make accurate forecasts (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990). 
 Overall, the estimates and research reports provided by analysts are likely to be useful 
only if they are accurate and successful in reducing the information gap between the firms’ 
management and external market participants (Hilary and Hsu, 2013). Therefore, analysts’ 
ability to accurately and consistently forecast firm performance has received considerable 
attention in the literature (Ramnath et al., 2008). In the next subsections, we review the 
literature on three forecast characteristics, namely, the accuracy, bias and dispersion.  
 
4.2.1. Accuracy and Bias  
Analysts are frequently evaluated based on the accuracy of their recommendations 
and short-term earnings forecasts (Dechow et al., 2000). Gu and Wu (2003) claim that 
accuracy is one of the most important aspects of analysts’ forecast performance. Therefore, 
determining accuracy and bias in forecasts is fundamental to market participants when this 
information is being used to form market expectations and/or investment decisions.  
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 Jackson (2005) finds that less sophisticated investors are more likely to be misled by 
biased forecasts if they are unable to “de-bias” them correctly. Prior literature suggests a 
number of reasons for biased forecasts. For example, analysts are more likely to issue biased 
forecasts if their incentives are linked to the amount of business they are able to generate for 
their firm (e.g. Hayes, 1998). This is because by satisfying firms’ management through 
optimistic forecasts, analysts may be able to generate more business for their firm, such as 
trading commissions (Hayes, 1998).  
In line with this, Irvine (2003) finds that optimistic recommendations generate higher 
own-broker trading volume. This study also suggests that analysts are more likely to issue 
optimistic recommendations when they are faced with mixed incentives i.e. issuing more 
accurate forecasts against generating more business for their firm by issuing optimistic 
forecasts. Additionally, Aitken, Muthuswamy, and Wong (2001) find that buy 
recommendations lead to a higher market share in an event window around the 
announcement, while sell recommendations do not. These results are in line with Jackson 
(2005) who verifies the optimism reported in prior studies and the trade-off an analyst faces 
between generating more trade and accuracy.  
On the other hand, it may be the case that analysts react differently to new 
information which, in turn, affects the accuracy of their forecast. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) 
examine whether analysts (1) systematically underreact to new earnings information, (2) 
systematically overreact to new earnings information, or (3) systematically optimistic in their 
reactions. By examining the nature of the information and the type of reaction, the authors 
find that analysts generally underreact to negative information and overreact to positive 
information. The study finds that forecast errors are upwardly biased, which may suggest that 
analysts reflect relevant information inaccurately and systematic optimism in response to new 
information.  
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Additionally, Daniel et al. (1998) also rely on the psychology literature and propose a 
theory based on investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias. This research suggests that 
investors are usually overconfident in the sense that they believe too strongly in their own 
private information and/or overestimate their own ability. A strong belief in their own ability 
is likely to prevent them from realistically estimating their error variance in making 
predictions and rely too much on their own forecasts. Any new information that confirms 
their prior belief is likely to aggravate this situation, whereas new information which 
contradicts their prior belief is likely to have a lesser impact.  
Finally, Hong and Stein (1999) consider a market consisting of two types of 
participants to account for under- and overreaction, namely, news watchers and momentum 
traders, and both participants are able to process only a subset of publicly available 
information. On the one hand, the news watchers make forecasts based on signals that they 
observe privately about future fundamentals, and their limitation being that they do not rely 
on current or past prices. On the other hand, momentum traders rely on past price changes, 
their limitation being that their forecasts must be univariate function of the past prices (Hong 
and Stein, 1999). The authors argue that news watchers rely too much on their own 
information set and fail to take into account the information of other news watchers and, 
therefore, this information is slow to fully diffuse throughout the market, leading to short-
term underreactions. This also suggests that momentum traders may benefit from trend 
chasing, which can lead to overreactions in the long run. 
Another strand of literature has examined the effect of analysts and their firm 
characteristics on forecast accuracy and bias. Jacob et al. (1999) examine the factors that 
influence the forecasts of sell-side analysts and find that analyst aptitude and brokerage house 
characteristics are both associated with forecast accuracy. Analysts experience is positively 
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associated with forecast accuracy only when the authors do not control for analysts' 
company-specific aptitude. Jacob et al. (1999) also find that industry specialisation may allow 
analysts to develop a depth of understanding that can be beneficial when forecasting for 
companies within that industry, resulting in greater forecast accuracy. Their findings suggest 
that following companies in unrelated industries can increase task complexity and decreases 
the accuracy of the estimates.  
Furthermore, Clement (1999) also finds that analysts’ forecast accuracy is positively 
related to their experience and the size of their employer but negatively related to the number 
of firms and industries they follow. Analysts belonging to larger and more prestigious 
brokerage houses may be highly regarded (Hong and Kubik, 2003) and receive greater 
incentives to provide accurate forecasts. This is in line with the findings of Jacob et al. (1999) 
suggesting that forecast accuracy is positively associated with brokerage house industry 
specialisation and negatively associated with brokerage house turnover. 
Prior studies that have examined the factors that may explain the differences in 
forecasts issued by analysts include Stickel (1992) who finds that the forecasts of top-ranked 
analysts are more accurate than the forecasts of analysts with lower ranking. Furthermore, 
top-ranked analysts have larger impact on stock prices than low-ranked analysts. This 
suggests that top-ranked analysts have superior forecasting ability and have more significant 
influence over market participants. In this case, the dispersion in forecasts issued by both 
lower-ranked analysts and top-ranked may be due to the superior forecasting ability of the 
latter.  
Further empirical research have provided evidence suggesting that more sophisticated 
analysts provide more accurate forecasts (Leone and Wu, 2007). For example, Leone and Wu 
(2007) find that ranked analysts are consistently able to make more accurate forecasts due to 
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their superior ability and are more likely to be recognised as leaders by other analysts. 
Additionally, more sophisticated analysts may work for large brokerage firms and have 
access to greater resources (Clement, 1999) as well as have their compensation linked to their 
ranking and reputation (Stickel, 1992).  
 
4.2.2. Forecast Consistency and Dispersion 
It is argued that dispersion in earnings forecasts reflects uncertainty about firms’ 
future cash flows and the lack of consensus among analysts about future events (Barry and 
Jennings, 1992; Barron et al., 1998). A key factor of dispersion in forecasts and the 
uncertainty about future economic performance is the absence of information about firms’ 
segments (Swaminathan, 1991). For example, Swaminathan (1991) finds that dispersion in 
forecasts is negatively related to the amount of segment level information disclosed by the 
firm. This suggests that, in the absence of segmental information, uncertainty about future 
performance of segments leads to wider disagreement about the firm’s future performance.  
Barron and Stuerke (1998) find a positive relationship between dispersion in forecasts 
and demand for more information by investors as well as the volatility in price around the 
earnings announcement. In particular, the study examines the dispersion in earnings forecast 
issued shortly after the earnings announcements as well as the analysts’ activity in generating 
and disseminating information up to the next announcement period. The study shows that 
dispersion in analysts’ forecast is high after announcements and there is the desire to obtain 
more information about the firm before the next earnings announcement.  
Johnson (2004) suggests that dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is likely to indicate 
nonsystematic risk relating to the unobservability of a firm’s underlying value. Additionally, 
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Deither et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between dispersion and stock returns. The 
authors argue that firms that have higher dispersion in earnings forecast perform worse 
compared with firms that have low dispersion.  
More recently, Hilary and Hsu (2013) find that analysts who have more consistent 
forecast errors have a greater ability to affect security prices than those who are less 
consistent. This study suggests that the usefulness of analysts’ forecasts should be based on 
how consistent their forecasts are rather than on the accuracy. The authors argue that whilst 
investors should take into account the accuracy of forecasts, they should actually place more 
weight upon forecasts by more consistent analysts.  
Hilary and Hsu (2013) argue that if investors are Bayesian, then forecast usefulness 
should be based on the extent to which an analyst delivers consistent forecast errors instead 
of accuracy. For example, consider two analysts in the market providing earnings forecasts to 
external market participants: Analyst A and Analyst B. Analyst A delivers forecasts which are 
consistently lower than the actual by a constant amount, whereas Analyst B provides closer 
forecasts, but these can be either above or below the actual reported earnings. In this case, 
investors should pay more attention to Analyst A and should place more weight upon 
forecasts made by this analyst when formulating expectations since forecasts made by 
Analyst A are more predictable than those made by Analyst B. Sophisticated investors are 
more easily able to “de-bias” any information they receive from consistent analysts.  
However, if consistency is more important than the accuracy of the forecasts, then 
analysts may intentionally issue under- or overoptimistic forecasts to maintain their 
consistency at the expense of accuracy. In line with this theory, Jackson (2005) argues that 
analysts can also intentionally issue optimistic forecasts in order to satisfy firms’ 
management and gain better access to private information. In addition to this, firms’ 
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management may also publicly disclose their future earnings expectations that may facilitate 
analysts’ predictions.  
For example, Hilary, Hsu and Wang (2013) examine the accuracy and consistency of 
management forecasts and find that managers who make consistent forecasting errors have a 
greater ability to influence investor reactions and analyst revisions. In relation to this, Yang 
(2012) also finds that managers who issue more accurate earnings forecasts have a greater 
influence over analysts. They argue that forecast news is likely to have a significantly larger 
impact on stock price when information asymmetry between internal and external markets is 
high.  
 
4.3. Buy/Sell Recommendations 
 Womack (1996) argues that analysts’ main objective is to make timely buy/sell 
recommendations and earnings forecasts are not their primary task. Analysts issue buy/sell 
recommendations which can indicate whether current stock price is incorrect and may help 
investors to make profitable trading strategies or investment decisions. For example, Green 
(2006) reports that buying/selling stock quickly following analysts’ recommendations to 
upgrade (downgrade) results in an average two-day return of 1.02% (1.50%). The study finds 
that opportunities to generate profit in the short term are greater during the two hour window 
after the release of analysts’ pre-market recommendations. This suggests that brokerage 
houses are able to provide investors with considerable opportunities to generate profit.  
Womack (1996) also finds that the frequency of analysts’ buy recommendations is 7 
times higher that their sell recommendations. This is in line with prior empirical findings of 
overoptimism and suggesting that the costs associated with issuing sell recommendation are 
– 101 – 
 
greater than the costs associated with issuing buy recommendations (Barber et al., 2004; 
Bradshaw et al., 2006). Furthermore, other studies have suggested that market participants 
react immediately to recommendations (Kim, Lin and Slovin, 1997), which appear to have a 
permanent effect.  
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2004) find that independent research analysts tend to 
outperform analysts employed by investment banks. They also find that a major factor of 
underperformance of analysts affiliated with investment banks is their reluctance to 
downgrade stocks that had recently issued equity. This is because, on the one hand, analysts 
may want to produce accurate reports to satisfy investors, but on the other hand, analysts 
have an incentive to produce positive reports to generate (or retain) investment banking 
business from the companies being evaluated. Conrad et al. (2006) also finds that changes are 
“sticky” in one direction and that analysts are more reluctant to downgrade stocks.  
Additionally, Conrad et al. (2006) find that analysts are more likely to alter their 
recommendations after large stock price changes, with the probability that analysts will make 
their recommendations higher if a large stock price event occurred in the preceding three days. 
A large decline in stock prices is likely to lead analysts to downgrade rather than upgrade the 
stock, which is likely to shatter their optimism. Furthermore, the study finds that, in general, 
the presence of a historical investment banking relationship leads to upgrades rather than 
downgrades of stock. Finally, analysts also tend to respond in the same manner as other 
analysts who recently changed their recommendations, thus herding towards a consensus. 
To add to this, Bradshaw (2004) examines the link between analysts’ forecasts and 
stock recommendations, arguing that if the purpose of analysts' recommendations is to advise 
the purchase/sale of stocks when the price is low/high compared to their estimate of intrinsic 
value, then recommendations should be related to value estimates based on their earnings 
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forecasts. This is because the earnings forecasts are likely to be used to estimate the stock’s 
value, which is then compared with the actual market price of the stock to determine whether 
it is under or overvalued. The results indicate that there is little evidence to show that 
analysts' recommendations can be explained by the residual income valuations but that there 
is strong evidence that both the price/earnings growth model and the long term growth model 
explain analysts' recommendations. The findings suggest that analysts do not incorporate 
their earnings forecasts into their stock recommendations, instead relying on valuation 
models.  
In addition to providing earnings forecasts and making stock recommendations, 
analysts also provide a number of other outputs, such as written company and industry 
reports and phone calls to buy-side clients. Although the quality of these output are much 
more difficult to assess than those of earnings forecasts, buy-side analysts value them as 
much as stock selections and earnings forecasts (Leone and Wu, 2007). Frequent forecasts 
can reflect more timely communication with investors, which is viewed as an important 
aspect of performance by external market participants (Stickel, 1992). Greater stock coverage 
can contribute to broader industry knowledge, which is also valued by buy-side clients.  
 
4.4. Forecast Errors and Information Complexity 
 Prior empirical studies find that firm complexity is negatively related to the accuracy 
of estimates issued by analysts (e.g. Duru and Reeb, 2002). Also, Cukierman and Givoly 
(1982) find that the dispersion in forecasts increases as the variance of information 
observations increases. Similarly, Brown et al. (1987) document that analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy is positively related to the dimensionality of the information set (firm size 
used as a proxy) and negatively related to both the variance of information observations and 
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the correlation between the information variables. The three proxies used for information 
variables are (i) firm size, (ii) prior dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and (iii) the number of 
lines of business of the firm. For example, if n is the number of information sources available 
to analysts and m represents the different lines of business, and if m is small, then n 
information signals will be highly correlated. On the other hand, if m is large, then each of the 
n information signals will tend to represent more diverse types of information.  
 Further evidence on information complexity and analysts’ forecast accuracy is 
provided by Plumlee (2003), who finds that errors made when forecasting effective tax rates 
increases as tax law becomes more complex. These results suggest that greater information 
complexity reduces analysts’ use of the information; analysts formulate less complex 
information to a greater extent and more complex information to a lesser extent. An 
alternative explanation is that if only a handful of companies are affected by the change in tax 
rates, then analysts may choose not to invest too much time analysing the potential impact. 
Duru and Reeb (2002) examine the relationship between the level of diversification 
and earnings forecast accuracy, and find that forecast accuracy is negatively related to 
geographical diversification. As firms become more geographically diversified, their 
operations become more complex and, hence, the accuracy of the forecasts decreases. 
Analysts tend to be more optimistic about performance of the firm that is well diversified and 
presumed to be more complex. Similarly, Lim (2001) provides further evidence that analysts' 
earnings forecasts are more optimistically biased for firms with less predictable earnings. 
Duru and Reeb (2002) document that the US firms have expanded significantly within their 
home country as well as abroad over the past decade and this has led to the development in 
financial reporting regulation on segments, which has increased the level of information 
about the firm available to external market participants.  
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Although all publicly traded firms must meet the minimum disclosure requirements 
set by the regulators, firms can vary substantially in terms of the amount of additional 
information they provide to the capital markets. O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that 
analysts follow more firms in industries with stringent reporting requirements. Similarly, 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) provide evidence that suggests firms with more informative 
disclosure policies have (i) a larger analyst following, (ii) more accurate analyst earnings 
forecasts, (iii) less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts and (iv) less volatility in 
forecast revisions. These findings suggest that the level of information disclosed by 
companies is an important determinant of the number of analysts following the firm. In 
addition, an increase in accuracy due to an increased level of information available to market 
participants suggests that more stringent reporting environments are positively related to 
forecast accuracy.  
 Furthermore, Atiase (1985) focuses on specific firm characteristics and argues that the 
amount of unexpected information conveyed to the market by analysts’ reports should be 
negatively related to firm size. This is based on the notion that firm size is positively related 
to the amount of information available in the market. The findings suggest that, firstly, the 
average price revaluation within the first week following the earnings report is significantly 
greater than the average security price revaluations over the entire other estimation period. 
Secondly, the level of a price revaluation in response to firms’ second-quarter earnings report 
is negatively related to the size of the firm. This suggests that the differential level of price 
revaluation can be attributed to the different level of information available for different firm 
characteristics. 
 Barry and Brown (1984) examine the effect of firm size on differential information. 
Based on information availability, larger firms that are likely to make more information 
available to market participants are considered to be less risky than smaller firms that make 
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less information available. These findings indicate that the perceived risk is negatively related 
to level of information available about securities that have the same historical beta. 
Additionally, Freeman (1987) shows that the security prices of large firms reflect reported 
earnings quicker than the security prices of small firms. However, the level of abnormal 
returns during the months surrounding a given level of a change in earnings is inversely 
related to firm size. 
 
4.5. Forecast Errors and External Financing 
Bradshaw et al. (2006) examine firms’ financing activities and earnings forecasts 
errors and find that analysts are generally overoptimistic in their forecasts when firms raise 
external finance by issuing debt or equity. In addition, examining short- and long-term 
forecasts and stock returns, the study finds a strong negative relationship between net external 
financing and future stock returns. This result is in line with the theory that firms issue new 
securities when they are overvalued. This suggest that there is a negative relationship 
between net external financing and future profitability in both equity and debt financing, 
more so in the former.  
These findings suggest that, on the one hand, a positive relationship between 
corporate financing activities and optimism in earnings forecasts may indicate that firms have 
good investment opportunities. On the other hand, it may indicate the presence of conflicts of 
interest as analysts tend to issue more optimistic forecasts to satisfy firms’ management and, 
in turn, generate trading commissions related to issuing new securities. Bradshaw et al. (2006) 
find that external financing activity dominates investment banking affiliation and it is a 
significant determinant of optimism. These findings are consistent with optimism in short- 
and long-term earnings forecasts, buy/sell recommendations and target prices.  
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Furthermore, Bradshaw et al. (2006) find that firms that are more involved in issuing 
new securities have 1-year (2-year) ahead earnings forecast errors that are 1.7 (2.2) times as 
optimistic as those of firms that are less involved in issuing new securities. In addition to this, 
for debt financing, the level of optimism is more pronounced in short-term earnings forecasts, 
whereas, for equity financing this optimism extends to long-term earnings growth forecasts, 
buy/sell recommendations and target prices. In this study, the short term forecast errors are 
computed as the realised annual earnings per share for the upcoming year minus the 
corresponding monthly consensus forecast of this amount, all scaled by stock price as of the 
end of the forecast month. Similarly, the long-term earnings growth forecast error is 
computed as the realised long-term earnings growth rate minus monthly consensus forecast 
growth rate. The realised earnings growth is computed from the slope coefficient of an 
ordinary least squares regression of the natural logarithm of annual earnings per share on a 
time trend.  
As these findings suggest, conflicts of interest can have a significant impact on the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (Ritter, 2003; Bradshaw et al., 2006). On the downside, 
external financing can be costly for firms due to the presence of an intermediary, such as an 
investment bank, which may charge a fee or gross spread for its services. On the upside, 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) show that banks help transmit more information in capital 
markets and may help to reduce information asymmetry between internal and external 
markets. The information asymmetry is generally taken as the standard deviation of a time 
series of abnormal returns to quarterly announcements. In contrast, Billett et al. (2001) show 
that there is no difference between bank borrowings compared to equity and debt issues. The 
study reports that bank borrowers had operating performance below their peers a year before 
their loan announcement and that their performance did not improve in the three years 
subsequent to issuing the loan. 
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Prior empirical studies have also examined the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts when (i) 
a firm that is already publicly listed issues new securities (seasoned equity offering) and (ii) a 
firm issues securities for the first time (initial public offering). Issuing securities can generate 
significant business in terms of trading commissions for investment banks. From the 
viewpoint of the issuing firm, in addition to the direct costs of issuing securities, an issuing 
firm that is already publicly traded can also end up paying additional indirect costs through 
the revaluation of its existing securities. This is also known as the announcement effect 
(Ritter, 2003). These indirect costs may be much larger than the direct costs and generate 
significant business for banks. 
For this reason, the Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that management are likely to 
issue securities when they are most overvalued. Assuming that management want to 
maximise the wealth of its existing shareholders in the long run, then they will issue 
securities when they believe that the current market price is too high. The firm is unlikely to 
issue undervalued stock because doing so dilutes the fractional ownership of existing 
shareholders. External market participants who are aware of this decision making process can 
interpret an equity issue announcement as management being of the opinion that the stock is 
overvalued, leading to a fall in stock price.  
Adding to this, financial analysts’ research reports are likely to be of significant 
importance to investors and their role has been documented as a marketing campaign playing 
a key role in ensuring new issues are placed successfully (Ritter, 2003). Rajan and Servaes 
(1997) examine whether analysts make systematic forecast errors in their research reports for 
firms undertaking the IPO and whether optimism is related to the number of IPOs coming to 
the market. Their study finds that underpriced IPOs attract larger analyst following, and 
analysts systematically overestimate the earnings of these companies, where the forecast error 
is around 5 percent of the firm's stock price on average. 
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Furthermore, Rajan and Servaes (1997) find that IPOs coming to the market from 
high growth industries are positively related to optimism in analysts’ long-term growth 
forecasts. Also, Rajan and Servaes (1995) present evidence suggesting that more firms 
conduct IPOs when seasoned firms in their industries are trading at high multiples relative to 
the stock market and historical levels. However, firms with the highest long-term growth 
projections appear to significantly underperform. It could be that firms come to the market 
when similar firms in their industry are trading at a significant premium but then fail to 
perform as expected (Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson and Shah, 1994) or analysts are 
overoptimistic about their future performance.  
 
4.6. Forecast Errors and Internal Financing 
 In this section, we derive a set of hypotheses from the literature on internal capital 
markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors. In particular, we build on the literature that 
examines the link between firm complexity and earnings forecast errors. Our main objective 
is to determine the relationship between the operations and efficiency of internal capital 
markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors. 
 
4.6.1. ICM Operations and Forecast Errors 
A key distinction between focused firms and multi-segment firms is the presence of 
internal capital markets in the latter (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Stein, 1997, 2003). As discussed 
in Chapter 2, internal capital markets can allow diversified firms to finance investments of a 
segment using cash flow of other segments within the firm and, thus, allow them to make 
decisions that may not be available to single-segment firms due to financial constraints e.g. 
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external capital becoming more expensive or unavailable during a financial crisis 
(Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Hovakimian, 2011). Therefore, the financing and 
investment decisions of multi-segment firms may differ significantly from those of focused 
firms.  
It is now acknowledged that firm complexity is negatively related to analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Clement, 1999; Duru and Reeb, 
2002; Plumlee, 2003). For example, diversified firms that operate multiple segments in 
different industries/countries tend to have lower forecast accuracy (Duru and Reeb, 2002). 
However, the literature on the determinant of complexity that is presumed with diversified 
firms and what it is about those diversified firms that increase informational task complexity 
is limited (Ramnath et al., 2008).  
Our first objective is to determine whether the operation of internal capital markets 
within diversified firms are related to the earnings forecast errors. This is because intra-
segmental capital allocations within multi-segment firms are likely to increase the complexity 
surrounding the evaluation of the firms’ future profitability for at least two reasons. First, 
unlike equity and debt finance, internal capital reallocation decisions do not require such 
detailed disclosure of information to external market participants. Therefore, it is difficult to 
identify which segments are being allocated more resources within the firm. Second, 
segments’ investment opportunities are more difficult to determine and, hence, the efficiency 
of internal capital markets may be more difficult to establish.11  
Diversified firms have the ability to operate internal capital markets and engage in 
cross-subsidisation of capital resources which may not be visible to market participants. For 
                                                          
11 As discussed in Chapter 2, segments of a conglomerate are not separately listed, and there is limited publicly 
available information. Therefore, it’s difficult to obtain a market value and investment opportunities of a 
particular segment. 
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example, the firm may be able to finance investment opportunities of a segment using cash 
flow of other segments within the firm (Shin and Stulz, 1998). This option is not available to 
single segment firms as these firms do not operate internal capital markets (Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga, 2010). Furthermore, segments of a diversified firm are not usually separately 
listed on an exchange, which makes it more difficult to determine the value of a segment and 
assess its investment opportunities due to limited publicly available information (Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Park, Lee and Shin, 2008; Gugler et al., 2013).  
Thus, internal capital markets may add to the difficultly of the task of determining the 
future profitability of the firm because information about the projects that are financed is 
limited and not fully disclosed to external market participants. Also, the size of intra-
segmental capital resources allocations or the managers’ assessment on segments’ investment 
opportunities is not usually disclosed. Therefore, we argue that limited information about 
firms’ internal capital markets can add to the complexity of the task of forecasting. Our first 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Internal capital markets operations are negatively related to analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy. 
 
In addition to this, prior literature suggests that the level of optimism in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts is positively related to the complexity of the task (e.g. Plumlee, 2003). This 
study argues that analysts pay more attention to less complex information and less attention 
to more complex information. In line with this, Duru and Reeb (2002) document that analysts 
tend to be more optimistic about firms’ performance that is well diversified and presumed to 
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be more complex. Similarly, Lim (2001) find evidence that suggests analysts' earnings 
forecasts are more optimistically biased for firms with less predictable earnings. 
If internal capital markets aggravates firm complexity, then analysts are likely to be 
more optimistic about the future performance of firms that operate larger internal capital 
markets (Duru and Reeb, 2002; Plumlee, 2003). Prior literature suggests that internal capital 
markets are successful at financing investment opportunities of a segment using capital 
resources of other segments within the firm (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000) and, 
therefore, are able to make decisions that are not available to single segment firms 
(Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010).  
If analysts consider internal capital markets operations to be value-enhancing, then the 
extent of internal capital markets operations are likely to be related to more optimistic 
forecasts. On the other hand, if internal capital market operations of firms are considered to 
be inefficient, then analysts are less likely to issue optimistic forecasts. Therefore, our next 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Internal capital markets operations are positively related to Bias in earnings 
forecasts. 
 
Prior literature suggests that, on the one hand, analysts may demand more segment 
level information and value the increased transparency between internal and external markets. 
In line with this, segment level information disclosed by firms is negatively associated with 
the level of dispersion in earnings forecasts (Swaminathan, 1991) and analyst coverage 
increases with the level of disclosure. As discussed above, dispersion in forecasts indicates 
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disagreement about the firms’ future economic performance and future events among 
analysts (Barron et al., 1998).  
On the other hand, a number of studies suggest that the presence of multiple segments 
within a firm may reduce accuracy and aggravates dispersion in forecasts (e.g. Duru and 
Reeb, 2002). Segments of diversified firms are not usually financially independent and, 
hence, their investment policies can differ significantly from focused firms (Kuppuswamy 
and Villalonga, 2010). Therefore, this is likely to increase the earnings uncertainty and the 
future profitability of the firm.  
Our objective is to determine whether the extent of internal capital markets operations 
aggravates information complexity and increase the level of dispersion in earnings forecast 
issued by analysts. Internal capital markets can enhance or destroy firm value depending on 
whether they are efficient or inefficient (Rajan et al., 2000). If analysts have different 
opinions about the value added by internal capital markets, then their estimates are likely to 
differ. Therefore, our next research question is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2.3: Internal capital markets operations are positively related to dispersion in 
earnings forecasts. 
 
4.6.2. ICM Efficiency and Forecast Errors 
Efficient internal capital market theory promotes the use of capital resources to 
finance good investment projects (Shin and Stulz, 1998) which, in turn, may enhance firm 
value (Rajan et al., 2000). However, the literature finds that internal capital markets generally 
operate inefficiently (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; 
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Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). This suggests that less profitable segments are allocated more 
resources compared with high profitable segments of the firm. A number of studies document 
the factors that may lead to inefficient internal capital markets within a firm, e.g. agency costs 
(Jensen, 1986), socialism (Scharfstein, 1998), rent-seeking (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), 
influence activities by division managers (Wulf, 2009).  
Therefore, the efficiency of internal capital markets is not only an indicator of how 
resources are distributed within the firm but are also likely to provide a signal to external 
market participants about internal working of the firm, e.g. investment policies, the extent of 
internal problems such as rent-seeking by division managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) 
and whether resources are misallocated in the presence of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) 
indicating failures in internal governance. 
The earnings forecasts are more likely to be accurate if analysts are able to determine 
the efficiency of internal capital markets and incorporate this information into their estimates. 
This is because the future profitability of the firm can depend on the type of investment 
projects financed, and amount of capital resources allocated to finance those investment 
projects. For example, efficient internal capital markets will allocate more resources towards 
segments which have good investment opportunities and are more profitable.  
If analysts believe internal capital markets to be well-functioning from the signals 
they observe about their efficiency and firms allocate resources efficiently, then their 
forecasts are likely to be more accurate. Therefore, our next hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2.4: Internal capital market efficiency is positively related to earnings 
forecast accuracy.  
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If analysts consider internal capital markets to be active and efficient, then they are 
likely to be more optimistic about the future performance of the firm. For example, it is well-
documented that efficient internal capital markets can enhance firm value by “winner-
picking” investment projects (Stein 1997, 2003; Rajan et al. 2000). If managers are able to 
allocate resources more efficiently, then the firm is likely to be more profitable in the future. 
On the other hand, if resources are misallocated (e.g. through rent-seeking or empire 
building as documented in prior literature) then internal capital markets are likely to destroy 
value. Thus, the value-diminishing and more inefficient internal capital markets are likely to 
be associated with lower optimism in forecasts. Also, if task of determining internal capital 
markets operations and efficiency are perceived to be complex, then analysts are also likely 
to be optimistic about a firm’s performance. For example, a number of studies report a 
positive relationship between firm complexity and an upward bias in earnings forecasts (Lim, 
2001; Duru and Reeb, 2002). Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2.5: Internal capital markets efficiency is positively related to Bias in 
earnings forecasts. 
 
It has been well-documented that more segment information disclosure is highly 
valued by analysts (Healy et al., 1999), and that number of analysts following increases when 
firms disclose more information (Botosan and Harris, 2000). For example, the level of 
segment information disclosed by firms is positively related to the number of analysts 
following the firm (Berger and Hann, 2003). Prior studies also find that higher level of 
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information disclosures enables analysts to make more accurate forecast about the future 
performance of the firm (e.g. Swaminathan, 1991).  
In general, this information is particularly valuable because segments of a diversified 
firm are not usually separately listed on an exchange and, thus, the task of determining firms’ 
future profitability becomes more complex due to lack of publicly available information 
about these segments. It has been well documented that corporate diversification not only 
increases firm complexity but can also increase earnings uncertainty (Duru and Reeb, 2002).  
If analysts consider internal capital markets to be well-functioning from the signals 
they observe about their efficiency and firms allocate resources efficiently, then their 
forecasts are likely to be more accurate. Therefore, there is likely to be less dispersion in 
earnings forecasts when internal capital markets are efficient. Similarly, there is likely to be 
more dispersion in earnings forecasts when internal capital markets are inefficient and 
analysts disagree on the future profitability of the firm. Thus, we expect a negative 
relationship between the level of efficiency and dispersion in earnings forecasts. Our next 
research question is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2.6: Internal capital markets efficiency is negatively related to the level of 
dispersion in earnings forecasts. 
 
4.7. Summary 
 The research reports and forecast estimates issued by analysts play a vital role in 
capital markets by helping to bridge the information gap between the management of firms 
and external market participants (Hall and Tacon, 2010; So, 2013). In this chapter, we 
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examined the literature on analysts’ earnings forecast errors and their link with internal 
capital markets. In particular, we examine the literature on three key characteristics of 
analysts’ forecasts, namely, the accuracy, bias and dispersion.  
 Prior literature has argued that the usefulness of such estimates is of significant 
importance to investors and market participants only if they are able to accurately forecast the 
future performance of the firm (Hilary and Hsu, 2013). A number of studies have argued that 
a key determinant of forecast errors is the complexity of the task (Clement, 1999; Duru and 
Reeb, 2002). In particular, Duru and Reeb (2002) argue that international diversification 
increases firm complexity and negatively affects analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.   
 Our first objective is to determine whether the extent of internal capital market 
activity aggravates firm complexity and negatively affects forecast accuracy. Unlike focused 
firms that operate primarily in a single industry, diversified firms usually have segments 
operating in related as well as unrelated industries and have the ability to operate internal 
capital marekts (Shin and Stulz, 1998). Unlike raising finance externally, internal capital 
market operations do not require disclosure of information to external market participants and 
are not directly observable. To add to this, segments are not usually separately listed on the 
exchange which makes it difficult to derive their value and investment opportunities.  
 Prior research finds a positive relationship between information complexity and 
optimism in forecasts (Lim, 2001; Duru and Reeb, 2002). Plumlee (2003) finds that analysts 
pay more attention to less complex information and less attention to more complex 
information. Furthermore, we explore the relationship between earnings forecast errors and 
the efficiency of internal capital markets, arguing that analysts are likely to be more 
optimistic about firms that operate efficient internal capital markets. Lastly, we investigate 
whether the extent of internal capital markets operations lead to a greater dispersion in 
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forecasts. If the presence of internal capital markets increase firm complexity, then analysts 
are likely to disagree more about firms’ future performance. 
 In Chapter 5, we discuss our data and the sources for our analysis on internal capital 
markets and analysts’ earnings forecasts errors in the UK, France and Germany. We also 
discuss the method used to examine the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets 
and present firm- and segment-level descriptive statistics for the three countries.  
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CHAPTER 5 – DETERMINING INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
OPERATIONS AND EFFICIENCY 
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5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we describe the sample selection process and the methods used to 
determine the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets within conglomerates. Prior 
literature has mainly focused on internal capital markets within two distinct organisational 
structures, namely, conglomerates and business groups (e.g. Hovakimian, 2011; Lee et al., 
2008) using two main methods to determine their operations and efficiency (Shin and Stulz, 
1998; Rajan et al., 2000). A key distinction between firms affiliated with business group and 
segments of diversified firms is that the latter are not usually listed separately on an exchange 
(Gugler et al., 2013). Segments of diversified firms are usually completely owned by the 
parent firm and mainly rely on headquarters for finance (Gugler et al., 2013).  
Our objective is to examine the operations and efficiency of internal capital markets 
in conglomerates that operate in two distinct financial systems, namely, market- and bank-
based systems. A major obstacle facing prior empirical studies has been the lack of segment 
level data in the financial reports of public listed companies (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2007). 
The adoption of the IFRS accounting standards in 2005 in Europe requires public listed 
companies to disclose more segment level information. Thus, it enables us to provide further 
evidence on this subject by examining internal capital markets in the UK, France and 
Germany, as well as allowing us to make cross-country comparisons. We obtain segment and 
firm level data from Datastream over a six year period.  
In Section 5.2, we discuss our process of calculating the operation and efficiency of 
internal capital markets. In Section 5.3, we examine the segmental reporting requirement of 
IFRS in Europe. Next, we discuss the data requirements, sources and data filtering process in 
Section 5.4. We present and discuss basic statistics from the UK, France and Germany in 
Section 5.5. In Section 5.6, we summarise the chapter.   
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5.2. Method: Determining Operation and Efficiency 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, internal capital markets play a key role in the allocation of 
capital resources within diversified firms. There are two methods put forward in prior 
literature to determine whether internal capital markets are active and efficient. The first 
approach put forward by Shin and Stulz (1998) examines the relationship between a 
segment’s investment and cash flow of other segments within the firm. The second approach 
was put forward by Rajan et al. (2000) and it directly measures the efficiency of internal 
capital markets through the relative value added model. We discuss each of them in the 
subsections below. 
 
5.2.1. Investment-Cash Flow Model  
 It is now a well-documented fact that corporate investment depends on financial 
factors of the firm, such as equity and debt finance as well as internal finance i.e. cash flow 
and retained earnings (Fazzari et al., 1988). Lamont (1997) documents that if internal finance 
has a cost advantage and differs substantially to the cost of external finance, then under these 
circumstances, investments and financing decisions will be interdependent. Prior research 
focusing on the investment-cash flow relationship generally use panel data to estimate: 
 
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐾
+  𝑐𝑐 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹              (5.1) 
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In the above Equation (5.1) the variable I is the investment and K is the capital stock 
at beginning of the period. Cash is a measure of cash flow which is generally the operating 
income plus depreciation, and Q is Tobin’s-Q of the firm. Lastly, FirmDummy and 
YearDummy are the firm or industry and time dummy variables respectively. Shin and Stulz 
(1998) build on the investment-cash flow sensitivity model (Fazzari et al., 1988) by 
examining the investment-cash flow sensitivity at segment level and introducing the cash 
flow of other segments as a proxy for resources available for reallocation within the firm.  
 
𝐼
𝑇𝐶
= 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑇𝐶
+  𝑐 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑂 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑇𝐶
+  𝑑𝑐 + ∆𝑆𝑎𝑆𝑌𝑆 + 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹             (5.2) 
  
In Equation (5.2), the variable I represents a segment’s investment and TA is the total 
assets of the firm at beginning of the period. OWN CASH is the cash flow of the segment and, 
OTHER CASH is the sum of cash flow of other segments within the firm excluding its own. 
The variable Q is the proxy for Tobin’s-Q of the segment. A problem with examining 
segment level data is that market value of segments is not available and, hence, Q cannot be 
computed at segment level. Thus, median Q of focused firms operating in the same industry 
is usually taken as a proxy for a segment Q in the prior literature. Lastly, ∆Sales is the growth 
in sales of the segment at the beginning of the period.  
Shin and Stulz (1998) argue that, in the presence of well-functioning internal capital 
markets, firms should find it easier to protect good investment projects of segments by cross-
subsidising resources. For example, a rise in cash flow of a segment should bring about a rise 
in the resources available for reallocation within the firm and, in turn, increase the level of 
investment by segments with good opportunities. Therefore, internal capital markets can 
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affect the investment made by a segment either by subsidising or transferring resources 
between segments. In line with this theory, Lamont (1997) examines the intra-segmental 
capital allocations within large oil companies and finds that cash flow from oil segments is 
generally used to subsidise the investments of non-oil segments of the firm.  
Efficient internal capital market theory promotes the use of capital resources to 
finance good investment projects. If internal capital markets are efficient then we expect 
segments’ investment to rise (fall) with an increase (decrease) in its investment opportunities. 
The idea is that if firms have limited resources and external finance is costly, then internal 
capital markets should prioritise and allocate more resources to segments with good 
investment opportunities. However, internal capital markets may fail to add value if capital 
resources are not allocated efficiently. A number of studies that have examined the efficiency 
of internal capital markets report that they generally operate inefficiently (Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2007). 
 
5.2.2. The Relative Value Added Model 
The second approach was introduced by Rajan et al. (2000) which measures the 
efficiency of intra-segmental capital allocations through the relative value added (RVA) 
model or the absolute value added (AVA) model. This method has been widely used in the 
prior literature (e.g. Sautner and Villalonga, 2010; Hovakimian, 2011). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the key distinction between RVA and AVA is that the former compares 
investment opportunities of a segment against investment opportunities of other segments 
within the firm to measure the efficiency of internal capital markets and, hence, it is mainly 
used in studies that focus only on diversified firms (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010).  
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To construct a measure of the efficiency of a firm’s internal capital market, we first 
look at the difference between the investment rate of a segment that is part of a diversified 
firm and the investment it would have made had it been a focused firm operating in the same 
industry. The industry-adjusted investment is constructed by taking the difference between 
the capital expenditure of the segment normalised by total assets and asset weighted average 
of the same variable for focused firms and segments of diversified firms in the same industry. 
In Equation (5.3), j refers to the segment of the firm and ss refers to the single segment firms 
in the same industry. I is the segment investment and TA is the total assets of segment/firm. 
 
𝐼𝑗
𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  � 𝐼𝑗
𝑇𝐶𝑗
−  𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝐶𝑠𝑠
�                           (5.3) 
 
As a next step, we further adjust this variable by subtracting the weighted average 
industry-adjusted investment for all segments within the firm. This is to control for the 
possibility that diversified firms might have more funds available than stand-alone firms. For 
example, Rajan et al. (2000) argues that if we measure transfers and subsidies just by taking 
the difference between the investment rate of a segment and that of a focused firm in the 
same industry, we might otherwise treat these additional funds as resources exchanged rather 
than as additional funds (e.g. obtained via external markets) available to all segments. 
Therefore, as a next step we obtain the firm- and industry-adjusted investment: 
 
𝐼𝑗
𝑓𝑖𝑓𝑓−𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 𝐼𝑗
𝑇𝐶𝑗
−  𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝐶𝑠𝑠
 � − ∑ 𝑤𝑗 � 𝐼𝑗𝑇𝐶𝑗 −  𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝐶𝑠𝑠�𝑖𝑗=1                                           (5.4) 
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In Equation (5.4), the variable I is the investment of segment j, ss refers to the single 
segment firm, and w is segment j’s share of total firm assets. TA is the total assets of the firm 
or segment and n is the total number of segments within the firm. This variable was 
developed by Rajan et al. (2000). If the firm- and industry-adjusted investment is positive 
(negative), then this indicates that a segment’s investment being part of a diversified firm is 
more (less) than the investment it would have made if it was a focused firm. Thus, a positive 
(negative) value indicates that a segment has more (less) resources to invest as it receives a 
subsidy (makes a transfer) via internal capital markets. We follow Sautner and Villalonga 
(2010) to compute the size of an internal capital market of firm i at time t by taking the sum 
of the absolute values of transfers and subsidies across all segments of firm i in year t.12 
Finally, to construct RVA, we weight the firm- and industry-adjusted investment of 
each segment by the difference between the segment’s Tobin’s-Q and the asset weighted 
average Tobin’s-Q of all segments in the firm. Next, we add the weighted subsidies and 
transfers across all segments of firm i in year t and standardise it by total assets. If this 
measure is positive i.e. RVA > 0, then this indicates that a firm operates an efficient internal 
capital market, and if RVA < 0 then internal capital markets are inefficient i.e. more resources 
are allocated to segments with below average investment opportunities. 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅 = ∑ 𝑇𝐶𝑗�𝑞𝑗− 𝑞�� � 𝐼𝑗𝑇𝑇𝑗 − 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 −∑ 𝑤𝑗� 𝐼𝑗𝑇𝑇𝑗 − 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠�𝑛𝑗=1  �𝑛𝑗=1  
𝑇𝐶𝑖
                  (5.5) 
                                                          
12 Sautner and Villalonga (2010) take the size of an internal capital market as the sum of subsidies and transfers 
made by the firm in a particular year. A segment receives a subsidy (makes a transfer) if the firm- and industry 
adjusted investment is positive (negative). 
 
𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑌 =  �𝑆𝐹𝑏𝑆𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑗 +  � 𝑇𝐹𝑎𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑌𝐹𝑗� 
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In Equation (5.5), the variable j refers to the segment and i refers to the firm. The 
variable Q is the segment Tobin’s-Q, and  𝑞� is the asset weighted average Tobin’s-Q of all 
segments within the firm. As discussed above, median Tobin’s-Q of focused firms is used as 
a proxy for segment Tobin’s-Q. As an alternative, we also use segment’s ROA instead of 
Tobin’s-Q for the construction of the internal capital market efficiency measure.  
Our segment-level variables, e.g. Tobin’s-Q and the industry average investment rate, 
are based on a comparison with focused firms operating in the same industry, which we 
construct by matching the segment of a diversified firm to all focused firms whose primary 
SIC code is in the same 2-digit SIC group (discussed in Section 5.4.2). In the next section, we 
discuss Tobin’s-Q as a measure of segments’ investment opportunities. 
 
5.2.3. Proxy for Segment Opportunities 
Determining investment opportunities of segments is essential for identifying whether 
the transfers of capital resources within a conglomerate are efficient or inefficient. In addition 
to this, Whited (2002) documents another potential problem associated with not taking into 
account the investment opportunities of segments when determining the presence of internal 
capital markets. The study finds that, in the absence of a proxy for investment opportunities 
in the investment-cash flow model put forward by Shin and Stulz (1998), the cash flow of 
other segments may appear as a significant explanatory variable for investment in another 
segment of the firm, not because of active internal capital markets but due to cash flow of one 
segment being correlated with investment opportunities of the second segment.  
Tobin’s-Q, which is the ratio of market value to replacement cost, has been widely 
used in the finance literature (Tobin 1969, 1978; Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Lang and Stulz, 
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1994; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al. 2000; Lee et al. 2008; Hovakimian, 2011). The basic 
theory behind the casual relationship between Q and investment is that if marginal Q 
exceeded unity (i.e. if the value of investment exceeds its cost) then firms would have an 
incentive to invest. If firms exploited these investment opportunities, then value of Q should 
head towards unity (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). Thus, if a firm’s Q is greater than one, its 
market value is in excess of the replacement costs. 
Since the market value plays a critical role in determining the value of Q, the main 
drawback has been that Q cannot be computed for non-listed firms such as segments of 
diversified firms that are not listed separately on an exchange. For this reason, prior studies 
examining the relationship between investment and Tobin’s-Q at segment level have 
generally used median Q of focused firms in the same industry as a proxy for investment 
opportunities of the segment (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Sautner and 
Villalonga, 2010; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Hovakimian, 2011). For example, 
Shin and Stulz (1998) estimate median Tobin’s-Q of focused firms, defined as value of equity 
plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity all over total assets, and use that as 
a proxy for segment investment opportunities.  
However, a small number of studies have documented that inefficiency of internal 
capital markets and diversification discount as reported in prior literature may be due to 
measurement error in Tobin’s-Q (Whited, 2002; Erickson and Whited, 2012). This strand of 
literature suggests that it may not be correct to assume that a segment of a diversified firm 
will have a median industry Tobin’s-Q. To deal with this issue, prior literature has used asset-
weighted average Tobin’s-Q of focused firms as an alternative to median Tobin’s-Q and find 
that results remain unchanged, arguing that Tobin’s-Q is a good proxy of investment 
opportunities (Rajan et al., 2000).  
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5.3. Segment Reporting 
The adoption of IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) in 2005 resulted in the application of a common set of financial reporting standards 
within Europe (Armstrong et al., 2010). Prior to the year 2005, most European firms applied 
domestic accounting standards and the adoption of IFRS represented one of the largest 
financial reporting changes in recent years (Armstrong et al., 2010). The IFRS 8 on Operating 
Segments, which replaced the IAS 14 Segment Reporting,13 requires publicly listed firms to 
disclose information about their operating segments, products and services, the geographical 
areas in which they operate, and their major customers. This information is based on internal 
management reports, both in the identification of operating segments and measurement of 
disclosed segment information.  
The IFRS 8 requires firms to report financial and descriptive information about its 
reportable segments. First, firms must report information on the segment if the reported 
revenue, from both external customers and intersegment sales or transfers, is 10 percent or 
more of the combined revenue of all operating segments. Second, if the absolute measure of 
its reported profit or loss is 10 percent or more of the greater, in absolute amount, of (i) the 
combined reported profit of all operating segments that did not report a loss and (ii) the 
combined reported loss of all operating segments that reported a loss. Third, its assets are 10 
percent or more of the combined assets of all operating segments. If the total external revenue 
reported by operating segments constitutes less than 75 percent of the entity's revenue, 
additional operating segments must be identified as reportable segments (even if they do not 
                                                          
13 The IFRS came into effect from January 2005, and required firms to disclose segment level information. IFRS 
8 Operating Segments replaced IAS 14 Segment Reporting in 2009. The measurement of key segment data 
items has not changed significantly under IFRS 8 and IAS 14, and unlikely to have an impact on our findings. 
For a review of the accounting standards see: http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ifrs/ifrs8. 
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meet the quantitative thresholds set out above) until at least 75 percent of the entity's revenue 
is included in reportable segments.  
Other required disclosures include general information about how the entity identified 
its operating segments and the types of products and services from which each operating 
segment derives its revenues. An explanation of the measurements of segment profit or loss, 
segment assets and segment liabilities, including certain minimum disclosures, e.g. how 
transactions between segments are measured, the nature of measurement differences between 
segment information and other information may also be included in the financial statements. 
For single segment firms, there exist entity-wide disclosures that are required even when an 
entity has only one reportable segment, including information about each product and service 
or groups of products and services. Firms may voluntarily disclose even more information 
than required by law and reduce information asymmetries and, in turn, gain access to 
inexpensive capital; however, this usually means exchange of transparency about their 
situation and operations (Veron, 2007). 
Segment level information enables market participants to understand corporate 
business models and the risks, value potential of different lines and synergies or inefficiencies 
that may make the group more or less valuable than portfolio of comparable single segment 
firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lins and Sarvaes, 1999; Veron, 2007). This becomes 
particularly important when firms are large and highly complex with segments operating in 
related as well as unrelated industries.  
The disclosure of segmental information has enabled market participants to 
understand the core working of the internal capital markets within the firm (Shin and Stulz, 
1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Stein, 2003; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2007). As segments are not 
financially independent, researchers have relied on the segment information provided by the 
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firm to be able to investigate the similarities and differences in investment policies of 
diversified and focused firms. 
 
5.4. Data Sources and Main Items 
 In this section, we describe the sample selection process and the data for our empirical 
analysis. Our study on internal capital markets focuses on diversified firms that are domiciled 
and publicly listed in the UK, France and Germany between 2005 and 2010. As discussed in 
prior section, the adoption of the IFRS in the year 2005 required public listed companies in 
Europe to disclose more segment level information, however, the availability of segment 
level data prior to 2005 is severely limited in Datastream. Thus, we take the year 2005 as the 
starting point for the analysis to minimise the problem of missing data. 
We begin by obtaining a list of firms for each year whose securities are publicly 
traded in the UK, France and Germany between 2005 and 2010 from Datastream. In 
particular, we focus on firms whose primary exchange is London Stock Exchange, Euronext 
Paris or Frankfurt Stock Exchange. We do this for two reasons. First, our focus is on 
diversified firms whose home or domiciled country is the UK, France or Germany. Second, 
this ensures that cross-listed firms are not represented twice in our sample.  
Additionally, we collect analysts’ forecast information for our list of firms. Analysts 
from investment research departments worldwide contribute estimates and recommendations 
to Thomson Financial I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System) database. 
These databases provide global current and historical earnings information. Historical data 
are available at company summary and global aggregate levels. We obtain information on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for our list of firms from I/B/E/S.   
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Table 5.1  
Main data items and source. 
 
Description Source Time Period 
Diversified 
/ Single 
segment 
firm 
Firm/ 
segment 
level data 
Total Assets This is the total current assets 
reported by the firm/segment. 
Datastream 2004 – 
2010  
All firms Both 
Sales/Revenues This represents gross sales and 
other operating revenue.  
Datastream 2003 – 
2010 
Diversified 
firms 
Segment 
Capital 
Expenditure 
The funds used to acquire fixed 
assets. 
Datastream 2005 – 
2010 
All firms Segment 
SIC Code The standard industry 
classification which covers the 
economic activities of 
firm/segment.  
Datastream 2003 – 
2010 
All firms Both 
Operating Income Operating income is the difference 
between sales and total operating 
expenses. 
Datastream 2005 – 
2010 
Diversified 
firms 
Segment 
Depreciation This represents the cost of a 
depreciable asset to the accounting 
periods covered during its 
expected useful life to a business. 
Datastream 2005 – 
2010 
Diversified 
firms 
Segment 
EBITDA This is the earnings of a company 
before interest expense, income 
taxes and depreciation.  
Datastream 2005 – 
2010 
All firms Both 
Market 
capitalisation 
This represents the total market 
value of the company.  
Datastream 2004 – 
2010 
All firms Firm 
Common Equity It is the common shareholders' 
investment in a company. 
Datastream 2004 – 
2010 
All firms Firm 
Long-term Debt This represents all interest bearing 
financial obligations, excluding 
any amounts due within one year. 
Datastream 2005 – 
2010 
All firms Firm 
Short-term debt Short-term debt represents the 
portion of debt payable within one 
year. 
Datastream 2005 – 
2010 
All firms Firm 
Earnings per share 
– mean one year 
forecast 
This is the average of all the 
earnings per share forecasts 
supplied by analysts for the current 
financial year of the company, that 
is, the financial year not yet 
reported.  
I/B/E/S 2005 – 
2013 
All firms Firm 
Earnings per share 
– mean two year 
forecast 
This is the average of all the 
earnings per share forecasts 
supplied by analysts for the next 
financial year of the company. The 
next financial year is defined as that 
following the current year.  
I/B/E/S 2005 – 
2013 
All firms Firm 
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Earnings per share 
– forecast standard 
deviation 
Standard deviation of the earnings 
estimates supplied by analysts. 
I/B/E/S 2005 – 
2013 
All firms Firm 
Earnings growth – 
mean long-term 
forecast  
This is the average of all long term 
growth estimates supplied by 
analysts. It is usually the growth rate 
in earnings over a five year period.  
I/B/E/S 2005 – 
2013 
All firms Firm 
This table shows the key data items obtained from Datastream and I/B/E/S for our sample of firms in the UK, 
France and Germany. The time period for our analysis on internal capital markets is between 2005 and 2010. 
We require monthly earnings forecast information to be available between 2005 and 2013. Datastream provides 
information on 10 Product Segments of the firm; we obtain this information for our sample of firms. In addition 
to the analysts forecast information shown in the table, we also obtain Min, Max, Mean, Median, Number of 
Analysts and the Standard Deviation of forecasts. 
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5.4.1. Data Filtering and Analysis 
 The initial list from Datastream contained 13,754, 5,045 and 7,104 firm-years 
between 2005 and 2010 in the UK, France and Germany, respectively. The initial list 
includes both diversified and focused firms. As a first step, we identify diversified firms by 
counting the number of segments reported by the firm. For example, Product Segment 
information is given for up to ten segments of a company in Datastream. If a company has 
only one product line data, then only Segment 1 is updated. If a company has more than ten 
segments the remaining segments are included with the Product Segment 10 data. We classify 
a firm as diversified if it reports 2 or more segments, and focused otherwise.  
Next, we exclude financial firms and firms with segments in financial industry, 
identified by SIC code 6000 to 6999. We exclude financial firms because these firms tend to 
have much higher leverage and increased sensitivity to financial risk (Foerster and Sapp, 
2004). For example, high leverage of financial firms may not indicate the “distress” 
associated with high leverage of non-financial firms which could bias the results from the 
analysis. This is a standard procedure in the literature to exclude financial firms (Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Hovakimian, 2011). Studies focusing specifically on financial firms generally 
find evidence in line with active internal capital markets (Cremers, Huang, Sautner, 2009). 
Our primary objective is to examine the operation and efficiency of internal capital 
markets within diversified firms. Hence, the primary variable in our analysis is the capital 
expenditure of segments. As a first step, we identify and exclude firms that have not reported 
the segment capital expenditure or it is missing for a reported segment. This is because the 
investment level will enable us to examine the interdependence of segment investment and 
resources within the firm.  
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Secondly, we identify and exclude firms that do not report or have missing total assets 
at segment and firm level. The asset base of the segment allows us to determine its size 
relative to other segments and the firm. As defined in section 5.3, we require the segment and 
firm assets at t-1 to compute ratio of investment to total assets as well as cash flow to total 
assets. Therefore, we do not include any firm in our analysis that does not provide total 
firm/segment assets.  
Third, our model includes growth in sales of a segment as a control variable for its 
profitability. We require sales growth of a segment to be available at the beginning of the 
period, calculated as sales (t-1) minus sales (t-2) divided by sales (t-2). For example, to 
determine the profitability of a segment at the beginning of 2005 we require segment sales to 
be available at 2003 and 2004. We identify and exclude firms from our analysis that have 
missing sales growth figures.  
As discussed in Section 5.3, our objective is to determine the sensitivity of segment 
investment and firms’ internal resources i.e. the sum of cash flow of all other segments within 
the firm. The cash flow is calculated as operating income plus depreciation (Shin and Stulz, 
1998). Therefore, we identify and exclude firms that do not report or have missing operating 
income. The cash flow of a segment as well as cash flow other segments is of significant 
importance as we establish whether internal capital markets enable the cross-subsidisation of 
resources within multi-segment firms. 
Lastly, our analysis requires the construction of industry adjusted variables and, thus, 
matching of a segment to its single segment firms in the same industry. We require that firms 
report segment and firm SIC codes. Otherwise, we exclude the firm from the analysis as we 
are unable to compute a proxy for investment opportunities and industry adjusted 
investments. We match the segment to focused firms in the same industry by converting the 
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reported four-digit SIC code to the two-digit SIC code. The construction of the two-digit SIC 
code is discussed in Section 5.4.2. 
Additionally, our measure of segment investment opportunities is based on beginning 
of the year median Tobin’s-Q of focused firms. Tobin’s-Q is calculated as value of equity 
plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity all over total assets (Shin and 
Stulz, 1998). Therefore, we only include firms in our analysis that have segments with at least 
three focused firms operating in the same industry. We require focused firms to have market 
capitalisation, shareholders’ equity and total assets available. We exclude the firm from the 
analysis if any of these data items are not reported or missing. Further, to determine the 
industry average investment we require focused firms to have capital expenditure available, 
and exclude the firm from the analysis otherwise.  
Unlike prior studies which exclude firms that have only related segments because the 
investment opportunities are the same (e.g. Hovakimian 2011), we include firms that operate 
unrelated as well as related segments in our analysis. This is because, a number of studies 
have observed that firms become more efficient when they increase focus i.e. operate in 
related industries (see, e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; John and 
Ofek, 1995). We follow Rajan et al. (2000) to compute the asset-weighted investment 
opportunities of segments and, thus, we examine whether the distribution of segment size as 
well as the investment opportunities affect the capital allocation process.  
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Table 5.2  
Data Filtering. 
 UK France Germany 
Initial Firm List  13,754 5,045 7,104 
Diversified Firms 4,621 2,830 3,347 
Capex and Total Assets 2,552 1,017 1,824 
Sales  2,493 988 1,742 
Operating Income 2,478 985 1,738 
Financial Firms/Segments 2,010 885 1,408 
Panel A  
Final Sample 
Firm-Years 2,010 885 1,408 
Number of Firms 530 207 311 
This table shows the sample selection process and the number of firms in our study on internal capital markets. 
We include three countries in our analysis, namely, the UK, France and Germany. The time period is between 
2005 and 2010. The number of firm-years at the beginning of the process and after applying the key restriction 
is shown for the three countries in our analysis. Panel A shows the final sample of diversified firms for the three 
countries.  
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5.4.2. Industry Classification  
 As discussed above, the industry estimates for segments in our analysis are based on 
the average/median values of focused firms operating in the same industry. To begin, we 
obtain the list of 48 industry portfolios from French’s website.14 Fama and French (1997) 
start from firms’ 4-digit SIC codes and restructure them into 48 industry portfolios. Similarly, 
we convert firm and segment 4-digit SIC code into a 2-digit SIC code using the list, and then 
match segments of diversified firms with focused firms operating in the same industry at the 
2-digit SIC level. 
The Fama-French (FF) industry classification has been widely used in many academic 
studies in asset pricing, corporate finance, accounting and economics (for a review of these 
studies see, Chan et al., 2007). In general, studies on internal capital markets usually match 
segments and focused firms at the 3- or 2-digit SIC level (Sautner and Villalonga, 2010; 
Hovakimian, 2011). The motivation behind using 3- or 2-digit SIC level is to maximise the 
number of segments matched with focused firms in their industry. To be able to compute 
average or median values, we require at least three focused firms in the same industry.  
 
5.4.3. Adjustment of Monetary Values  
 The data we obtain over a six year period are reported in local currency in which the 
firm operates, i.e. Euros and Pound Sterling. To be able to make a comparison between firms 
in three countries, the monetary values reported in our descriptive tables are in a common 
currency and base year, namely, the Euro (2005). To do this, we start by converting monetary 
values reported in a particular year to their equivalent value with 2005 as the base year. As a 
                                                          
14 The 48 industry portfolios are obtained from French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_48_ind_port.html  
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next step, we convert all GBP values to Euros using the exchange rate in that year. We use 
the exchange rate that corresponds to the firms’ fiscal year-end month i.e. if a firm has year-
end month as December, then we use the end-of-month exchange rate for December.  
For example, consider a UK based firm that releases its financial statements in 
December 2009 and the reporting currency is GBP. We start by adjusting the reported 
monetary values by using 2005 as the base year with the GDP deflator series, and then 
convert them into Euros using December 2005 exchange rate. Similarly, consider a firm 
based in Germany that releases its financial statements in March 2008. As the reporting 
currency is Euros, we only adjust the monetary values by using 2005 as the base year with the 
GDP deflator series. This approach is similar to how Worldscope handled the adoption of 
Euro by newly member countries.15 Prior studies that examine data from multiple countries 
or data over an extensive time period often report figures in a common currency and adjusted 
to a particular base year (e.g. Hovakimian, 2011).  
 
  
                                                          
15 Thomson Financial, Worldscope Database, Issue 6, page 30: 
http://www-cgi.uni-
regensburg.de/Fakultaeten/WiWi/roeder/DownloadsGeneral/Datastream%20Worldscope.pdf  
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Table 5.3  
Adjusting Monetary Values. 
 
 Reporting 
Currency 
Currency after 
adjustment 
Base 
Year 
Method 
UK Pound Sterling Euros 2005 (Reported value x GDP deflator base 
year / GDP deflator for the reporting 
year) x exchange rate. 
France/Germany Euros Euros 2005 Reported value x GDP deflator base 
year / GDP deflator for the reporting 
year. 
This table shows the method of converting all monetary values to a common currency and base year. The source 
of GDP deflators and the exchanges rates are ECB and World Bank.16 Reporting currency of firms in France 
and Germany is Euros (€), and for the UK firms its Pound Sterling (£). We obtain 2005 € equivalent values for 
all countries. For France and Germany, this is done by producing a real terms series using 2005 as base year. For 
the UK, it’s done by, first, producing a real terms series using 2005 as a base year, and secondly, converting the 
values into € using the exchange rate at the end of corresponding fiscal month.  
 
 
  
                                                          
16 The exchange rates of GBP and Euro in 2005 are obtained from European Central Bank and European 
Commission - Eurostat. The GDP deflators for the UK, France and Germany are obtained from the World Bank. 
The base year is 2005. 
European Commission – Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Exchange_rates_and_interest_rates  
European Central Bank: 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html  
World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2005+wbapi_data_value&sor
t=asc&page=1 
Further information on how to use GDP deflator series: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-to-use-the-gdp-deflator-series-practical-examples   
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5.5. Basic Statistics 
 In this section, we present the firm- and segment-level descriptive statistics from the 
UK, France and Germany. The main questions to be addressed are as follows. Are internal 
capital markets active and efficient? What was the impact of the financial crisis on internal 
capital markets? What are the similarities and differences in internal capital markets in 
market-based and bank-based system?  
Although the financial crisis started sometime in 2007 in the US (Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga, 2010), prior literature generally take 2008-2009 as the crisis period (e.g. 
Campello et al., 2011). In our analysis, we classify 2008 as early-crisis, 2009 as mid-crisis 
and 2010 as late-crisis period. During the financial crisis of 2008, the UK, France and 
Germany experienced significant loss of output and sharp fall in economic growth, as 
measured by growth in GDP.17 Figure 1 below shows the GDP growth for the three countries 
between 2004 and 2012 and highlights the impact and magnitude of the financial crisis. The 
growth in GDP declines significantly between 2008 and 2009, and reached the lowest point 
during the year 2009 for all three countries. However, the percentage decline in GDP in 
France appears to be lower compared with the UK and Germany.  
To determine the impact of the financial crisis on our key internal capital market 
variables, we present our data in two sections, namely, non-recession period (2005-2007) and 
recession period (2008-2010). We perform two statistical tests to distinguish the level of 
change in key variable in the two time periods, namely, the t-test and Mann-Whitney test. 
The average and median values which are statistically significant are marked accordingly. 
In line with prior literature, we report that the investment, cash flow and sales decline 
significantly during the financial crisis period in all three countries (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). 
                                                          
17 The GDP growth (annual percentage) figures from 2004 to 2012 are obtained from World Bank for the UK, 
France and Germany. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG  
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In general, we find that diversified firms have 3 segments on average and are significantly 
larger in market-based systems (measured by total assets). This finding is in line with the 
findings of Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2000) who also report that firms in the UK are larger 
than firms in any other European country.  
Additionally, we measure the degree of diversification of a firm by the Herfindahl 
Index (HI). A higher value corresponds to a higher concentration of the firm’s activities in a 
particular industry and, thus, considered to be a more focused firm (Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Rajan et al., 2000). It is calculated as the sum of squared ratios of segment assets over firm 
assets. Hovakimian (2011) reports the average (median) HI of 0.576 (0.550) in the US 
between 1980 and 2008. We report the average (median) HI of 0.416 (0.374) in the UK 
between 2005 and 2010. The HI is much higher in France and Germany as we report average 
(median) HI of 0.564 (0.394) and 0.643 (0.482) during the same period. In the next 
subsection, we begin our discussion by examining the data for the UK, followed by France 
and then Germany. 
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Figure 1 
GDP Growth in the UK, France and Germany. 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
  
– 142 – 
 
5.5.1. Findings from the UK 
In Table 5.4, we present segment level descriptive statistics for the UK between 2005 
and 2010. Our findings indicate a significant fall in the level of sales, investment and cash 
flow during the financial crisis compared with non-recession level (Kahle and Stulz, 2013). 
We also find that firms begin to sell-off their assets during the crisis as we report the average 
(median) total assets as 5.796 (0.237) billion prior to the crisis and 3.568 (0.088) billion 
during the crisis period. The differences in average and median values are statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. This suggests that firms expanded dramatically in the good 
times, and when the crisis hit, they significantly cut back on the scale of their operations.  
 Furthermore, we report the differences in average (median) segment investment level 
between non-recession and recession of 0.004 (0.002). This suggests that managers are more 
cautious about investing in new projects and segments significantly cut back on their 
investment during the recession. In line with this, Hovakimian (2011) reports a significant 
decline in corporate investments during financially constrained periods in the US. For 
example, she finds the average (median) growth in investments during financially relaxed and 
financially constrained period to be 0.008 (0.002) and 0.003 (-0.002), respectively.  
Consistent with falling sales and revenue during the crisis, we also report a significant 
decline in the segments’ investment opportunities during the financial crisis, measured by 
Tobin’s-Q. We report the average (median) Tobin’s-Q as 1.711 (1.532) before the crisis and 
1.420 (1.249) after the crisis. Similarly, Hovakimian (2011) reports average (median) 
Tobin’s-Q of 1.718 (1.476) between 1980 and 2008. Also, Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) 
report a lower Tobin’s-Q of 1.43 between 1980 and 2006. A reason for the differences in 
reported Tobin’s-Q may be that we take our data from an economic boom and a financial 
crisis period. 
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Finally, we observe a small improvement in segment’s return on assets during the 
crisis compared with non-recession level, although statistically insignificant. We find that the 
average return on assets increases from 0.100 in non-recession to 0.124 during the crisis. This 
may be due to the significant downsizing of segment assets by firms in response to the 
financial crisis. Hence, it appears that segments become more productive as managers come 
under pressure to improve the performance of their divisions.  
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Table 5.4  
Descriptive statistics for segments in the UK. 
 Mean Median Standard deviation 
Total Assets (€) 4.354 0.129 24.711 
Sales (€) 3.370 0.169 16.775 
Capex / Total Assets 0.021 0.009 0.046 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.051 0.033 0.071 
Tobin’s-Q 1.561 1.392 1.226 
ROA 0.115 0.109 0.290 
Number of Observations 4,207   
Panel A 
Descriptive statistics during non-recessionary period 
Total Assets (€) 5.796 0.237 24.856 
Sales (€) 4.295 0.304 18.439 
Capex / Total Assets 0.024 0.010 0.051 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.056 0.036 0.071 
Tobin’s-Q 1.711 1.532 0.723 
ROA 0.100 0.129 0.257 
Number of Observations 1,517   
Panel B 
Descriptive statistics during recessionary period 
Total Assets (€) 3.568*** 0.088a 24.598 
Sales (€) 2.836*** 0.116a 15.711 
Capex / Total Assets 0.020** 0.008 0.042 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.047*** 0.031 0.070 
Tobin’s-Q 1.420*** 1.249c 1.414 
ROA 0.124 0.118 0.307 
Number of Observations 2,690   
The table shows segment level statistics and the time period is between 2005 and 2010. We take non-
recessionary period as 2005-2007 and recessionary period as 2008-2010. The computations of variables (e.g. 
Tobin’s-Q and ROA) are discussed above. Number of observations shows the segment years. The total assets 
and sales figures are in billion and adjusted to 2005 Euros. Using t-test (Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), 
the Mean and Median values marked with *** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are different from non-recession values at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level respectively.  
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As a next step, we present descriptive statistics at firm level for the UK between 2005 
and 2010 in Table 5.5. As mentioned above, the UK being a market-based system has 
considerably higher number of firms listed on the exchange than France or Germany. 
Similarly, in the cross-country evidence provided by Lins and Sarvaes (1999) shows a 
significantly higher number of firms in the UK than in Germany. In general, we find that 
firms are larger in the UK than in other two countries. We report the average (median) total 
assets of a diversified firm to be 12.676 (0.457) billion Euros for the UK.  
 Additionally, we report that the average (median) capital expenditure of firms is 
around 5.6% (4.0%) of total assets of the firm before the crisis and it significantly declines to 
4.9% (2.9%) during the crisis. This is likely to be due to lack of financial resources available 
through external markets (Hovakimian, 2011) and falling cash flow, sales and investment 
opportunities (Kahle and Stulz, 2013) indicating the severity of the crisis. In fact, we find that 
the average (median) cash flow also declines from 11.6% (11.3%) before the crisis to 8.2% 
(9.7%) during the crisis. 
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Table 5.5  
Diversified firms in the UK. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Total Assets (€) 12.676 0.457 39.203 
Sales (€) 9.946 0.425 32.963 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.094 0.102 0.168 
Capex / Total Assets 0.052 0.033 0.065 
Number of segments 3.003 3.000 1.393 
Herfindahl Index 0.416 0.374 0.243 
Number of Observations  2,010   
Panel A  
Summary statistics during non-recession period 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.116 0.113 0.145 
Capex / Total Assets 0.056 0.040 0.062 
Number of Observations  747   
Panel B 
Summary statistics during recession period 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.082*** 0.097 0.178 
Capex / Total Assets 0.049** 0.029 0.066 
Number of Observations  1,263   
This tables shows firm-level variables between 2005 and 2010. The non-recession and recession periods are 
between 2005-2007 and 2008-2010, respectively. The total assets and sales figures are in billion and adjusted to 
2005 Euros. The variables are discussed above. Number of observations shows the firm years. Using the t-test 
(Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), the Mean and Median values marked with *** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are 
different from non-recession values at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
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In Table 5.6, we present internal capital market variables before and during the 
financial crisis. The internal capital markets activity and efficiency variables are discussed in 
Section 5.2. Our main findings remain in line with Hovakimian (2011) and Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga (2010) as we find inefficient internal capital markets within multi-segment firms, 
and efficiency significantly increases during financially constrained period compared with 
financially relaxed period. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that firms in the UK 
experience deep cutbacks in investments and significantly reduce the level of cross-
subsidisation of capital resources during the crisis.  
For example, the size of internal capital markets in the UK decreased significantly 
during the crisis period. We report the average (median) of Size to be 0.418 (0.112) before 
the crisis and 0.204 (0.082) after the crisis. The change in average and median values in the 
two time periods is statistically significant at 1 percent level. This suggests that falling 
sales/revenue and a more stringent financial environment during the crisis leads to fewer 
resources available for reallocation. In addition, managers are more cautious about financing 
new investments during times of uncertainty. Thus, there is likely to be a lesser need for 
cross-subsidisation of capital resources.  
In line with this, we find that the efficiency of internal capital markets significantly 
improves during the crisis. For example, we report the average (median) of RVA before the 
crisis as -0.033 (-0.001) and -0.002 (-0.000) in recession period. The change in efficiency 
before and after crisis is statistically significant at 5 percent level. The significant fall in 
internal capital allocations along with the increase in efficiency indicates that management 
cutback significantly on inefficient capital allocations. This evidence is in line with internal 
capital markets becoming more efficient during the crisis (Hovakimian, 2011). This suggests 
that in the presence of free cash flow during financially relaxed periods, managers are more 
likely to misallocate resources (Jensen, 1986; Hovakimian, 2011). 
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Consistent with increased financial constraints and decreased investment 
opportunities during the financial crisis, we find that Tobin’s-Q significantly declines during 
the crisis in the UK. This suggests that a fall in investment opportunities results in reduced 
level of intra-segmental capital allocations within multi-segment firms. On the other hand, we 
find that segment ROA increases during the crisis. This is likely to be due to the significant 
assets sell-off activity undertaken by firms during the crisis as firms attempt to slim down and 
become more focused in a dynamic environment (Campello et al., 2011; Kahle and Stulz, 
2013).  
In line with Kahle and Stulz (2013), we find that diversified firms considerably reduce 
investments in new projects during the crisis, as we report significant decline in segments’ 
capital expenditure across the firm. For example, we report the average Capex variable falls 
from 2.4% prior to the crisis to 2% after the crisis. Furthermore, the firm- and industry-
adjusted investment also shows a significant decline, which is consistent with the results 
reported earlier.  
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Table 5.6 
Internal capital markets in the UK. 
 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Number of 
Observations 
Capex 0.021 0.009 0.046 4,207 
Ind-Adj Capex 0.008 0.006 0.149 4,207 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.029 -0.001 0.204 4,207 
Size 0.283 0.019 0.690 2,010 
RVA -0.014 -0.000 0.173 2,010 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.561 1.392 1.226 4,207 
Segment ROA 0.115 0.109 0.290 4,207 
Panel A 
Descriptive statistics during non-recession period 
 
Capex 0.024 0.010 0.051 1,517 
Ind-Adj Capex -0.029 -0.004 0.199 1,517 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.055 0.000 0.287 1,517 
Size 0.418 0.112 0.973 747 
RVA -0.033 -0.001 0.259 747 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.791 1.592 0.723 1,517 
Segment ROA 0.100 0.129 0.257 1,517 
Panel B 
Descriptive statistics during crisis period 
 
Capex 0.020** 0.008a 0.042 2,690 
Ind-Adj Capex 0.031*** 0.009a 0.104 2690 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.014*** -0.001b 0.136 2,690 
Size 0.204*** 0.082a 0.430 1,263 
RVA -0.002*** -0.000b 0.085 1,263 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.420*** 1.249 1.414 2,690 
Segment ROA 0.124 0.118 0.307 2,690 
This table shows internal capital market variables between 2005 and 2010. The non-recession period is 2005-
2007 and crisis period is 2008-2010. The Size and RVA of internal capital markets are computed at firm level 
and all other variables are computed at segment level. The computations of variables are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Number of observations show segment years. The mean, median and standard deviation are given for pre- and 
recession period. Using t-test (Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), the Mean and Median values marked with 
*** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are different from non-recession values at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively.  
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5.5.2. Findings from France 
 Table 5.7 shows the descriptive results for segments of diversified firms in France 
between 2005 and 2010. We observe that segments in France appear to be much smaller 
(measured by total assets) compared with segments of diversified firms in the UK. However, 
this difference is to a higher extent when we compare the average values and to a lower 
extent when we compare the median values. For example, we report the average (median) 
segment assets of 2.027 (0.130) billion Euros in France. On the other hand, we report average 
(median) segment assets of 4.354 (0.129) billion Euros in the UK.  
In line with the findings from the UK, we find that segments in France significantly 
cut back on their asset base during the crisis period. This appears to suggest that managers 
allowed their segments to grow considerably during the good times, and scale back 
significantly during the crisis. However, the impact of the financial crisis on segment 
investment appears to be less severe compared with the UK. For instance, we find that the 
average (median) decline in segment investment in France from non-recession to recession 
period of 0.002 (0.001). This suggests that segments in France cut back on capital 
expenditure during the crisis, but not as much as segments in the UK during the same period. 
Furthermore, we find that investment opportunities decline considerably during the 
crisis as we report the average (median) segment Tobin’s-Q of 1.468 (1.334) in non-recession 
and 1.347 (1.188) in recession period. This significant shift in Tobin’s-Q shows the severity 
of the crisis and fall in the level of good projects available for investment. However, the 
change in Tobin’s-Q from non-recession to recession period is lower in France compared 
with the UK. This appears to suggest that firms in the UK experienced much bigger decrease 
in Tobin’s-Q compared with firms in France. Also, firms in the UK experience much steeper 
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fall in segment investments, and sales during the same period compared with segments in 
France.  
Table 5.7  
Descriptive statistics for segments in France. 
 Mean Median Standard deviation 
Total Assets (€) 2.027 0.130 6.203 
Sales (€) 1.731 0.113 6.220 
Capex / Total Assets 0.020 0.009 0.026 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.041 0.021 0.078 
Tobin’s-Q 1.405 1.276 0.610 
ROA 0.099 0.084 0.751 
Number of Observations 1,888   
Panel A 
Descriptive statistics during non-recessionary period 
Total Assets (€) 2.331 0.139 7.174 
Sales (€) 1.742 0.104 6.230 
Capex / Total Assets 0.021 0.009 0.027 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.045 0.024 0.073 
Tobin’s-Q 1.468 1.334 0.659 
ROA 0.124 0.089 0.971 
Number of Observations 909   
Panel B 
Descriptive statistics during recessionary period 
Total Assets (€) 1.759*** 0.119a 5.186 
Sales (€) 1.702* 0.126a 6.213 
Capex / Total Assets 0.019** 0.008 0.025 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.036*** 0.018a 0.083 
Tobin’s-Q 1.347** 1.188c 0.554 
ROA 0.089** 0.083 0.434 
Number of Observations 934   
The table shows segment level statistics and the time period is between 2005 and 2010. We take non-
recessionary period as 2005-2007 and recessionary period as 2008-2010. The computations of variables (e.g. 
Tobin’s-Q and ROA) are discussed above. Number of observations shows the segment years. The total assets 
and sales figures are in billion and adjusted to 2005 Euros. Using t-test (Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), 
the Mean and Median values marked with *** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are different from non-recession values at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
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 In Table 5.8 we present descriptive statistics at firm-level. In general, we find results 
suggesting that the financial crisis leads to a significant decline in investments and cash flow 
at firm level as well as segment level in France. For example, we report the average (median) 
investment level as 6.2% (4.7%) prior to the crisis and 4.7% (3.6%) during the crisis period. 
The difference in average value in the two time periods is statistically significant at 1 percent 
level.  
Furthermore, we find that cash flow from operations generally tend to decline during 
the crisis. We report the average (median) cash flow as 0.079 (0.072) in non-recession and 
0.062 (0.063) in the recession period. The difference in mean is statistically significant at 1 
percent level. The segment level results coupled with firm level results give a clear picture of 
the impact of the financial crisis. 
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Table 5.8  
Diversified firms in France. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Total Assets (€) 8.351 0.615  20.681 
Sales (€) 6.067 0.515  14.961 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.070 0.067 0.088 
Capex / Total Assets 0.054 0.041 0.061 
Number of segments 2.835 3.000 1.374 
Herfindahl Index 0.564 0.394 0.774 
Number of Observations  885   
Panel A 
Summary statistics during non-recession period. 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.079 0.072 0.084 
Capex / Total Assets 0.062 0.047 0.073 
Number of Observations  408   
Panel B 
Summary statistics during recession period. 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.062*** 0.063 0.092 
Capex / Total Assets 0.047*** 0.036 0.045 
Number of Observations  477   
This tables shows firm-level variables between 2005 and 2010. The non-recession and recession periods are 
between 2005-2007 and 2008-2010, respectively. The total assets and sales figures are in billion and adjusted to 
2005 Euros. The variables are discussed above. Number of observations shows the firm years. Using the t-test 
(Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), the Mean and Median values marked with *** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are 
different from non-recession values at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
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As a next step, we present our findings on internal capital markets from the French 
data in Table 5.9. In comparison to the results from the UK, internal capital markets are 
affected significantly by the onset of the financial crisis. However, we find that internal 
capital market activity increased significantly during the crisis compared to the non-recession 
level. For example, we report the average (median) of Size as 0.567 (0.155) prior to the crisis 
and 0.856 (0.163) after the crisis. The difference in mean in the two time periods is 
statistically significant at 5 percent level.  
The significant increase in internal capital market activity during the crisis in France 
whereas a decrease in internal capital markets in the UK during the same period shows the 
differences in management decisions in these two countries. Internal capital markets played a 
greater role in the allocation of capital resources to finance investment projects across the 
firm during the crisis in France. Interestingly, we find that the efficiency of internal capital 
markets declined during the crisis. This is in contrast to the improvements in the efficiency of 
internal capital markets during the recession period reported for the UK. It appears that more 
capital is flowing towards weaker segments in France during the crisis. For example, we 
report average (median) RVA of 0.003 (-0.000) before the crisis and -0.018 (-0.004) in 
recession period. The differences in the average RVA is statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. This may suggest that management attempted to help those segments in financial 
difficulty, regardless of their investment opportunities. 
Similar to the findings for the UK, we find that the financial crisis negatively affects 
the investment rate of segments of diversified firms in France. For example, the variable 
Capex declines from 2.1% before the crisis and 1.9% during the crisis period. However, in 
comparison with the UK, segments in France appear to experience lesser decline in 
investments. Similarly, we find that firm- and industry-adjusted investment increased during 
the crisis. This suggests that internal capital markets were successful in limiting the impact of 
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credit and cash flow shocks on segment investment to a greater extent in France. It may be 
that French firms experienced less stringent environment and lesser financial constraints 
during the crisis.   
 Lastly, in line with falling sales and cash flow, and significant asset sell-off 
undertaken by firms, we find that Tobin’s-Q significantly decreases during the crisis 
indicating reduced investment opportunities compared with non-recession level. The average 
segment Tobin’s-Q declines from 1.468 prior to the crisis to 1.347 after the crisis, difference 
being statistically significant at 1 percent level. In line with this finding, return on assets also 
decreases during this period; however, the difference is insignificant at any level. 
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Table 5.9 
Internal capital markets in France. 
 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Number of 
Observations 
Capex 0.020 0.009 0.026 1,888 
Ind-Adj Capex -0.044 -0.003 0.797 1,888 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.032 0.003 0.522 1,888 
Size 0.765 0.157 2.092 885 
RVA -0.008 -0.000 0.089 885 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.405 1.276 0.610 1,888 
Segment ROA 0.099 0.084 0.751 1,888 
Panel A 
Descriptive statistics during non-recession period. 
 
Capex 0.021 0.009 0.027 909 
Ind-Adj Capex -0.024 -0.004 0.506 909 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.016 0.004 0.449 909 
Size 0.567 0.155 1.557 408 
RVA 0.003 -0.000 0.056 408 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.468 1.334 0.659 909 
Segment ROA 0.124 0.089 0.971 909 
Panel B 
Descriptive statistics during crisis period. 
 
Capex 0.019* 0.008c 0.025 934 
Ind-Adj Capex -0.061*** -0.003 0.994 934 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.047 0.001 0.581 934 
Size 0.856** 0.163 2.490 477 
RVA -0.018** -0.004 0.113 477 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.347*** 1.188a 0.554 934 
Segment ROA 0.089 0.083 0.434 934 
This table shows internal capital market variables between 2005 and 2010. The non-recession period is 2005-
2007 and crisis period is 2008-2010. The Size and RVA of internal capital markets are computed at firm level 
and all other variables are computed at segment level. The computations of variables are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Number of observations show segment years. The mean, median and standard deviation are given for pre- and 
recession period. Using t-test (Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), the Mean and Median values marked with 
*** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are different from non-recession values at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
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5.5.3. Findings from Germany 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the German financial system is much more bank orientated 
compared with UK and France (Allen and Gale, 2000; Rajan et al., 2003). In addition, the 
Figure 1 above shows that Germany experienced a significant fall in GDP between the year 
2008 and 2009, and significantly rises to non-recession level in 2010. On the other hand, UK 
and France experience a much slower recovery.  
In Table 5.10 we present our descriptive statistics at segment level in Germany 
between 2005 and 2010. In general, the segments of diversified firms in Germany are smaller 
in size (as measured by total assets) than segments of diversified in the UK and France. 
Unlike our results from the UK and France, we find that total assets of segments did not 
decline significantly during the crisis period in Germany. We report the average (median) 
segment asset base of 1.835 (0.073) billion Euros prior to the crisis and 1.759 (0.077) billion 
Euros during the crisis. The change in asset base is insignificant at any significance level. 
This may suggest that firms in Germany experienced a less stringent environment or firms 
did not allow their segments to expand beyond their optimal size prior to the crisis and, 
therefore, did not scale back on assets during the crisis period.  
Additionally, segments in Germany appear to invest less on average than their 
counterparts in other two countries. However, the financial crisis has a negative and 
significant impact on their operations. In line with Kahle and Stulz (2013) we find a 
significant fall in cash flow and capital expenditure across firms during the crisis. For 
example, the average (median) capital expenditure declines from 2.2% (1.1%) to 1.9% 
(1.0%). The difference in mean values is statistically significant at 1 percent level.  
In contrast to findings from UK and France, we find that segment investment 
opportunities significantly increase during the crisis period. We report the average (median) 
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Tobin’s-Q of 1.360 (1.248) before the crisis and 1.596 (1.329) during the crisis. In 
comparison, Sautner and Villalonga (2010) find average (median) Tobin’s-Q of 1.55 (1.20) in 
Germany between 2000 and 2006. To investigate the rise in Tobin’s-Q during the crisis, we 
analyse the change in Tobin’s-Q in each year between 2008 and 2010, and find that Tobin’s-
Q declines during 2008 and 2009 (although insignificantly) compared with non-recession 
level; however, it significantly rises in 2010 as Germany rapidly emerges out of the recession. 
The increase in average Tobin’s-Q in the recession period compared to the non-recession 
period appears to be driven by significant increase in Tobin’s-Q in the year 2010. A stronger 
Tobin’s-Q in 2010 suggests an increase in confidence in economic outlook and general 
certainty about the investment opportunities in Germany.  
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Table 5.10 
Descriptive statistics for segments in Germany. 
 Mean Median Standard deviation 
Total Assets (€) 1.799 0.076 8.400 
Sales (€) 1.828 0.095 6.438 
Capex / Total Assets 0.021 0.010 0.025 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.046 0.028 0.067 
Tobin’s-Q 1.476 1.298 0.834 
ROA 0.143 0.108 0.312 
Number of Observations 3,085   
Panel A 
Descriptive statistics during non-recessionary period 
Total Assets (€) 1.835 0.073 9.096 
Sales (€) 1.686 0.084 5.757 
Capex / Total Assets 0.022 0.011 0.026 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.050 0.030 0.070 
Tobin’s-Q 1.360 1.248 0.725 
ROA 0.142 0.111 0.307 
Number of Observations 1,564   
Panel B 
Descriptive statistics during recessionary period 
Total Assets (€) 1.759 0.077 7.540 
Sales (€) 1.984 0.106 7.105 
Capex / Total Assets 0.019*** 0.010 0.024 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.042*** 0.027c 0.063 
Tobin’s-Q 1.596*** 1.329 0.918 
ROA 0.143 0.107 0.317 
Number of Observations 1,521   
The table shows segment level statistics and the time period is between 2005 and 2010. We take non-
recessionary period as 2005-2007 and recessionary period as 2008-2010. The computations of variables (e.g. 
Tobin’s-Q and ROA) are discussed above. Number of observations shows the segment years. The total assets 
and sales figures are in billion and adjusted to 2005 Euros. Using t-test (Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), 
the Mean and Median values marked with *** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are different from non-recession values at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
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In Table 5.11 we present descriptive statistics at firm level in Germany between 2005 
and 2010. We report the average (median) total assets of diversified firms to be 8.398 (0.298) 
billion Euros in Germany between 2005 and 2010. Similarly, Sautner and Villalonga (2010) 
report the average (median) total assets of firms in Germany as 6.715 (0.136) billion Euros 
between 2000 and 2006. Diversified firms in France and Germany appear to be significantly 
smaller in size (as measured by total assets of the firm) compared with diversified firms in the 
UK, particularly prior to the crisis. This suggests that firms in the UK grew substantially prior 
to the financial crisis and then significantly cut back on assets during the crisis. However, this 
was not the case with firms in bank-based systems.  
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Table 5.11  
Diversified firms in Germany. 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Total Assets (€) 8.398 0.298  27.814 
Sales (€) 6.305 0.339  18.093 
Cash flow/Total Assets 0.068 0.079 0.128 
Capex / Total Assets 0.053 0.038 0.067 
Number of segments 2.871 3.000 1.416 
Herfindahl Index 0.643 0.482 0.499 
Number of Observations  1,408   
Panel A 
Summary statistics during non-recession period. 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.069 0.082 0.129 
Capex / Total Assets 0.056 0.040 0.079 
Number of Observations  762   
Panel B 
Summary statistics during recession period. 
Cash flow / Total Assets 0.064 0.075 0.126 
Capex / Total Assets 0.049** 0.035 0.049 
Number of Observations  646   
This tables shows firm-level variables between 2005 and 2010. The non-recession and recession periods are 
between 2005-2007 and 2008-2010, respectively. The total assets and sales figures are in billion and adjusted to 
2005 Euros. The variables are discussed above. Number of observations shows the firm years. Using the t-test 
(Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), the Mean and Median values marked with *** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are 
different from non-recession values at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
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Lastly, Table 5.12 presents the findings on internal capital markets from the German 
data. Similar to the UK, we find that diversified firms significantly decrease internal capital 
market activity during the crisis period. We report the average (median) of Size as 0.436 
(0.169) prior to the crisis and 0.325 (0.125) during the crisis. The change in average and 
median values in the two time periods is statistically significant at 1 percent level. This 
suggests that managers were more cautious about new investments and cutback on intra-
segmental transfers of resources during times of uncertainty. These findings are in contrast 
with the results from France where we find the internal capital market activity increases 
significantly. 
In line with the findings of Sautner and Villalonga (2010), we find that internal capital 
markets efficiently allocate resources during financially relaxed periods in Germany. 
However, we do not find any evidence to suggest that internal capital markets become more 
efficient or inefficient during the crisis compared to non-recession levels. We report the 
average (median) RVA to be 0.001 (-0.001) before the crisis and -0.002 (-0.000) after the 
crisis. The change in the efficiency variable in the two time periods is statistically 
insignificant. In general, internal capital markets appear to be much less inefficient in 
Germany compared with inefficient internal capital markets reported in UK and France.  
Furthermore, the impact of the financial crisis on segment investments is comparable 
in the three countries. We find segment investments (Capex) significantly declined during the 
crisis to 1.9% from 2.2% of total assets during non-recession. The change in investments in 
the two periods is statistically significant at 1 percent level. This is in line with theory that 
fewer resources are available for investment during recessionary periods and managers are 
generally more cautious about new investments. However, the decrease in segment 
investment in Germany is to a lesser extent than the UK suggesting that segments of 
diversified firms in the UK experienced a more financially stringent environment. 
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Lastly, we find that the segment investment opportunities before and after the crisis 
change significantly. However, we find that Tobin’s-Q increase during the recession period 
compared to the non-recession level. As discussed earlier, we find that Tobin’s-Q decreases 
in 2008 and 2009, although not significantly, and then increases sharply in 2010. This is 
likely to indicate the growing confidence among investors about the economic outlook and 
investment opportunities in Germany.  
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Table 5.12 
Internal capital markets in Germany. 
 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Number of 
Observations 
Capex 0.021 0.010 0.025 3,085 
Ind-Adj Capex -0.015 0.007 0.279 3,085 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.016 -0.000 0.185 3,085 
Size 0.385 0.149 0.697 1,408 
RVA 0.000 -0.000 0.026 1,408 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.476 1.298 0.834 3,085 
Segment ROA 0.143 0.108 0.312 3,085 
Panel A 
Descriptive statistics during non-recession period. 
 
Capex 0.022 0.011 0.026 1,564 
Ind-Adj Capex -0.029 0.005 0.294 1,564 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.018 0.002 0.202 1,564 
Size 0.436 0.169 0.715 762 
RVA 0.001 -0.001 0.028 762 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.360 1.248 0.725 1,564 
Segment ROA 0.142 0.111 0.307 1,564 
Panel B 
Descriptive statistics during crisis period. 
 
Capex 0.019*** 0.010c 0.024 1,521 
Ind-Adj Capex -0.000*** 0.009a 0.261 1,521 
Firm-Ind-Adj Capex 0.013 -0.001a 0.164 1,521 
Size 0.325*** 0.125a 0.671 646 
RVA -0.002 -0.000 0.022 646 
Segment Tobin’s-Q 1.596*** 1.329a 0.918 1,521 
Segment ROA 0.143 0.107c 0.317 1,521 
This table shows internal capital market variables between 2005 and 2010. The non-recession period is 2005-
2007 and crisis period is 2008-2010. The Size and RVA of internal capital markets are computed at firm level 
and all other variables are computed at segment level. The computations of variables are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Number of observations show segment years. The mean, median and standard deviation are given for pre- and 
recession period. Using t-test (Mann-Whitney two sample statistic), the Mean and Median values marked with 
*** (a), ** (b) or * (c) are different from non-recession values at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
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5.6. Summary  
 In this chapter, we examine two main methods of determining operation and 
efficiency of internal capital markets. The first approach was put forward by Shin and Stulz 
(1998) who build on the investment-cash flow model (Fazzari et al., 1988) and examine the 
relationship between investment and cash flow of other segments within the diversified firm. 
The second approach was developed by Rajan et al. (2000) which directly measures the 
efficiency of internal capital markets through two methods, namely, the absolute value added 
model and relative value added model. 
 The firm- and segment-level data as well as analysts’ earnings forecast information is 
obtained for public listed companies in the UK, France and Germany from Datastream and 
I/B/E/S. We apply a number of restrictions on our data, such as excluding firms with key data 
items missing. We present basic descriptive statistics for the three countries and find that 
firms across the three countries significantly cut back on investments during the recent 
financial crisis. In line with prior literature, we report a significant decline in cash flow, sales 
and investment opportunities during the crisis period. Our results from the analysis on 
internal capital markets variables indicate that they are active and operate inefficiently in 
general. However, internal capital markets are more efficient in bank-based systems. 
 In Chapter 6, we present and discuss our findings on the operation and efficiency of 
internal capital markets in the UK, France and Germany. In addition, we examine the impact 
of the financial crisis on internal capital market activity in these three countries. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 7 we present and discuss our findings on the relationship between 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors and internal capital market activity.  
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CHAPTER 6 – FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
AND FINANCIAL CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK, FRANCE AND 
GERMANY 
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6.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, internal capital markets facilitate the allocation of 
resources within multi-segment firms (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). On the one 
hand, they can enable multi-segment firms to pool capital resources and finance good 
investment projects of segments which could not have been financed otherwise (Stein, 1997, 
2003). On the other hand, prior literature suggests that internal capital markets generally 
misallocate resources and finance poor investment projects (e.g. Hovakimian, 2011).  
More recent studies have shown that country characteristics as well as characteristics 
of the firm can affect the operations and efficiency of internal capital markets (e.g. Gugler et 
al., 2013; Buchuk et al., 2014). Furthermore, studies examining the impact of a financial 
crisis on the internal capital markets operations and efficiency across countries have generally 
produced mixed findings (Lee et al., 2008; Hovakimian, 2011).  
In this chapter, we present and discuss the results from our empirical analysis on the 
operation and efficiency of internal capital markets in market- and bank-based systems. Our 
main research questions are (i) whether diversified firms based in these two distinct financial 
systems operate internal capital markets, (ii) are internal capital markets efficient or 
inefficient, (iii) what impact did the financial crisis have on their operation and efficiency, 
and (iv) the similarities and differences in investment policies of multi-segment firms based 
in the three countries, namely, the UK, France and Germany.  
 In Section 6.2, we begin by discussing our model to determine whether internal 
capital markets are active and efficient. In Section 6.3, we present and discuss our results 
from the multivariate analysis. As a next step, we discuss the cross country variations in the 
activity and efficiency of internal capital markets in Section 6.4. The robustness of our 
findings are discussed in Section 6.5. Finally, we summarise the chapter in Section 6.6.  
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6.2. The Basic Model 
The main objective of the study is to determine whether diversified firms actively 
engage in the transfer of capital resources between segments and whether these capital 
allocations are efficient or inefficient. As discussed in Chapter 5, there are two main methods 
to determine the activity and efficiency of internal capital markets which have been used 
extensively in the prior literature (for example see, Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) for a 
literature review of studies on internal capital markets). In the following subsections, we 
describe our model to determine the operations and efficiency of internal capital markets. 
 
6.2.1. Investment-Cash Flow Model 
We follow Shin and Stulz (1998) to examine the relationship between investment and 
cash flow. As discussed in Chapter 5, this approach builds on the investment-cash flow model 
put forward by Fazzari et al. (1988) by examining the relationship between segment 
investment and its own cash flow as well as cash flow of other segments within the firm. The 
intuition here is that a rise in cash flow of a segment is likely to increase the level of 
resources available for reallocation at firm level and, therefore, increase the level of resources 
available for investments across the firm. If internal capital markets are efficient then capital 
resources should be directed towards segments with good opportunities. Thus, our primary 
variable of interest in our analysis is the segment investment level, which is the capital 
expenditure of segments of diversified firms.  
 
Ii,j(t)
TA j(t−1)  =  β1 x Si,j(t−1)− Si,j(t−2)Si,j(t−2) + β2 x Ci,j(t)TA j(t−1) + β3 x Oi,j(t)TA j(t−1) + β4 x Tobin’s − Qi,j(t −1) +  ni,j +  ei,j(t)                    (6.1) 
– 169 – 
 
 
In Equation (6.1), i and j refer to segment i of firm j, and t is the year of disclosure. 
Our dependent variable I is the capital expenditure of segment i of the firm j in the reporting 
year t, normalised by firm assets at the beginning of the year. Our objective is to determine 
how investment of a segment varies with cash flow of other segments within the firm as well 
as its own cash flow. If segments within the conglomerate are financially interdependent, 
then a financial shock to one segment will affect the cost of finance of another segment 
(Lamont, 1997). For example, cash flow generated by one segment may be used to finance 
investment projects in another segment across the firm (Shin and Stulz, 1998) and, therefore, 
cash flow shocks to one segment can affect the investment level of other segments within the 
firm.  
Thus, the main independent variable in our analysis is the 𝑜𝑖,𝑗, which is the sum of 
cash flow of all other segments within the firm, excluding its own. This variable is a proxy 
for resources available for reallocation within the firm and it has been used extensively in the 
prior literature (e.g. Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Hovakimian, 2011). For example, 
Lamont (1997) finds that large oil firms in the US used cash flow of cash-rich segments to 
finance investment projects of other segments across the firm. Also, Shin and Stulz (1998) 
find that large segments usually subsidise investment of smaller segments within the firm. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) find that diversified firms tend to subsidise loss-making segments, 
suggesting that managers may misallocate free cash flow (Jensen, 1986).  
In addition, we include the variable 𝑐𝑖,𝑗 in our analysis which is the segment’s own 
cash flow, a proxy for availability of own resources. For example, Shin and Stulz (1998) find 
that segments’ investment is more sensitive to its own cash flow than the cash flow of other 
segments within the firm. This suggests that an adverse cash flow shock to its own cash flow 
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has a larger impact on investment than an adverse shock to cash flow of other segments 
within the firm. This is of particular importance as segments are likely to face adverse cash 
flow shocks during the financial crisis (Kahle and Stulz, 2013) and, hence, may rely more on 
cash flow of other segments for financing their investment projects during this period.  
Additionally, we include Tobin’s-Q as a proxy for investment opportunities 𝑐𝑖,𝑗(𝑡−1). 
Internal capital market theory promotes that resources should be used to finance good 
investment projects i.e. resources should flow towards high-Tobin’s-Q segments and away 
from low-Tobin’s-Q segments. If internal capital markets are efficient then a segments’ 
investment should rise or fall with increasing or decreasing investment opportunities. 
Therefore, we expect investment to be positively related to Tobin’s-Q. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, Tobin’s-Q cannot be computed at segment level and, therefore, it is estimated by 
taking the median Tobin’s-Q of focused firms operating in the same industry.  
Subsequently, we also include Sales Growth (𝑆𝑖,𝑗) in our analysis, which is the Sales 
(t-1) minus Sales (t-2) divided by Sales (t-2). Thus, it’s the change in sales or revenue of 
segment over prior reporting year as a proxy for growth. A higher sales growth of a segment 
is likely to indicate more profitable segments, and such segments are likely to invest more 
than segments which experience lesser growth in sales. Unlike Tobin’s-Q which is 
constructed using industry average variable, sales growth is constructed using segment level 
data. We assume the error term has two components, and ni,j is specific to segment. 
To determine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on our key variables, we 
include time dummy variables in our model. We pay particular attention to the variables 2008 
(early-crisis), 2009 (late-crisis) and 2010 (late-crisis). These variables take a value of 1 if the 
reporting year is 2008, 2009 or 2010, respectively, and zero otherwise. The year 2005 is the 
reference point in our analysis. The recent financial crisis exposed fundamental weaknesses 
– 171 – 
 
in the global financial system (Kahle and Stulz, 2013; Rudolph and Schwetzler, 2013) and 
had enormous economic costs in terms of lost output, higher unemployment and weakened 
public finances all across Europe.18 In short, during the build-up to the crisis lenders and 
borrowers took on excessive and ill-understood risks, and banks operated with excessive 
leverage and inadequate liquidity. When the crisis hit, banks were not in a position to absorb 
losses of such magnitude. To ensure continuous running of the basic banking services, 
governments and central banks injected vast amounts of capital and liquidity into the 
financial system. 
 
6.2.2. Relative Value Added Model 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, we follow Rajan et al. (2000) and obtain the two additional 
measures of capital allocations within multi-segment firms, namely, the industry-adjusted 
investment and firm- and industry-adjusted investment of segments. These variables indicate 
whether a segment of a diversified firm invests more or less than it would have been able to 
invest if it was a single segment firm. Furthermore, we measure the size of an internal capital 
market by taking the absolute sum of subsidies and transfers of capital resources within the 
firm in a particular year, and compute the relative value added by allocation (RVA) as a direct 
measure of internal capital market efficiency.  
 
Ii,jind(t) =  β1 x Qi,j(t − 1) + β2 x ROAi,j(t − 1) + β3 x Crisisi,t + β4 x Crisisi,t x  ROAi,j(t − 1) + β5 x Crisisi,t x Qi,j(t − 1) + �Control Variablesi,j(t)� + ni,j +  ei,j(t)           (6.2) 
                                                          
18 For detailed discussion on the impact of the financial crisis in Europe see, Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, 
Consequences and Responses, European Commission, 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf  
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In Equation (6.2), the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted investment of 
segment i of firm j in year t. We also repeat the analysis by setting the dependent variable as 
firm- and industry- adjusted investment or Size of internal capital markets. Rajan et al. (2000) 
argue that when segments are expected to make an efficient investment, headquarters should 
allocate more resources to segments with good investment opportunities and away from 
segments with poor investment opportunities. However, empirical results suggest that weaker 
segments generally invest more than industry averages (Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and 
Stein, 2000). We include the variable Tobin’s-Q as a proxy for segment investment 
opportunities in our analysis. In addition to the proxy for investment opportunities, we 
include the variable ROA (return on assets at segment level at beginning of the year) as a 
measure of segment profitability. 
Given that our objective is to determine the impact of the financial crisis on segment 
investment, we include the Crisis variable which takes a value of 1 if the reporting year is 
2008 or later, and takes a value of 0 otherwise. Prior literature suggests that internal capital 
markets allocate more resources to finance investment projects of high-Tobin’s-Q segments 
during financially constrained periods (Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 
2010). However, other studies have provided mixed evidence on their role and efficiency 
during a crisis (e.g., Lee, Park and Shin, 2008). We also include interaction of segment 
performance and investment opportunities with financial crisis variable. In Section 6.4, we 
extend the model to include country-dummy variables by pooling the data for the three 
countries in order to distinguish between the effects of the crisis on internal capital 
allocations in market- and bank-based financial systems. 
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As a next step, we set the dependent variable as the efficiency of internal capital 
markets, i.e. RVA. In Equation (6.3), j refers to the firm and t refers to the reporting year. 
Prior research from the US finds that internal capital markets generally operate inefficiently 
(Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Ozbas and Scharfstein 20110), however, 
firms improve their capital allocation process during financially constrained periods 
(Hovakimian, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). In contrast, Lee et al. (2008) find 
that efficient internal capital markets stop functioning after the financial crisis of 1997 in 
Korea.  
 
RVAj,t  =  β1 x Size_ICMj,t + β2 x HIj,t + β3 x Crisisj,t x Size_ICMj,t + β4 x Crisisj,t x HIj,t +                   β5 x Crisisj,t + �Control Variablesj,t� +  nj + ej,t              
(6.3) 
 
Our objectives are (i) to determine the impact of the financial crisis on the efficiency 
of internal capital markets, and (ii) the relationship between the size and efficiency of internal 
capital markets. In particular, we discuss the similarities and differences in internal capital 
market efficiency before and during the financial crisis in two distinct financial systems. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, we argue that diversified firms in bank-based systems are likely to 
experience less stringent environment due to their close relationship with banks (e.g. Hoshi et 
al., 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) and, therefore, managers in these countries are likely to 
come under less pressure to significantly improve their capital allocation process. 
Finally, our control variables include HI, the Herfindahl Index, to determine whether 
diversity has an impact on our key internal capital market variables. A higher HI corresponds 
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to a higher concentration of the firm’s activities in a particular industry and, thus, a more 
focused firm. We also include the size of the firm and segment as control variables in our 
analysis as prior research has shown that smaller segments within large, well-diversified 
firms are usually allocated more resources and tend to invest more than their industry 
average.  
Additionally, prior literature has argued that leverage creates pressure to service debt 
obligations (Hovakimian, 2011), which in turn, reduces the problem of overinvestment of 
free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Peyer and Shivdasani (2000) find that presence of debt creates 
pressure to meet interest obligations, which in turn, provides incentives to select investments 
that generate high levels of current cash flow. However, Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) find 
that the negative impact of leverage on investment is stronger for high-Tobin’s-Q segments. 
We follow prior literature to include short-term debt and long-term debt normalised by total 
assets of the firm. We expect that, in the presence of high monitoring such as in bank-based 
systems, free cash flow is less likely to be used to finance projects that generate high private 
benefits for management at the expense of shareholders as documented in prior literature 
(Jensen, 1986; Peyer and Shivdasani, 2000) and internal capital markets are likely to be more 
efficient. 
 
6.3. Multivariate Analysis 
 For this analysis, we utilise firm- and segment-level panel data to construct our 
internal capital markets variables. In this section, we perform a number of tests and discuss 
some of the problems associated with panel data analysis.  
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 For our analysis, we obtain firm- and segment-level panel data for a large number of 
listed firms in three countries over a six year period. In order to track the segment and firm 
over time, we create a panel ID unique to that segment or firm. Next, each segment and firm 
is indexed in a specific format, for example, Ii,j(t) indicates investment by segment (i) of 
diversified firm (j) and in year (t). Similarly, TAj(t-1) indicates total assets of the firm (j) in 
year (t-1). 
In general, the main benefit of panel data is that it allows researchers to control for 
unobserved characteristics, such as CEO and division managers’ ability, and isolate the effect 
of specific actions or events (Wooldridge, 2006). However, panel data associated with 
diversified firms that have multiple segments can also increase the complexity with the 
analysis of the data, as discussed in the proceeding subsections. 
 
6.3.1. Multicolinearity 
 O’Brien (2007) documents that in the presence of perfect multicolinearity, the 
standard errors will not be correct and efficient. This is because, (i) it may produce models 
where 𝑅𝑗2 is high but none of the explanatory variables are significant, (ii) produce results 
with “incorrect sign” and, (iii) situations where parameter estimates are very sensitive to 
small changes in the data (Belsley et al., 1980; Grenne 1993). 
The Gauss-Markov assumption only requires that there should not be perfect linear 
relationship among independent variables. In that case, the coefficients will remain best linear 
unbiased estimators (BLUE). However, if there is perfect linear relationship or near perfect 
relationship among independent variables (i.e. close to one) then it is likely to cause statistical 
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problems (Wooldridge, 2006). There are a number of procedures which can enable us to 
detect the presence of multicolinearity.  
Firstly, pairwise correlations can highlight any significant linear dependence amongst 
independent variables. This is more likely to be an issue when variables are computed from 
one or more of the independent variables within the model. In Table 6.1, we present the 
correlation matrix showing our key variables for the three countries in our analysis. Secondly, 
an independent variable can be regressed on another independent variable within the model to 
determine any dependencies. This is usually referred to auxiliary regressions.  
  
– 177 – 
 
Table 6.1 
Correlation Matrix 
 Segment 
Capex 
Own cash 
flow 
Other cash 
flow 
Sales 
Growth 
Tobin’s-Q Ind-adj cap-
ex 
HI Return on 
assets 
Segment 
Assets 
Firm Assets 
Capex 1.000 - - - - - - - - - 
Own cash flow 0.105 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
Other cash flow -0.144 0.067 1.000 - - - - - - - 
Sales Growth -0.015 -0.037 -0.004 1.000 - - - - - - 
Tobin’s-Q 0.022 0.022 -0.017 -0.008 1.000 - - - - - 
Ind-adj capex 0.162 -0.001 -0.027 -0.001 -0.129 1.000 - - - - 
HI  0.014 0.023 0.047 0.005 -0.000 -0.024 1.000 - - - 
ROA 0.005 0.079 0.139 -0.011 0.002 -0.051 -0.001 1.000 - - 
Segment Assets 0.026 0.038 -0.013 -0.009 0.007 -0.004 0.001 0.002 1.000  
Firm Assets -0.022 -0.012 0.025 -0.008 -0.011 0.006 -0.017 0.006 0.658 1.000 
Panel A  
France 
Capex 1.000 - - - - - - - - - 
Own cash flow 0.304 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
Other cash flow -0.037 -0.064 1.000 - - - - - - - 
Sales Growth -0.008 -0.003 -0.005 1.000 - - - - - - 
Tobin’s-Q 0.047 0.084 -0.003 -0.009 1.000 - - - - - 
Ind-adj capex 0.062 0.332 0.015 0.005 0.009 1.000 - - - - 
HI 0.275 0.138 0.089 -0.011 0.022 -0.032 1.000 - - - 
ROA 0.015 0.181 0.005 0.001 -0.018 0.028 -0.004 1.000 - - 
Segment Assets 0.020 0.048 -0.091 -0.008 -0.030 0.004 -0.031 -0.009 1.000 - 
Firm Assets -0.106 -0.108 -0.041 -0.011 -0.048 0.026 -0.121 -0.016 0.716 1.000 
Panel B  
Germany 
Capex 1.000  - - - - - - - - 
Own cash flow 0.018 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
Other cash flow 0.404 -0.320 1.000 - - - - - - - 
Sales Growth -0.005 -0.005 0.005 1.000 - - - - - - 
Tobin’s-Q -0.007 0.005 0.007 0.008 1.000 - - - - - 
Ind-adj capex 0.015 0.025 -0.009 -0.001 0.019 1.000  - - - 
HI 0.919 0.286 0.224 -0.004 -0.008 0.016 1.000 - - - 
ROA 0.000 0.036 -0.012 -0.000 0.002 -0.019 0.000 1.000  - 
Segment Assets -0.005 -0.016 -0.026 0.002 0.017 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 1.000 - 
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Firm Assets -0.009 -0.068 -0.007 0.006 0.045 0.011 -0.008 0.009 0.601 1.000 
This table shows the correlation matrix for the UK, France (Panel A) and Germany (Panel B). The time period is between 2005 and 2010. The HI (Herfindahl Index) and 
Firm Assets are computed at firm level. All other variables are computed at segment level. Capex is the capital expenditure of segment and Ind-Adj Capex is the industry-
adjusted capital expenditure of segments. Own cash flow is segment’s own cash flow, which is calculated as operating income plus depreciation. Other Cash flow is the sum 
of cash flow of other segments within the firm. Tobin’s-Q is the proxy for segments’ investment opportunities and ROA is the return on segment assets. The methods for 
constructing these variables are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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The third approach involves examining the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to 
determine whether near high multicolinearity is present (O‘Brien, 2007). VIF measures how 
much the variance of the coefficients is inflated by multicolinearity. As a rule of thumb, VIF 
of 1 indicates no colinearity and a value greater than 10 indicates high colinearity. The VIF 
measure is easily obtained in modern software packages, such as STATA, and it is given by: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑗 =  11− 𝑅𝑗2                                 (6.4) 
  
In the Equation (6.4), 𝑅𝑗2 is obtained from regression testing. We repeat the VIF test 
for all models discussed in prior section that examine segment level as well as firm level data, 
to determine whether there is any linear relationship between variables. The results from the 
VIF test conducted on the investment-cash flow model are presented in Table 6.2. Given the 
thresholds above, we find that multicolinearity does not cause an issue in any of our analysis.  
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Table 6.2  
Test for presence of Multicolinearity. 
 UK France Germany 
 VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
Own Cash  1.03 0.971 1.02 0.985 1.03 0.975 
Other Cash  1.01 0.987 1.03 0.971 1.03 0.969 
Sales Growth 1.01 0.989 1.01 0.989 1.00 0.998 
Tobin’s- Q 1.01 0.991 1.08 0.929 1.06 0.941 
Year 2006 2.26 0.443 2.08 0.479 1.89 0.529 
Year 2007 2.66 0.377 2.23 0.449 1.92 0.520 
Year 2008 3.04 0.329 2.24 0.446 1.92 0.520 
Year 2009 3.14 0.319 2.18 0.459 1.84 0.543 
Year 2010 2.88 0.347 2.00 0.499 1.79 0.559 
Mean VIF 2.00  1.65  1.50  
This table shows the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to determine whether multicolinearity is present in data 
for the UK, France and Germany. In the regression analysis, the dependent variable is capital expenditure of 
segments normalised by firm assets at the beginning of the year. Own Cash and Other Cash are segment’s own 
cash flow and cash flow other segments within the firm, respectively. Tobin’s-Q is the proxy for segment 
investment opportunities and Sales Growth is the change in segment sales at the beginning of the year. The time 
dummy variables take a value of 1 and 0. As a rule of thumb, a value greater than 10 represents high 
multicolinearity. This test is conducted with the investment-cash flow model. We also perform this test for other 
models in our analysis and find that multicolinearity is does not cause any problem in our analysis. 
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6.3.2. Serial Correlation 
Next, we consider the possibility that the error terms from different time periods may 
be correlated. For example, diversified firms operate multiple segments and a random shock 
to a segment is likely to impact all its segments, i.e. the errors are likely to be correlated by 
segment. There are various tests to detect serial correlation, for example, the Durbin-Watson 
Test statistic (Durbin and Watson, 1950) for the first-order serial correlation in the 
disturbance when all the independent variables are strictly exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with 
the error term.  
In the presence of both time effect and firm effect, we include time dummy variables 
within the model and estimate the standard errors on the other dimension, i.e. cluster by firm. 
By allowing unobserved effects to be arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables in 
each time period, the purpose of the time dummy variables is to remove the correlation 
between observations in the same time period. Prior empirical studies have shown that in 
such a case the standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased (Petersen, 2009).19  
 
6.3.3. Heteroskedasticity 
 The OLS makes an assumption that the error term is constant (homoskedasticity).  
However, in the event of variance of the error term, given the explanatory variables, is not 
constant then errors are said to be heteroskedastic.  This can occur when observations are for 
the same time period but from different firms such as in the panel-data in our case. Thus, 
when heteroskedasticity is present, the least squares are not the best linear unbiased estimator 
                                                          
19 Petersen (2009) shows that when there are only a few clusters in one dimension, clustering by the more 
frequent cluster yields results that are almost identical to clustering both by firm and time. 
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(BLUE). It does not affect the coefficients; however, the variance of the estimated parameters 
is biased.  
To determine if heteroskedasticity is present, we follow Cameron and Trivedi (1990) 
and perform the information matrix test, and an orthogonal decomposition into tests for 
heteroskedasticity, skewness, and kurtosis for the models discussed in Section 6.2. The White 
(1980) test for homoskedasticity against unrestricted forms of heteroskedasticity is usually 
similar to the first term of the Cameron-Trivedi decomposition. Table 6.3 shows that 
heteroskedasticity is present in our dataset across the three countries. Thus, we correct for this 
by using the White’s robust standard errors in all our regression tests. 
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Table 6.3  
Test for Heteroskedasticity. 
 UK France Germany 
 chi sq Df P chi sq Df P chi sq Df P 
Heteroskedasticity 141.56 39 0.000 159.96 39 0.000 238.19 39 0.000 
Skewness 21.96 9 0.009 224.78 9 0.000 256.18 9 0.000 
Kurtosis 8.44 1 0.004 79.36 1 0.000 123.63 1 0.000 
Total 171.96 49 0.000 464.11 49 0.000 618.00 49 0.000 
This table shows the results from the information matrix test (the Cameron-Trivedi decomposition) to determine 
the presence of heteroskedasticity in our data for the UK, France and Germany. We perform this test for the 
investment-cash flow model and tests performed with other models yield similar results. The dependent variable 
in the investment-cash flow model is the capital expenditure of a segment normalised by total assets of the firm 
at the beginning of the year. The independent variables remain the same as above.    
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6.3.4. Fixed-Effects Estimation 
 One of the important advantages of panel data is the ability to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. For example, we are interested in whether internal capital markets are efficient 
or inefficient within diversified firms. In addition to the several firm- and segment-level 
characteristics which are observable, there are many other characteristics which may have an 
impact on the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets but cannot be observed. 
Thus, there is potential for an omitted variable bias i.e. unobserved heterogeneity.  
 The unobserved variables, such as CEO and division managers’ ability, are in the 
error term and may be correlated with the explanatory variables, which may result in biased 
estimates. For this reason, we make use of regression methods which decompose the error in 
two components; the firm-specific error term 𝛼𝑖 and idiosyncratic error term 𝑌𝑖𝑡. The former 
is fixed over time i.e. time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, and the latter varies over time 
and it is uncorrelated with explanatory variables across all time periods. One of the 
techniques to eliminate the fixed effects is called the fixed effects transformation. Consider a 
simple model with just one explanatory variable as shown below: 
𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑥𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑌𝑖𝑡 
 Next, for each i we average the equation over time and obtain the following equation. 
𝐹�𝑖 =  𝛽1?̅?𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  ?̅?𝑖𝑡 
 As a next step, we subtract the second equation from the first equation. This results in 
the elimination of time-constant firm-specific error term. This means the unobserved effects 
are no longer cause a problem in the analysis. 
𝐹𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐹�𝑖 =  𝛽(𝑥𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖) +  𝑌𝑖𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖 
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 The fixed effects method does not allow researchers to observe the effect of time-
constant variables, e.g. the country in which the firm operates, as they are eliminated during 
the transformation. This is because the effect of any variable whose change over time is 
constant cannot be estimated (Wooldridge, 2006; pg. 489). An alternative method is to 
include the interaction of the time-constant variable with another variable of interest that does 
change over time.  
The fixed effects transformation is not the only method which eliminates the time-
constant unobserved effects. For example, the first differencing or the random effects model 
may also be used to achieve the same goal. Firstly, the first differencing method involves 
differencing the data rather than time-demeaning in the case of fixed effects. The decision to 
use fixed effects or first differencing may rely on the correlation between idiosyncratic errors 
over time. When the error term is serially correlated over time, then fixed effects method is 
more efficient than first differencing and standard errors reported by fixed effects are valid 
(Wooldridge, 2006).  
Furthermore, the random effects model assumes that the explanatory variables are not 
correlated with the time-constant unobserved effects. If so, then eliminating the unobserved 
effects results in inefficient estimators. If explanatory variables are correlated with time-
constant unobserved effects the random effects estimator is biased. Whereas, fixed effects 
allows arbitrary correlation between explanatory variables and unobserved effects. 
Also, a commonly used method to determine whether fixed effects or random effects 
should be used is the Hausman Test (Hausman, 1978). In this test, the null hypothesis is that 
both fixed and random effects methods are good and they should yield coefficients that are 
similar. The alternative hypothesis is that the fixed effects estimation is better than the 
random effects estimation. If this is the case, then we would expect to see differences 
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between the two sets of coefficients. We find a large and significant Hausman statistic which 
indicates that a large and significant difference between the fixed and random effects 
estimation. Thus, we use fixed effects method as it appears to be more appropriate than 
random effects method.  
 
6.3.5. Selection Bias  
It is now well documented that diversified firms generally trade at a discount (Berger 
and Ofek, 2005; Lins and Sarvaes, 1999) and that these firms tend to misallocate capital 
resources (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Hovakimian, 2011). However, there have 
been a number of studies which have argued that these results may be due to selection bias 
and measurement errors (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). This strand of literature 
argues that the diversification discount and inefficiency of internal capital markets may be 
due to the fact that firms choose to (or not to) diversify in certain lines of business. 
In the presence of selection bias, the regression analysis will lead to inconsistent 
estimators. A number of estimators are available which correct for this (e.g. Heckman, 1979). 
However, Rajan et al. (2000) argue that measurement errors or selection bias may only 
account for some of the between-firm results reported on diversification. This is because, the 
authors control for firm-specific effects and, therefore, control for any consequences arising 
from the way the firm is set up and the results derive only from within-firm variations over 
time. 
In addition to this, Laeven and Levine (2007) study financial firms between 1998 and 
2002, and find a diversification discount even after correcting for selection bias. For example, 
the study finds that the market values of financial conglomerates that operate in multiple 
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industries are lower than the value of the portfolio of financial intermediaries that specialise 
in the individual activities. More recent studies have examined the link between value of non-
financial firms and efficiency of internal capital markets, and find that firm value increases 
(i.e. diversification discount decreases) when internal capital markets become more efficient 
(Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). 
 
6.4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present our findings from the regression analysis for the three 
countries in our study. In general, our findings indicate that internal capital markets appear to 
be successful to some extent in transferring resources between segments within the firm, 
however, they are generally inefficient. This suggests that more resources appear to be 
allocated to less profitable segments of the firm. Furthermore, we show that the capital 
allocation process not only differs between single segment firms and multi-segment firms, 
but also between multi-segment firms across countries i.e. within market- and bank-based 
financial systems.  
For example, we find that internal capital markets appear to be more active in France 
and less active in Germany compared with the UK. Also, the efficiency of internal capital 
markets significantly differs across multi-segment firms in these three countries. Consistent 
with prior literature, we find that internal capital markets operate inefficiently overall but they 
are less inefficient in Germany. In general, internal capital markets are less inefficient in 
bank-based systems compared with market-based systems. This suggests that financial 
system characteristic, such as supervisory role of markets and banks (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003), role of banks in firms’ investment selection process (Chakraborty and Ray, 2006) and 
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ownership concentration of firms (Sautner and Villalonga, 2010) have a positive impact on 
the efficiency of capital allocation process within multi-segment firms in these countries. 
Additionally, our findings on the impact of the financial crisis on internal capital 
markets indicate that their operations declined significantly in the UK but not in France and 
Germany. Furthermore, consistent with prior literature diversified firms in the UK 
significantly improved their investment policies during the financial crisis, which in turn, 
results in more efficient internal capital markets in the UK. However, we find that efficiency 
of internal capital markets did not improve in France or Germany during the crisis. In the 
following subsections, we begin our discussion with the findings for the UK followed by a 
discussion on the findings from France and Germany. 
 
6.4.1. Evidence from the UK 
 In Table 6.4, we present our findings on the relationship between segment investment 
and cash flow. Our primary objective is to determine whether internal capital markets are 
active and play a significant role in allocation of capital within multi-segment firms. The 
dependent variable in our analysis is the capital expenditure of a segment normalised by firm 
assets at beginning of the year.  
We include a number of explanatory variables which have shown to affect the 
investments of segments, as discussed in section 6.2. The main variable of interest in our 
analysis is the cash flow of other segments which is our proxy for the internal capital 
resources available for reallocation within the diversified firm in a particular year. Lamont 
(1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) find a significant relationship between the proxy for 
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internal capital resources available for reallocation (i.e. the cash flow of other segments 
within the firm) and investment of a segment. 
In line with prior literature, our findings indicate a significant relationship between 
segment’s capital expenditure and cash flow of other segments within the firm. This suggests 
that firms engage in cross-subsidisation of resources, and segments rely on transfer of capital 
resources through internal channels for investment. We report a coefficient of 0.044 for Other 
Cash, statistically significant at 10 percent level. These findings show that there is some 
evidence to suggest that internal capital markets are active.  
The financial dependency also means that a cash flow shock to one segment of the 
firm is likely to be transmitted to other segments and may affect the cost of finance of other 
segments within the firm (Lamont, 1997). For example, Lamont (1997) document that when 
cash flow of oil segments declined in 1986, it lead to a significant decline in investments of 
non-oil segments of the firm. In relation to this, we examine the impact of the financial crisis 
on the investment and role of internal capital markets during this period. In general, we find 
that the financial crisis of 2008 affected all industries around the same time and, thus, lead to 
a firm-wide decline in capital resources and investment.  
Next, we examine the impact of the financial crisis by including the dummy variable 
Crisis, which is equal to 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and zero otherwise. 
Furthermore, we include the interaction of Crisis with Other Cash as well as Own Cash in 
our analysis. We find that the coefficients are negative, but statistically insignificant. This 
suggests that segments do not rely more or less on cash flow of other segments during the 
crisis period compared to non-recession level as we had expected.  
Our results show that segment investment is significantly more dependent on its own 
cash flow than the cash flow of other segments within the firm. We report the coefficient of 
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Own Cash as 0.105, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This implies that segments’ 
internal resources are still the primary source of funding. Similar to the findings of Shin and 
Stulz (1998), this also suggests that internal capital markets play a significant but a limited 
role in the UK. A segment that faces adverse cash flow shock receives some or most of the 
impact of that shock and internal capital markets do not appear to fully substitute the role of 
internal finance.  
In addition, we find that segment investment is positively related to investment 
opportunities. We report the coefficient of Tobin’s-Q as 0.001, statistically significant at 5 
percent level. The investment level of a segment increases (decreases) with increasing 
(decreasing) investment opportunities. This suggests that firms allow segments with good 
investment opportunities to invest more and reduce their investment level when their 
investment opportunities fall. 
Finally, we examine the impact of the financial crisis on segment investment and find 
that segments experience a significant decrease in capital expenditure during the crisis period. 
For example, we find that capital expenditure significantly decline between 2008 and 2009 
compared with non-recession level. This is in line with the prior literature documenting that 
firms significantly reduce their investments during such periods (Hovakimian, 2011; Kahle 
and Stulz, 2013). In this next section, we discuss the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on 
the size of internal capital markets in the three countries in our analysis.   
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Table 6.4  
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity in the UK. 
 (1) (2) 
Sales Growth -0.000 
(0.682) 
0.000 
(0.958) 
Own Cash  0.105*** 
(0.000) 
0.116*** 
(0.000) 
Other Cash  0.044* 
(0.067) 
0.062* 
(0.057) 
Tobin’s- Q 0.001** 
(0.036) 
0.001*** 
(0.005) 
Year 06 -0.005 
(0.167) 
- 
Year 07 -0.003 
(0.476) 
- 
Year 08 -0.003 
(0.370) 
- 
Year 09 -0.007** 
(0.027) 
- 
Year 10 -0.011*** 
(0.000) 
- 
Crisis - -0.003 
(0.265) 
Crisis x Own-cash - -0.014 
(0.569) 
Crisis x Other-cash - -0.264 
(0.194) 
   
Constant 0.016*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
Adj. R-Sq 0.069 0.070 
Obs. 5,207 5,207 
This table shows the estimation results from the investment-cash flow model for the UK. The time period is 
between 2005 and 2010. In this analysis, the dependent variable is capital expenditure of segments normalised 
by firm assets at the beginning of the year. Own Cash and Other Cash are segment’s own cash flow and cash 
flow other segments within the firm, respectively. Tobin’s-Q is the proxy for segment investment opportunities 
and Sales Growth is the change in segment sales at the beginning of the year. The time dummy variables take a 
value of 1 and 0. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. The regressions 
are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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As a next step, we set the dependent variable as the industry-adjusted investment of 
segments of diversified firms. Our objective is to determine whether capital allocations 
within multi-segment firms become more efficient during the crisis period. Prior literature 
suggests that firms significantly improve their investment policies during recession and 
allocate more capital resources towards segments with good opportunities (Hovakimian, 
2011). We present our empirical findings in Table 6.5.  
In line with prior literature, we find that firms pay attention to segments’ investment 
opportunities when allocating resources. For example, we report the coefficient of Tobin’s-Q 
variable as 0.007 prior to the crisis and 0.009 during the crisis, statistically significant at 1 
percent level. This suggests that firms continue to allocate resources to segments with good 
investment opportunities during economic uncertainty (Kahle and Stulz, 2013) which then 
helps to improve the efficiency of internal capital markets. This also suggests that managers 
are put under more pressure to make better use of internal capital resources during the 
recession.   
On the other hand, our results show it is not the case that segments which have 
performed well in the past are allocated more resources. For example, we find that variable 
ROA is positive but insignificant in our analysis. This indicates that past performance of the 
segment does not result in the segment receiving more capital resources for investment. In 
line with Shin and Stulz (1998) we also find that firms allow smaller segments to invest more 
than industry average. This suggests that smaller segment generally receive resources and 
larger segments subsidise investments of smaller segments. In addition to this, it appears that 
segments associated with highly diversified firms tend to invest more than industry average. 
This result suggests that well-diversified firms allow their segment to take advantage of 
internal capital resources and enable them to invest more than their peers.  
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Furthermore, we examine the impact of the financial crisis on our dependent variable 
and report the during-crisis year dummy variable to be positive and statistically significant at 
5 percent level. This again suggests that internal capital markets are successful at shielding 
some of the impact of credit- and cash-flow shocks and enable their segments to continue 
investment during the crisis. Shin and Stulz (1998) document that single segment firms invest 
more when they have more resources and invest less when they have fewer resources 
compared with segments of diversified firms. Our findings remain in line with prior literature 
on the advantages of operating internal capital markets (e.g. Stein, 1997, 2003).  
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Table 6.5  
Industry-adjusted Investments in the UK. 
 All segments Non-recession Recession 
Tobin’s- Q 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
Herfindahl Index -0.058*** 
(0.001) 
-0.199** 
(0.012) 
-0.060** 
(0.024) 
ROA 0.000 
(0.672) 
0.014 
(0.315) 
0.005 
(0.465) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.041** 
(0.030) 
0.118 
(0.106) 
-0.055 
(0.203) 
Log(Segment Assets) -0.019** 
(0.049) 
0.013 
(0.763) 
-0.042* 
(0.053) 
Year 06 -0.006 
(0.519) 
-0.020 
(0.150) 
- 
Year 07 -0.005 
(0.546) 
-0.027 
(0.108) 
- 
Year 08 0.021** 
(0.024) 
- - 
Year 09 0.052*** 
(0.000) 
- 0.036*** 
(0.000) 
Year 10 0.057*** 
(0.000) 
- 0.036*** 
(0.000) 
    
Constant -0.157 
(0.155) 
-0.755* 
(0.099) 
0.522** 
(0.037) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.011 0.003 0.000 
Obs. 5,129 1,989 3,088 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted capital expenditure of segment. The time period 
is between 2005 and 2010. We take non-recession as 2005-2007 and recession period as 2008-2010. All 
independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- 
and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
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Next, we examine the determinants of internal capital market activity by setting the 
dependent variable as the size of internal capital allocations of a firm within a particular year. 
We follow Rajan et al. (2000) and Sautner and Villalonga (2010) to compute the variable 
Size, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
In Table 6.6, we present our findings from our analysis. We find that the firm 
diversity (Herfindahl Index) appears as a significant explanatory variable when determining 
whether internal capital markets are active or inactive. For example, we find that the 
coefficient of HI is 0.025, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This suggests that firms 
that have their segments operating in related industries tend to engage in more intra-
segmental capital allocations. Managers are more likely to have in-depth knowledge about 
investment opportunities of segments that are closely related (Xuan, 2009), which in turn, 
may result in more transfers of capital resources between segments. 
 Additionally, we find that cash flow available within the firm is positively related to 
the size of internal capital markets. We report the coefficient of Cash Flow as 0.268, 
statistically significant at 10 percent level. This suggests that an increase in cash flow 
increases the level of resources available for reallocation within the firm, and hence, allows 
the firm to make transfers of capital resources between segments. However, it is not the case 
size of the firm has an effect on the size of internal capital markets. We find that the variable 
Log(Total Assets) appears positive and insignificant at any significance level. 
 Finally, we find no evidence to suggest that the presence of short- and long-term debt 
affects internal capital markets by forcing significant cash flow out of the firm which may 
then lead to fewer resources for allocation. For example, the presence of free cash flow may 
aggravate over-investment problem and managers may cross-subsidise resources to finance 
positive as well as negative NPV projects. However, these variables appear insignificant.  
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Table 6.6  
The size of internal capital markets in the UK. 
 (1) (2) 
Herfindahl Index 0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.024*** 
(0.007) 
Cash Flow 0.268* 
(0.096) 
0.269* 
(0.094) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.014 
(0.892) 
0.031 
(0.769) 
Short-Term Debt 0.133 
(0.352) 
0.141 
(0.324) 
Long-Term Debt -0.129 
(0.465) 
-0.118 
(0.508) 
Tobin’s-Q 0.016 
(0.631) 
0.009 
(0.750) 
Inventory Turnover 0.000 
(0.481) 
0.000 
(0.372) 
Year 06 0.064 
(0.224) 
- 
Year 07 0.119* 
(0.064) 
- 
Year 08 -0.081 
(0.130) 
- 
Year 09 -0.056 
(0.297) 
- 
Year 10 -0.049 
(0.355) 
- 
Crisis - -0.071 
(0.168) 
   
Constant 0.137 
(0.820) 
0.052 
(0.933) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.043 0.047 
Obs. 1,602 1,602 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis. In this analysis, the dependent variable is 
the size of an internal capital market within a multi-segment firm in a particular year. The time period is 
between 2005 and 2010. Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. All 
independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- 
and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
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Finally, we investigate the determinants of the efficiency of internal capital markets in 
the UK. For this analysis, we set the dependent variable as RVA. Our objectives are to 
determine whether Size of an internal capital market is related to its efficiency and what 
impact did the financial crisis have on internal capital markets.  
Table 6.7 shows the results from the analysis. Our results from the univariate analysis 
in Chapter 5 indicated that firms’ cutback on unnecessary capital allocations during the crisis 
which is related to improvements in efficiency. In line with prior results, we find that firms 
become less inefficient at allocating resources during the crisis compared to non-recession 
level. This suggests that diversified firms significantly improve their investment policies 
during economic uncertainty and allocate more resources towards segments with good 
opportunities.  
Additionally, we find that there is significant evidence to suggest that firms which 
operate larger internal capital markets are more inefficient. We report Size as negative with a 
coefficient of -0.129 and statistically significant. This suggests that managers allow good as 
well as poor investment projects to be financed through internal capital markets. These 
findings are in line with the results reported in Section 5.5 indicating that size of internal 
capital markets decreases significantly during the crisis and efficiency improves during this 
period.  
Furthermore, we examine the impact of long-term and short-term debt has on the 
efficiency of internal capital allocations. Debt can require regular payments which can force 
cash out of the firm and, thus, leave fewer resources available for reallocation. It can also 
help realign managers’ interests with the interest of shareholders, which can lead to more 
efficient capital allocations (Gertner et al. 1994). However, we report the variable for short- 
and long-term debt does not have any significant explanatory power in any of our tests. 
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Table 6.7  
Efficiency of internal capital markets in the UK. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ICM Size -0.129*** 
(0.000) 
-0.151*** 
(0.000) 
-0.156*** 
(0.000) 
Cash flow 0.100 
(0.554) 
0.099 
(0.166) 
0.124 
(0.177) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.110 
(0.333) 
0.079 
(0.487) 
0.027 
(0.548) 
Short-term debt -0.307 
(0.197) 
-0.273 
(0.272) 
0.039 
(0.831) 
Long-term debt -0.137 
(0.593) 
-0.193 
(0.407) 
-0.053 
(0.382) 
Herfindahl Index 0.009*** 
(0.000) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
Year 2006 -0.184** 
(0.012) 
- - 
Year 2007 0.030 
(0.311) 
- - 
Year 2008 0.325 
(0.500) 
- - 
Year 2009 0.062* 
(0.058) 
- - 
Year 2010 0.080* 
(0.081) 
- - 
Crisis - -0.033 
(0.252) 
-0.016 
(0.424) 
Crisis x ICM Size - - 0.021 
(0.644) 
Crisis x Cash Flow - - -0.026 
(0.794) 
Crisis x Short-term Debt - - -0.189 
(0.335) 
    
Constant -0.993 
(0.125) 
-0.807 
(0.209) 
-0.117 
(0.638) 
Adj-R Sq 0.078 0.078 0.081 
Obs. 1,471 1,471 1,471 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the efficiency internal capital market within a multi-segment firm in a 
particular year. Efficiency is calculated using the RVA method. The time period is between 2005 and 2010. 
Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are 
discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-
values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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6.4.2. Evidence from France 
As discussed in prior chapters, the segments of diversified firms in France are also 
completely owned by the parent firm and they are not separately listed. However, there are 
some key distinctions between the bank-based financial system in France compared with the 
market-based system in the UK which may affect the operations of firms based in these two 
systems, as discussed in Chapter 3. For example, the key differences relate in the governance 
and monitoring of firms within these systems that can affect the investment project selection 
process within firms (Tadesse, 2002, 2003; Chakraborty and Ray, 2006).  
We begin by examining the relationship between investment and cash flow, and 
present the findings in Table 6.8. In general, our findings indicate that multi-segment firms 
actively engage in the cross-subsidisation of capital resources in France. We report a positive 
coefficient of 0.046 for Other Cash, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This suggests 
that segments of diversified firms in France are financially interdependent. The relationship 
between segment’s investment and cash flow of other segments within the firm indicates that 
firms actively cross-subsidise resources to finance investment projects of a segment using 
cash flow of other segment within the firm.  
A notable difference between the UK and France is the significant importance of the 
role of internal capital markets in the latter. For example, we find that the coefficient of Other 
Cash is significantly larger than the coefficient of Own Cash in France. This suggests that 
internal capital markets play a key role in allocating resources for investment. Similarly, 
when we examine the investment sensitivity with Other Cash during the crisis, we find that 
internal capital markets become more active during the crisis period and play an even more 
important role within diversified firms. For example, we report the coefficient of Crisis x 
Other Cash as 0.026, statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
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In line with the prior literature, we find segment investment is significantly sensitive 
to its own internal resources as well resources available within the firm. We report the 
coefficient of 0.033 for Own Cash, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This suggests 
that a shock to its own cash flow has a significant impact on its investment level. However, 
internal capital markets in France appear to be better able to shield segments capital 
expenditure from variations in their own cash flow as we find that segment investment is 
significantly more dependent on cash flow of other segments as well as its own cash flow.  
In addition to this, we examine the impact of the financial crisis and find a significant 
reduction in segment investment only in year 2009 in France, whereas for UK we report a 
significant reduction in 2009 and 2010. This may suggest, firstly, firms in market-based 
systems experienced more stringent financial environment which lead to deeper cutback in 
investments. Secondly, bank-based financial system provided more financial stability to firms 
through their close relationship with banks. Thirdly, it may be that diversified firms in France 
had built up a financial slack which could have enabled them to continue investing when the 
crisis began in 2008.  
Unlike the results from the UK, we find that the variable for investment opportunities 
(segment Tobin’s-Q) appears as insignificant. This suggests that firms pay less attention to 
public signals about investment opportunities of segments when allocating resources and may 
rely more on private signals e.g. division managers assessment of projects available for 
investment. It may be that managers rely more on private signals (e.g. division managers’ 
assessment of the investment project) or it may be due to the smaller sample size for the 
French data, there isn’t sufficient variation to be able to determine the effect of Tobin’s-Q on 
investment. In comparison to the firms in the UK, firms in France appear to rely more on 
managers’ expertise rather than market signals to when allocating capital resources.  
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Table 6.8  
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity in France 
 (1) (2) 
Sales Growth 0.000 
(0.573) 
0.000 
(0.471) 
Own Cash  0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.034** 
(0.021) 
Other Cash  0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.038*** 
(0.002) 
Tobin’s-Q -0.000 
(0.588) 
0.000 
(0.767) 
Year 06 -0.001 
(0.225) 
- 
Year 07 0.000 
(0.822) 
- 
Year 08 0.001 
(0.592) 
- 
Year 09 -0.004*** 
(0.004) 
- 
Year 10 -0.002 
(0.342) 
- 
Crisis - -0.003** 
(0.043) 
Crisis x Own cash - -0.001 
(0.953) 
Crisis x Other cash - 0.026** 
(0.015) 
   
Constant 0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.016*** 
(0.000) 
Adj. R-Sq 0.014 0.010 
Obs. 1,888 1,888 
This table shows the estimation results from the investment-cash flow model for France. The time period is 
between 2005 and 2010. In this analysis, the dependent variable is capital expenditure of segments normalised 
by firm assets at the beginning of the year. Own Cash and Other Cash are segment’s own cash flow and cash 
flow other segments within the firm, respectively. Tobin’s-Q is the proxy for segment investment opportunities 
and Sales Growth is the change in segment sales at the beginning of the year. The time dummy variables take a 
value of 1 and 0. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. The regressions 
are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
  
– 202 – 
 
As a next step, we examine the industry-adjusted investment and the size of internal 
capital markets in diversified firms. Table 6.9 presents the empirical results from the analysis. 
In line with the earlier findings from the univariate analysis on the decrease in efficiency of 
internal capital markets during the crisis, we find that segments with low-Tobin’s-Q are 
allocated more resources than segments with high-Tobin’s-Q during the crisis period in 
France. For example, when the dependent variable is industry-adjusted investment during the 
crisis, we report the coefficient of Tobin’s-Q as -0.319, statistically significant at 1 percent 
level.  
On further analysis, we find that this only the case during the crisis and not prior to 
the crisis. This may suggest that firms did not update their investment policies during the 
crisis and, thus, segments which may have had good investment opportunities prior to the 
crisis continued to receive resources during the crisis, even when they no longer had the best 
opportunities within the firm. Similarly, we notice that the variable ROA changes sign from 
positive prior to the crisis to negative during the crisis suggesting that low performing 
segments were allocated more resources, but this finding statistically insignificant.  
Unlike the findings for the UK, we find no evidence to suggest that smaller segments 
of the firm are allocated more resources in France. For example, our findings for the UK 
suggested larger segments of the firm end up subsidising investments of smaller segments, in 
line with prior literature from the US. However, we find the segment size variable appears to 
be negative, but it is statistically insignificant. Similarly, we find no evidence to suggest that 
segments that invest more or less than industry average belong to large diversified firms. In 
contrast to the findings for the UK, we find some evidence which indicates that firms which 
operate in related business lines invest more than industry average in France.   
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Table 6.9  
Industry-adjusted Investments in France. 
 All segments Non-recession Recession 
Tobin’s-Q -0.114*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.168) 
-0.319*** 
(0.001) 
Herfindahl Index -0.003 
(0.913) 
-0.018 
(0.557) 
0.275** 
(0.038) 
ROA 0.017 
(0.501) 
0.022 
(0.168) 
-0.031 
(0.534) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.299 
(0.176) 
-0.319 
(0.403) 
1.361 
(0.342) 
Log(Segment Assets) -0.082 
(0.391) 
-0.171 
(0.362) 
-0.103 
(0.580) 
Year 06 -0.122** 
(0.045) 
-0.092* 
(0.062) 
- 
Year 07 -0.148** 
(0.024) 
-0.099 
(0.127) 
- 
Year 08 -0.006 
(0.932) 
- - 
Year 09 -0.192** 
(0.011) 
- -0.267*** 
(0.007) 
Year 10 -0.705*** 
(0.000) 
- -0.749*** 
(0.000) 
    
Constant 2.456* 
(0.056) 
2.919 
(0.252) 
-7.291 
(0.397) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.016 0.007 0.012 
Obs. 1,861 834 789 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted capital expenditure of segment. The time period 
is between 2005 and 2010. We take non-recession as 2005-2007 and recession period as 2008-2010. All 
independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- 
and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
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As a next step, we examine the impact of the financial crisis on the size of internal 
capital markets. For this analysis, we set the Size as the dependent variable. The results are 
presented in Table 6.10. In contrast to the findings for the UK, we find that internal capital 
market activity increased during the crisis in France. These findings are consistent with 
earlier results from the univariate analysis. It may be that firms used internal capital markets 
to support financially weaker or segments that are in distress, in addition to financing 
investment projects in France. In the UK, we reported a significant decline in the level of 
transfers of capital resources.  
It may also be that firms in France faced less stringent financial environment 
compared to the UK and, therefore, did not experience a significant reduction in the 
availability of external resources. Firms’ easy access to external resources may have been 
used support weaker segments experiencing significant decline in sales and cash flow. Hence, 
their internal capital markets operations are not affected in the same way. In line with this 
theory, Hardie and Howarth (2009) document that the French government intervened during 
the crisis and forced banks to increase lending to domestic firms during this period.  
Unlike the results for the UK, we find that diversity of firms does not appear to be a 
significant explanatory variable for the size of internal capital markets in France. In addition, 
we find no evidence to suggest that firms with large cash flow tend to operate larger internal 
capital markets, as such is the case in the UK. In fact, none of the variables in our analysis 
have significant explanatory power. This shows that determinants of internal capital markets 
size in the UK do not appear to affect French firms in the same way. 
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Table 6.10  
Size of Internal Capital Markets in France. 
 (1) (2) 
Herfindahl Index 0.124 
(0.400) 
0.146 
(0.329) 
Cash Flow 0.109 
(0.943) 
-1.302 
(0.416) 
Log(Total Assets) 1.866 
(0.170) 
1.587 
(0.240) 
Short-Term Debt 0.486 
(0.798) 
1.546 
(0.360) 
Long-Term Debt -0.966 
(0.506) 
-0.627 
(0.687) 
Tobin’s-Q -0.008 
(0.954) 
-0.177 
(0.033) 
Inventory Turnover 0.000 
(0.167) 
0.000 
(0.885) 
Year 06 0.144 
(0.478) 
- 
Year 07 0.285 
(0.223) 
- 
Year 08 -0.188 
(0.458) 
- 
Year 09 0.486* 
(0.061) 
- 
Year 10 1.246** 
(0.001) 
- 
Crisis - 0.401 
(0.123) 
   
Constant -10.695 
(0.192) 
-8.992 
(0.270) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.011 0.006 
Obs. 645 645 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis. In this analysis, the dependent variable is 
the size of an internal capital market within a multi-segment firm in a particular year. The time period is 
between 2005 and 2010. Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. All 
independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- 
and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
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Lastly, we examine the efficiency of internal capital markets and present the findings 
in Table 6.11. The dependent variable in this analysis is RVA. In contrast to the findings from 
the UK, the results in this analysis indicate that internal capital markets efficiency does not 
improve in France during the crisis of 2008. On the other hand, there appears to be some 
evidence to suggest that efficiency decreases during the crisis, in line with our findings from 
the univariate analysis.  
For example, we find that the Crisis variable becomes negative and significant when 
the dependent variable is RVA. We report the coefficient of the variable as -0.013, significant 
at 10 percent level. The change in efficiency from non-recession to recession level is 
statistically significant. Nevertheless, these findings show an important distinction in the 
investment policies during the crisis between the UK and France.  
Our main results for the UK are consistent with prior literature on internal capital 
markets becoming significantly more efficient in the US during the crisis (Hovakimian, 
2011). However, this does not appear to be the case for France. Also, unlike the findings for 
the UK, the size of internal capital markets does not appear to be a significant explanatory 
variable in France. 
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Table 6.11  
Efficiency of Internal Capital Markets in France. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ICM Size -0.025 
(0.174) 
-0.025 
(0.147) 
-0.025 
(0.144) 
Cash flow 0.153 
(0.225) 
0.159 
(0.177) 
0.163 
(0.173) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.070 
(0.250) 
-0.067 
(0.254) 
-0.073 
(0.297) 
Short-term debt -0.018 
(0.878) 
-0.028 
(0.816) 
-0.022 
(0.857) 
Long-term debt -0.044 
(0.677) 
-0.049 
(0.646) 
-0.045 
(0.655) 
Herfindahl Index -0.010 
(0.147) 
-0.009 
(0.155) 
-0.009 
(0.211) 
Year 2006 -0.005 
(0.773) 
- - 
Year 2007 -0.004 
(0.849) 
- - 
Year 2008 -0.010 
(0.480) 
- - 
Year 2009 -0.022 
(0.289) 
- - 
Year 2010 -0.018 
(0.517) 
- - 
Crisis - -0.012* 
(0.076) 
-0.013* 
(0.058) 
Crisis x ICM Size - - 0.001 
(0.879) 
Crisis x Cash Flow - - 0.042 
(0.621) 
Crisis x Short Term Debt - - -0.042 
(0.406) 
    
Constant 0.446 
(0.212) 
0.432 
(0.216) 
0.465 
(0.266) 
Adj-R Sq 0.016 0.015 0.015 
Obs. 642 642 642 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the efficiency internal capital market within a multi-segment firm in a 
particular year. The efficiency is calculated using the RVA method. The time period is between 2005 and 2010. 
Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are 
discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-
values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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6.4.3. Evidence from Germany 
 In Table 6.12 we present our empirical results for Germany. As discussed above, 
Germany is a good example of a bank-based system and in contrast to market-based systems 
found in the UK and the US (Allen and Gale, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As discussed 
above, a key distinction between the two systems is the significant role of banks in 
monitoring firms as well as their involvement in the firms’ decision making process (Boot 
and Thakor, 1997; Tadesse, 2003; Chakraborty and Ray, 2006).  
Similar to the prior sections, we examine the relationship between segments’ 
investment and cash flow of other segments within the firm. Our results from the investment-
cash flow model indicate that segments are not sensitive to the cash flow of other segments 
within the firm. We report the coefficient as 0.005 for Other Cash, statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that segments of diversified are more financially independent in Germany 
compared with segments of diversified in the UK and France. Instead, we find that segments 
in Germany are more sensitive to changes in own cash flow and sales growth.  
Additionally, we investigate whether the crisis had an impact on the operation of 
internal capital markets by examining the interaction of the Crisis dummy variable with 
Other Cash. We find that this variable is negative during crisis, but insignificant at any 
significance level. This suggests that there were no significant changes in the investment 
policies of firms as the financial crisis began in 2008. Inactive or severely limited activity of 
internal capital markets suggests that a segment which experiences an adverse cash flow 
shock is likely to receive the full impact of that shock. Internal capital markets do not play a 
vital role in protecting segments’ investments. 
As an additional step, we perform the test separately for non-recession period and 
recession period. Our findings remain unchanged. Segments rely less on cash flow of other 
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segments within the firm and more on their own cash flow. We report a positive but 
insignificant relationship between segment investments and cash flow of other segments 
within the firm before and during the crisis. This suggests that segments of a diversified firm 
are treated more like stand-alone firms and an increase in cash flow of one segment does not 
have any impact on the capital expenditure of other segments within the firm.  
In addition, we report the coefficient of Own Cash as 0.090, statistically significant at 
1 percent level. As discussed above, this is in line with segments own internal resources 
being the primary source of finance for investments. Furthermore, we examine the impact of 
the financial crisis on segments’ investment and find that it appears to contract only in the 
year 2010, and not between 2008 and 2009 when the crisis was at its peak in Germany, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. It may be that firms close relationship with banks enabled the firm to 
obtain external finance more easily and continue investing. This indicates that firms in 
Germany experienced a lesser stringent environment compared with the UK during the crisis 
period.  
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Table 6.12  
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity in Germany. 
 (1) (2) 
Sales Growth 0.000** 
(0.048) 
0.000** 
(0.023) 
Own Cash  0.090*** 
(0.000) 
0.086*** 
(0.000) 
Other Cash  0.005 
(0.491) 
0.005 
(0.526) 
Tobin’s-Q -0.000 
(0.702) 
-0.000 
(0.699) 
Year 06 0.001 
(0.644) 
- 
Year 07 0.000 
(0.702) 
- 
Year 08 0.001 
(0.545) 
- 
Year 09 -0.002 
(0.148) 
- 
Year 10 -0.003*** 
(0.009) 
- 
Crisis  -0.002 
(0.276) 
Crisis x Own cash - 0.013 
(0.393) 
Crisis x Other cash - -0.001 
(0.930) 
   
Constant 0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
Adj. R-Sq 0.189 0.186 
Obs. 3,805 3,085 
This table shows the estimation results from the investment-cash flow model for Germany. The time period is 
between 2005 and 2010. In this analysis, the dependent variable is capital expenditure of segments normalised 
by firm assets at the beginning of the year. Own Cash and Other Cash are segment’s own cash flow and cash 
flow other segments within the firm, respectively. Tobin’s-Q is the proxy for segment investment opportunities 
and Sales Growth is the change in segment sales at the beginning of the year. The time dummy variables take a 
value of 1 and 0. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. The regressions 
are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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As a next step, we examine the industry-adjusted investment and the size of internal 
capital markets within diversified firms. The results are presented in Table 6.13. It appears 
that the results are more in line with those reported for the UK than for France. For example, 
we find Tobin’s-Q appears positive when the dependent variable is industry-adjusted 
investment as we report a coefficient of 0.021, statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
However, we find the coefficient of Tobin’s-Q is significantly smaller during the crisis 
compared to the non-recession level. For example, we report a coefficient of 0.053 before the 
crisis and 0.015 in the recession period, statistically significant at 1 percent. Overall, this 
suggests investment opportunities are positively related to investment level of segments.  
 Additionally, we find that the Herfindahl Index appears positive and statistically 
significant in our analysis. This suggests that multi-segment firms that operate in related 
businesses allow their segments to invest more than industry average. Furthermore, smaller 
segments appear to invest more than larger segments of the firm. We find that the segment 
size variable appears negative and highly significant in our analysis. This finding is in line 
with prior literature arguing that larger segments usually subsidise the investments of smaller 
segments (Shin and Stulz, 1998).   
 In addition to this, segments that tend to invest more than industry average usually 
associated with large diversified firms. For example, we report the coefficient of Firm Size as 
0.184, statistically significant at 1 percent level. Large firms are likely to have multiple 
segments which may range from small to large segments. In the presence of large segments, 
the firm may find it easier to shield the investments of smaller segments as their capital 
requirements are likely to be lower compared to the overall budget of the firm.  
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Table 6.13  
Industry-adjusted Investments in Germany. 
 All segments Non-recession Recession 
Tobin’s-Q 0.021* 
(0.075) 
0.053*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
Herfindahl Index 0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.071** 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.689) 
ROA -0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.157 
(0.228) 
0.042 
(0.170) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.184** 
(0.011) 
-0.026 
(0.931) 
-0.089 
(0.676) 
Log(Segment Assets) -0.203*** 
(0.000) 
-0.469 
(0.332) 
-0.098** 
(0.036) 
Year 06 -0.196*** 
(0.000) 
-0.164*** 
(0.000) 
- 
Year 07 -0.057** 
(0.041) 
-0.013 
(0.659) 
- 
Year 08 -0.120*** 
(0.000) 
- - 
Year 09 -0.034 
(0.276) 
- 0.096*** 
(0.000) 
Year 10 -0.021 
(0.543) 
- 0.109*** 
(0.000) 
    
Constant -0.032 
(0.938) 
2.458 
(0.110) 
0.939 
(0.405) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.025 0.001 0.026 
Obs. 3,503 1,713 1,411 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the industry-adjusted capital expenditure of segment. The time period 
is between 2005 and 2010. We take non-recession as 2005-2007 and recession period as 2008-2010. All 
independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- 
and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
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Subsequently, we investigate the determinants of the size of internal capital markets 
in Germany. The results in Table 6.14 indicate that diversity and firm size are significant 
explanatory variables when the dependent variable is size of internal capital markets in 
Germany. For example, we report the coefficient of Firm Size as -0.368, statistically 
significant at 10 percent level. This suggests that smaller, possibly younger, firms appear to 
operate larger internal capital markets. Whereas, large firms are likely to have more well-
established segments and may be treated like stand-alone firms.  
 Next, we examine the impact of the financial crisis and find that the crisis had a 
negative impact of the size of internal capital markets in Germany. This finding is similar to 
the results for the UK but opposite to the results reported for France. For example, we find 
that time dummy variables prior to the crisis are positive and significant, but negative and 
insignificant during the crisis period. This is in line with our findings from the univariate 
analysis indicating that internal capital markets operations declined significantly during the 
financial crisis. This suggest that managers were more cautious about taking up new 
investment projects by using cash flow of other segments within the firm. 
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Table 6.14  
Size of Internal Capital Markets in Germany. 
 (1) (2) 
Herfindahl Index -0.000 
(0.123) 
-0.000* 
(0.065) 
Cash Flow 0.399 
(0.293) 
0.451 
(0.255) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.280 
(0.163) 
-0.368* 
(0.076) 
Short-Term Debt -0.085 
(0.825) 
-0.088 
(0.819) 
Long-Term Debt -0.033 
(0.950) 
0.006 
(0.990) 
Tobin’s- Q 0.078 
(0.190) 
0.107** 
(0.045) 
Year 06 0.210*** 
(0.009) 
- 
Year 07 0.011 
(0.883) 
- 
Year 08 0.169* 
(0.055) 
- 
Year 09 -0.009 
(0.902) 
- 
Year 10 -0.019 
(0.819) 
- 
Crisis - 0.088 
(0.230) 
   
Constant 1.810* 
(0.097) 
2.245** 
(0.048) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.005 0.014 
Obs. 1,209 1,209 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis. In this analysis, the dependent variable is 
the size of an internal capital market within a multi-segment firm in a particular year. The time period is 
between 2005 and 2010. Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. All 
independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- 
and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
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Lastly, we examine the efficiency of internal capital markets by setting the dependent 
variable as RVA. The results are presented in Table 6.15. Our objective is again to determine 
whether size of internal capital markets affects the efficiency, as well as the impact of the 
financial crisis on efficiency. Firstly, we find some evidence that suggests firms that operate 
larger internal capital markets are more inefficient. We find that the coefficient of ICM Size is 
-0.005, statistically significant at 10 percent level. Secondly, we notice that the variable 
Crisis is negative but insignificant in our analysis. This result again suggests internal capital 
market efficiency does not improve during the crisis period in Germany. 
 Additionally, we find that Cash Flow is positive and significant when the dependent 
variable is RVA. We report the coefficient as 0.011, statistically significant at 10 percent 
level. This suggests that firms allocate resources more efficiently when they have larger cash 
flow. This may indicate the segments that have performed well in the past continue to receive 
more resources via internal capital markets.  
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Table 6.15  
Efficiency of Internal Capital Markets in Germany. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ICM Size -0.005* 
(0.099) 
-0.005 
(0.118) 
-0.004 
(0.718) 
Cash flow 0.011* 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.699) 
-0.000 
(0.988) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.003 
(0.229) 
0.003 
(0.202) 
0.003 
(0.181) 
Short-term debt -0.009 
(0.566) 
-0.009 
(0.537) 
-0.000 
(0.997) 
Long-term debt -0.031 
(0.201) 
-0.031 
(0.201) 
-0.034 
(0.183) 
Herfindahl Index 0.000 
(0.879) 
0.000 
(0.858) 
0.000 
(0.904) 
Year 2006 0.004* 
(0.092) 
- - 
Year 2007 0.002 
(0.314) 
- - 
Year 2008 -0.001 
(0.563) 
- - 
Year 2009 -0.000 
(0.827) 
- - 
Year 2010 0.001 
(0.722) 
- - 
Crisis - -0.001 
(0.736) 
0.003 
(0.903) 
Crisis x ICM Size - - -0.006 
(0.160) 
Crisis x Cash Flow - - 0.017 
(0.454) 
Crisis x Short Term Debt - - -0.020 
(0.175) 
    
Constant -0.010 
(0.365) 
-0.011 
(0.335) 
-0.011 
(0.352) 
Adj-R Sq 0.007 0.003 0.010 
Obs. 1,212 1,212 1,212 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is the efficiency internal capital market within a multi-segment firm in a 
particular year. Efficiency is calculated using the RVA method. The time period is between 2005 and 2010. 
Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. All independent variables are 
discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-
values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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6.4.4. Cross-Country Comparison 
In this section, we present our empirical results from the regression analysis of pooled 
data for the three countries. As our primary objective is to determine the similarities and 
differences in internal capital markets operations and efficiency in the three countries in our 
analysis, we include country dummy variables in our analysis. The dummy variable FR takes 
a value of 1 if the firm is based in France and zero otherwise. Similarly, the dummy variable 
DE takes the values of 1 if the firm is based in Germany and zero otherwise. In this case, the 
reference point, or in this case, country is the UK. 
As discussed in Section 6.2, the key advantage of using the fixed effects model is that 
it eliminates the unobserved characteristics that are constant over time. However, the country 
in which the firm operates in also remains fixed over time and, thus, its effects are eliminated. 
By including the country dummy alone, the variable is omitted from the analysis as it double 
accounts for country affects. However, for this part of the analysis our interest lies in the 
effect of this time constant variable (i.e. the country in which the firm is based) on the key 
time changing firm/segment characteristics and, therefore, we include the interaction term 
between the country dummy and time changing variables in our analysis.  
We begin the analysis by examining the relationship between investment and cash 
flow of segments in these three countries. As discussed above, we are particularly interested 
in the relationship between segment’s investment and cash flow of other segments within the 
firm. Our objective is to determine whether segments rely more or less on cash flow of other 
segments in France and Germany compared to the UK. Therefore, we include the interaction 
variable between Other Cash and Country in our analysis. The results are presented in Table 
6.16. 
– 218 – 
 
In general, the findings indicate that segments do rely on cash flow of other segments 
for their investments. We report the coefficient of Other Cash as 0.051, statistically 
significant at 10 percent. This suggests that firms actively finance investment projects of 
segment using cash flow of other segments within the firm. This supports our earlier findings 
and it is consistent with the findings reported by Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998). 
However, our earlier findings in Section 6.3.2 had indicated that segments rely less on cash 
flow of other segments for their investments in Germany, indicating limited role of internal 
capital markets. 
We report the coefficient of variable DE x Other Cash as -0.042, significant at only 
10 percent level which suggests that internal capital markets play a lesser significant role in 
allocating resources in Germany compared to the UK. This implies that a segment of a 
diversified firm in Germany which experiences an adverse cash flow shock is more likely to 
experience the full impact of that shock and internal capital markets perform a limited 
function to protect investment of segments with good opportunities. If internal capital 
markets are inactive then an important advantage of multi-divisional structure may not 
utilised.  
Furthermore, we find that segments of diversified firms in France rely less on their 
own cash flow than segments of diversified firms in the UK. For example, we report the 
coefficient of variable FR x Own Cash as -0.071, statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
This indicates that internal capital markets in France are more successful at reducing 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of segments. On the other hand, we find no evidence to 
suggest that segments investment in the UK is more or less sensitive to its investment 
opportunities compared with other two countries.  
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Table 6.16  
Investment-cash flow sensitivity in the UK, France and Germany. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sales 
Growth 
-0.000 
(0.968) 
0.000 
(0.555) 
0.000 
(0.681) 
0.000 
(0.725) 
0.000 
(0.193) 
0.000* 
(0.058) 
0.000** 
(0.046) 
Own Cash 
Flow 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
0.078*** 
(0.000) 
0.081*** 
(0.000) 
0.114*** 
(0.000) 
0.110*** 
(0.000) 
0.110*** 
(0.000) 
0.107*** 
(0.000) 
Other Cash 
Flow 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
0.029*** 
(0.002) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.054* 
(0.056) 
0.053* 
(0.058) 
0.051* 
(0.065) 
Tobin’s- Q 0.001 
(0.159) 
0.001** 
(0.027) 
0.001** 
(0.026) 
0.001** 
(0.028) 
0.001** 
(0.030) 
0.001*** 
(0.013) 
0.001** 
(0.015) 
Crisis - -0.003*** 
(0.006) 
-0.002* 
(0.090) 
-0.002* 
(0.078) 
-0.002 
(0.110) 
-0.002 
(0.109) 
-0.003** 
(0.024) 
Crisis x Own 
cash 
- - -0.004 
(0.725) 
-0.004 
(0.777) 
-0.004 
(0.765) 
-0.004 
(0.773) 
-0.002 
(0.852) 
Crisis x 
Other cash 
- - -0.009 
(0.365) 
-0.001 
(0.359) 
-0.011 
(0.329) 
-0.011 
(0.343) 
-0.001 
(0.410) 
FR x Own 
cash 
- - - -0.078** 
(0.011) 
-0.074** 
(0.020) 
-0.074** 
(0.020) 
-0.071** 
(0.022) 
DE x Own 
cash 
- - - -0.026 
(0.400) 
-0.018 
(0.574) 
-0.017 
(0.590) 
-0.015 
(0.642) 
FR x Other 
cash 
- - - - -0.005 
(0.872) 
-0.004 
(0.891) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
DE x Other 
cash 
- - - - -0.045* 
(0.083) 
-0.044* 
(0.087) 
-0.042* 
(0.098) 
FR x 
Tobin’s-Q 
- - - - - -0.001 
(0.323) 
-0.001 
(0.392) 
DE x 
Tobin’s-Q 
- - - - - -0.001 
(0.168) 
-0.001 
(0.152) 
FR x Crisis - - - - - - 0.002 
(0.120) 
DE x Crisis - - - - - - 0.002 
(0.218) 
Year 06 -0.002 
(0.214) 
- - - - - - 
Year 07 -0.000 
(0.793) 
- - - - - - 
Year 08 -0.000 
(0.782) 
- - - - - - 
Year 09 -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
- - - - - - 
Year 10 -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - 
        
Constant 0.016*** 
(0.000) 
0.016*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
0.014*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
Adj. R-Sq 0.082 0.081 0.082 0.089 0.072 0.070 0.073 
Obs. 9,180 9,180 9,180 9,180 9,180 9,180 9,180 
This table shows the results from the investment-cash flow analysis for the UK, France and Germany. The time 
period is between 2005 and 2010. The variable Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later 
and 0 otherwise. The country dummy variables FR and DE take the value of 1 if the parent firm is based in 
France or Germany and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the capital expenditure of segment of diversified 
firm normalised by total assets of the firm at the beginning of the year. The independent variables are discussed 
above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are 
presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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As a next step, we examine the cross-country variation in the second measure of 
capital allocations, namely, the industry-adjusted investment of segments. The results are 
presented in Table 6.17. In general, we find that the financial crisis had a mixed affect on 
industry-adjusted investment of segments in the three countries in our analysis.  
We find that segments of diversified firms in both France and Germany invest less 
compared to segments of diversified firms in the UK during the crisis. For example, we find 
that the Crisis x FR variable is negative and significant at 1 percent. On the other hand, the 
variable Crisis x DE is also negative and significant at only 10 percent, but we find that the 
coefficient is much smaller in Germany. This suggests that firms in market-based systems 
allow their segments to invest more by transferring resources via internal capital markets.  
Additionally, our findings indicate that Tobin’s-Q appears as a significant explanatory 
variable when the dependent variable is industry-adjusted investment. For example, we report 
the coefficient of the variable DE x Tobin’s-Q as 0.019, statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. This suggests that diversified firms in Germany allowed more resources to be directed 
towards segments with good investment opportunities compared with the UK. On the other 
hand, we report the coefficient of the variable FR x Tobin’s-Q as -0.053, statistically 
significant at 1 percent. This suggests that firms in France allowed more resources to be 
allocated to segments with weak investment opportunities compared with the UK. This is in 
line with our earlier findings reported in Section 6.3.2. In particular, firms in France do not 
appear to update their investment policies in response to the financial crisis and segments that 
were the receivers of resources prior to the crisis continued to receive resources during the 
crisis despite the decline in their investment opportunities.  
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Table 6.17  
Industry-adjusted investment in the UK, France and Germany. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tobin’s-Q 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
Herfindahl Index 0.013 
(0.572) 
0.010 
(0.656) 
-0.047* 
(0.057) 
-0.040** 
(0.044) 
-0.062*** 
(0.009) 
ROA 0.002 
(0.496) 
0.002 
(0.499) 
0.002 
(0.494) 
0.000 
(0.871) 
0.000 
(0.934) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.089 
(0.305) 
-0.091 
(0.296) 
-0.090 
(0.300) 
-0.095 
(0.274) 
-0.107 
(0.222) 
Log(Segment Assets) -0.002 
(0.932) 
-0.003 
(0.911) 
-0.001 
(0.979) 
0.012 
(0.689) 
0.014 
(0.635) 
Crisis -0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.061*** 
(0.000) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
-0.060*** 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.168) 
FR x Tobin’s-Q - -0.042** 
(0.025) 
-0.042** 
(0.026) 
-0.042** 
(0.027) 
-0.053*** 
(0.010) 
DE x Tobin’s-Q - 0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
FR x HI - - 0.058 
(0.257) 
0.060 
(0.235) 
0.0105* 
(0.066) 
DE x HI - - 0.069* 
(0.092) 
0.072* 
(0.080) 
0.078** 
(0.050) 
FR x ROA - - - 0.027 
(0.104) 
0.017 
(0.307) 
DE x ROA - - - 0.017 
(0.203) 
0.019 
(0.155) 
FR x Crisis - - - - -0.166*** 
(0.000) 
DE x Crisis - - - - -0.029* 
(0.071) 
      
Constant 0.515 
(0.190) 
0.535 
(0.175) 
0.529 
(0.179) 
0.481 
(0.226) 
0.534 
(0.180) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.006 
Obs. 10,593 10,593 10,593 10,593 10,593 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis for multi-segment firms in the UK, France 
and Germany. The time period is between 2005 and 2010. The variable Crisis takes the value of 1 if the 
reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. The country dummy variables FR and DE take the value of 1 if 
the parent firm is based in France or Germany and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the industry-adjusted 
investment of segment. The independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with fixed 
effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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As a next step, we examine the similarities and differences in size of internal capital 
markets in the three countries as well as the impact of the financial crisis on its operations. In 
this analysis, our dependent variable is Size, which is a measure of cross-subsidisation of 
resources within the firm during a particular year, as discussed earlier. The results are 
presented in Table 6.18. 
 In line with our results in the prior sections, we find that size of internal capital 
markets significantly differs between the three countries. We find that internal capital market 
activity significantly increases in France compared to the UK during the financial crisis. For 
example, we report the coefficient of the variable Crisis x FR to be 0.419, statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. This suggests that firms in France make larger transfers of 
capital resources during the financial crisis. 
 In relation to this, we find that transfers of capital resources during the crisis are 
generally associated with weaker investment projects. For example, the coefficient of the 
variable FR x Tobin’s-Q appears as -0.226, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This is 
again consistent with our results in the prior section indicating that firms in France did not 
appear to update their investment policies in response to the financial crisis or allocate more 
resources towards segments that are in financial difficulty. 
 On the other hand, we only find weak evidence which suggests that internal capital 
markets became more active in Germany compared to the UK. The finding of increased 
activity does not agree with our findings from the univariate analysis in Section 5.5 which 
indicated that size on cross-subsidisation significantly decreases in Germany. However, as 
UK is the reference point in the analysis, this result suggests that firms in the UK cutback 
significantly on transfers of capital resources during the crisis.  
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Table 6.18  
The size of internal capital markets in the UK, France and Germany. 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
Herfindahl Index -0.000 
(0.754) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.026*** 
(0.010) 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
Cash Flow 0.110 
(0.679) 
0.113 
(0.670) 
0.217 
(0.264) 
0.178 
(0.329) 
0.207 
(0.253) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.011 
(0.951) 
-0.033 
(0.855) 
-0.012 
(0.950) 
0.004 
(0.981) 
0.049 
(0.792) 
Total Debt -0.015 
(0.952) 
-0.021 
(0.935) 
-0.023 
(0.926) 
0.020 
(0.937) 
-0.004 
(0.986) 
Tobin’s-Q -0.013 
(0.784) 
-0.013 
(0.776) 
-0.012 
(0.789) 
0.036 
(0.209) 
0.008 
(0.777) 
Crisis 0.128** 
(0.038) 
0.131** 
(0.033) 
0.128** 
(0.037) 
0.119** 
(0.050) 
-0.009 
(0.867) 
FR x HI - -0.076 
(0.352) 
-0.067 
(0.426) 
-0.023 
(0.796) 
-0.003 
(0.974) 
DE x HI - -0.026** 
(0.011) 
-0.026*** 
(0.010) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
-0.024*** 
(0.006) 
FR x Cash flow - - -1.953 
(0.147) 
-1.305 
(0.324) 
-1.303 
(0.320) 
DE x Cash flow - - 0.476 
(0.238) 
0.257 
(0.539) 
0.231 
(0.581) 
FR x Tobin’s-Q - - - -0.326*** 
(0.000) 
-0.226*** 
(0.002) 
DE x Tobin’s-Q - - - 0.082 
(0.144) 
0.107* 
(0.064) 
FR x Crisis - - - - 0.419*** 
(0.010) 
DE x Crisis - - - - 0.099* 
(0.082) 
      
Constant 0.337 
(0.741) 
0.467 
(0.665) 
0.349 
(0.749) 
0.222 
(0.840) 
-0.013 
(0.991) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.001 
Obs. 3,456 3,456 3,456 3,456 3,456 
This table shows the results from the regression analysis for multi-segment firms in the UK, France and 
Germany. The time period is between 2005 and 2010. The variable Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting 
year is 2008 or later and 0 otherwise. The country dummy variables FR and DE take the value of 1 if the parent 
firm is based in France or Germany and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the size of internal capital 
market within a diversified firm in a particular year. The independent variables are discussed above. The 
regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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As a final step, we investigate whether the efficiency of internal capital markets 
differs in three countries by setting the dependent variable as RVA. We present our results in 
Table 6.19. Prior research studies finds internal capital markets are generally inefficient and 
that they become more efficient during a recession (e.g. Hovakimian, 2011). We investigate 
whether efficiency improves in both bank- and market-based systems as the literature 
suggests. Our results in prior sections indicated the efficiency of internal capital markets 
improved in the UK but not in France or Germany. As before, we include country and time 
dummy variables in our analysis.  
In line with our prior results, we find that efficiency improves significantly in the UK 
during the financial crisis compared with efficiency in France and Germany during the same 
period. We report the coefficient of Crisis x FR as -0.135, statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. Furthermore, we report the coefficient of Crisis x DE as -0.131, statistically significant 
at 5 percent level. The negative sign indicates that firms in France and Germany do not 
improve the efficiency of internal capital markets as much as firms in the UK during the 
financial crisis.  
In general, our findings indicate that the financial system of a country plays a key role 
in determining the impact of the financial crisis on internal capital markets activity. Internal 
capital market operations tend to decrease in market-based systems as prior empirical 
literature suggests, however it increase significantly in France. In addition, this increase in 
activity is generally associated with lower efficiency in France. It may be that diversified 
firms in bank-based systems experienced lesser stringent environment and they did not 
respond to changes in the industry opportunities or firms used internal capital markets to 
support segments in distress regardless of their investment opportunities. 
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Internal capital markets add value when resources are efficiently allocated to finance 
value-enhancing investment projects (Stein, 2003), but destroy value if capital resources are 
misallocated (Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). As multi-divisional structure 
allows diversified firms to pool resources from different segments, there is the possibility that 
management may misuse free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). In the event of a shock to its credit 
supply, such as during a recession, managers are put under more pressure to improve 
investment policies. However, if firms face less stringent environment then they are unlikely 
to be under similar pressure to improve.  
Lastly, we find that the variable Total Debt appears negative and significant in our 
analysis. We report the coefficient as -0.379, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This 
may suggests that having too much debt forces large amount of capital resources out of the 
firm and, thus, leaves the firm unable to finance good investment opportunities. It may also 
be that managers bypass good investment opportunities to service corporate debt. 
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Table 6.19  
Efficiency of internal capital markets in the UK, France and Germany. 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
ICM Size -0.039* 
(0.091) 
-0.028 
(0.123) 
-0.108 
(0.463) 
-0.108 
(0.463) 
Cash flow -0.028 
(0.867) 
0.066 
(0.549) 
0.072 
(0.534) 
0.083 
(0.484) 
Log (Total assets) 0.062 
(0.153) 
0.091** 
(0.029) 
0.093** 
(0.029) 
0.099** 
(0.036) 
Total Debt -0.537** 
(0.043) 
-0.380*** 
(0.000) 
-0.379*** 
(0.000) 
-0.379*** 
(0.000) 
Crisis 0.029 
(0.412) 
0.116* 
(0.067) 
0.105* 
(0.051) 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
FR x Crisis - -0.152** 
(0.013) 
-0.141*** 
(0.008) 
-0.135*** 
(0.010) 
DE x Crisis - -0.146** 
(0.025) 
-0.132** 
(0.013) 
-0.131** 
(0.013) 
FR x ICM Size - - 0.083 
(0.576) 
0.084 
(0.572) 
DE x ICM Size - - 0.103 
(0.485) 
0.103 
(0.484) 
FR x Log (Total Assets) - - - -0.148* 
(0.086) 
DE x Log (Total Assets) - - - -0.030 
(0.434) 
     
Constant 1.292** 
(0.036) 
0.447* 
(0.092) 
0.447 
(0.106) 
0.647** 
(0.012) 
Adj-R Sq 0.331 0.260 0.253 0.306 
Obs. 3,325 3,325 3,325 3,325 
This table shows the results from the regression analysis for the UK, France and Germany. The time period is 
between 2005 and 2010. The variable Crisis takes the value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008 or later and 0 
otherwise. The country dummy variables FR and DE take the value of 1 if the parent firm is based in France or 
Germany and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the efficiency of internal capital market of a diversified 
firm in a particular year. The independent variables are discussed above. The regressions are estimated with 
fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
  
– 227 – 
 
6.5. Discussion on Control Variables 
6.5.1. Own Cash Flow 
Consistent with prior research, our findings indicate segment’s investment is 
significantly sensitive to their own cash flow (Shin and Stulz, 1998). The coefficients of own 
cash flow are positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level or better in all three 
countries. It appears that although internal capital markets play an important role, segments 
still rely on their own cash flow for investment. Our results for France indicate that other cash 
flow is more important than own cash flow of segments for investment. Internal capital 
markets appear to be more successful at reducing segment’s sensitivity to its own cash flow 
through internal cross-subsidisation of resources. Overall, we find that own cash flow is 
positive and significant which is in line with the theory and previous findings.  
 
6.5.2. Segment and Firm Size 
In general, the results show that the firm (segment) size has a positive (negative) 
effect on segments’ investment level. Consistent with prior literature we find that the 
coefficient of firm size appears positive and significant in the UK and Germany. This is line 
with the theory as large firms are more likely to be well diversified and have many segments, 
as well as may be able to raise more finance from external markets for investment.  
Secondly, it appears that smaller segments are more likely to be the receivers of 
internal resources as we find smaller segments tend to invest more than the industry average. 
Large diversified firms are more likely to have many segments, from small segments to very 
large segments and, thus, smaller segments are likely to be subsidised by cash flow of larger 
segments as their requirements for resources are also likely to be small compared to the 
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budget of the firm. This is again in line with previous findings of Shin and Stulz (1998) and 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) who find smaller segments are usually the receivers of internal 
resources while larger segments are usually making the transfer. 
 
6.5.3. Diversity  
We find that diversity, as measured by the Herfindahl Index, is negatively related to 
industry-adjusted capital expenditure in the UK. Our finding suggests that a segment of a 
highly diversified firm tends to invest more than industry average in the UK. In contrast, 
diversity appears to have the opposite impact on segment investment level in Germany. We 
find the coefficient is positive and significant, which suggests that segments of less 
diversified firms tend to invest more than industry average.  
Additionally, the diversity of a firm has a significant impact on the size of internal 
capital markets in market-based and bank-based systems. In specific, the results show highly 
diversified firms are more likely to have larger internal capital markets in Germany. On the 
other hand, we find firms with segments operating in related industries operate larger internal 
capital markets in the UK. Firms in the UK appear to allocate more resources when divisions 
are in similar industries, whereas in Germany internal capital allocation is larger when 
divisions are in unrelated industries. This is an important distinction between the two 
countries and indicates a different managerial perspective on operating multiple divisions in 
unrelated industries within a firm.  
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6.5.4. Investment opportunities 
We find that diversified firms pay attention to segment’s investment opportunities 
when allocating resources. These results are similar to the results from the US indicating that 
capital expenditure of segments is sensitive to investment opportunities (Shin and Stulz, 
1998). Internal capital markets can add value when good projects are financed using internal 
cash flow. Additionally, firms tend to pay more attention to segments’ investment 
opportunities during the financial crisis. 
A segment with good investment opportunities appears to invest more than industry 
average in the UK and Germany. However, we find that coefficient for investment 
opportunities appear negative and significant in France; indicating resources are flowing 
away from divisions with high-Tobin’s-Q and towards divisions with low-Tobin’s-Q. On 
further investigation, we find that this is more pronounced during the crisis period. This 
evidence is in line with our finding that efficiency of internal capital markets decreases in 
France but an increase in the UK during the recession. In addition, we find sales growth of a 
segment is a significant determinant of its investment level in Germany. In addition to this, 
our measure of segment profitability, the return on assets (ROA), appears positive but 
insignificant in most of the tests.   
Our results from the regression analysis with pooled data for three countries shows 
that low-Tobin’s-Q segments receive more capital allocations in France compared to the UK 
during the crisis. Overall, the effects of investment opportunities and sales growth on 
segment capital expenditure appear to be somewhat different across market- and bank-based 
systems. This highlights some important similarities and differences in multi-divisional firms 
and how they allocate resources internally.  
  
– 230 – 
 
6.6. Robustness Checks 
 In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results on the operations and 
efficiency of internal capital markets presented in earlier sections. The basic empirical 
strategy remains the same and the objective is to test the hypothesis in several ways. Our 
analysis proceeds in three main ways. Firstly, since asset sales may be a problem during the 
recessionary period as changes in the size of the segment could drive changes in capital 
expenditure, we focus on the ratio of investment to sales. Secondly, we use median values 
instead of averages to compute our industry adjusted measures for segments. Thirdly, we use 
segment return on assets to compute the efficiency of internal capital markets instead of 
Tobin’s-Q.  
 
6.6.1. Investment-Cash Flow Model 
 In Table 6.20, we present our findings from the investment-cash flow analysis for the 
three countries. In this analysis, the key variables are normalised by firm sales instead of total 
assets of the firm. As discussed in Section 6.2, internal capital markets can allow diversified 
firms to finance investment projects of a segment using the cash flow of other segments 
within the firm. In this case, we expect segments’ investment to be sensitive to its own cash 
flow as well as the cash flow of other segments within the firm. 
 In line with the results reported in earlier sections, we find that segment investment is 
significantly sensitive to cash flow of other segments within the firm in the UK and France. 
Furthermore, we find that Other Cash appears positive; however it does not have significant 
explanatory power only for Germany. This suggests that segments in Germany rely more on 
their own cash flow for financing investment projects. Internal capital markets appear to play 
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more significant role at allocating capital resources in the UK and France compared with 
Germany. 
 The impact of the recession on segment investment appears to be more significant in 
Germany compared with the other two countries. For example, we find that investment by 
segments of diversified firms decline significantly between 2009 and 2010 in Germany; 
however, this is not the case for UK and France. Interestingly, the variable for 2008 and 2009 
are positively related to segment capital expenditures in France suggesting that they 
significantly increased investment during that period. For the UK, we find that Crisis 
variables are negative but do not have significant explanatory power. 
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Table 6.20  
Investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
 UK France Germany 
Sales Growth -0.001* 
(0.099) 
-0.000 
(0.133) 
0.000 
(0.782) 
Own Cash 0.097*** 
(0.000) 
0.429*** 
(0.014) 
0.155** 
(0.034) 
Other Cash 0.362* 
(0.085) 
0.312*** 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.797) 
Tobin’s- Q 0.000 
(0.986) 
0.003 
(0.258) 
0.002 
(0.469) 
Year 2006 -0.005 
(0.328) 
0.009 
(0.139) 
0.003 
(0.516) 
Year 2007 -0.001 
(0.849) 
0.002 
(0.750) 
0.002 
(0.687) 
Year 2008 0.021 
(0.422) 
0.015** 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.830) 
Year 2009 -0.020 
(0.183) 
0.013* 
(0.099) 
-0.008** 
(0.021) 
Year 2010 -0.026 
(0.158) 
0.007 
(0.314) 
-0.009** 
(0.023) 
    
Constant 0.006 
(0.805) 
-0.020 
(0.243) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
R-sq 0.032 0.194 0.103 
Obs. 4,085 1,888 3,076 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis examining the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity in the UK, France and Germany. The time period is between 2005 and 2010. The dependent variable 
here is the capital expenditure of segment over total firm sales at the beginning of the year. Own Cash is cash 
flow of segments and Other Cash is cash flow of other segments within the firm. These variables are also 
normalised by total firm sales at the beginning of the year. Sales growth is change in sales of the segment at the 
beginning of the year. Tobin’s-Q is the proxy for segment investment opportunities. The regressions are 
estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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6.6.2. Relative Value Added by Allocation 
 As a next step, we examine two other measures of capital allocation, namely, the 
industry-adjusted investment of segment and firm- and industry adjusted investment of 
segment. The findings are presented in Table 6.21. For this analysis we use the median 
industry investment instead of average values. Median values are likely to be less affected by 
any outliers that may affect the average. The variables are normalised by total assets of the 
firm. 
In line with prior results, we find that segments with low Tobin’s-Q appear to be 
allocated more resources than segments with high Tobin’s-Q in France. For example, we find 
that variable Tobin’s-Q is negative and significant in our analysis. On the other hand, 
Tobin’s-Q appears to be positive and significant in Germany and the UK. This suggests that 
segments with good investment opportunities appear to invest more in Germany, but this is 
not the case in France. However, as our analysis indicated earlier, this appears to be the case 
during the crisis. Furthermore, we find that return on segment assets is negatively related to 
investments in the UK suggesting that less profitable segments invest more than high 
profitable segments of the firm. 
These findings are in line with our prior results suggesting that internal capital 
markets appear to operate more efficiently in Germany. In addition, we find that segment 
(firm) size appears negative (positive) and significant when the dependent variable is 
industry-adjusted investment in the UK and Germany. This suggests that smaller segments of 
diversified firms are allocated more capital resources. In the presence of larger segments, 
smaller segments are able to invest more resources than if it was a stand-alone firm.  
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Table 6.21  
Industry-adjusted investment of segments. 
 UK France Germany 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Tobin’s- Q -0.002 
(0.216) 
0.003* 
(0.098) 
-0.074** 
(0.026) 
-0.025* 
(0.073) 
0.008*** 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.451) 
Herfindahl Index 0.159*** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.603) 
-0.003 
(0.834) 
-0.006 
(0.607) 
0.000*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.393) 
ROA -0.002*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001** 
(0.041) 
0.002 
(0.771) 
-0.002 
(0.375) 
0.000 
(0.358) 
-0.000 
(0.701) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.134*** 
(0.005) 
0.016 
(0.530) 
0.172 
(0.401) 
0.013 
(0.921) 
0.103*** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.830) 
Log(Segment Assets) -0.025* 
(0.066) 
0.018*** 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.879) 
0.024 
(0.146) 
-0.024** 
(0.049) 
0.014 
(0.114) 
Year 06 0.027** 
(0.038) 
0.010 
(0.248) 
-0.024 
(0.340) 
-0.009 
(0.600) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.035) 
Year 07 -0.068*** 
(0.001) 
-0.028** 
(0.044) 
-0.028 
(0.397) 
-0.024 
(0.323) 
-0.035*** 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.697) 
Year 08 0.040*** 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.614) 
-0.005 
(0.906) 
-0.016 
(0.599) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.566) 
Year 09 0.036*** 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.902) 
-0.148** 
(0.046) 
-0.052 
(0.243) 
0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.245) 
Year 10 0.028* 
(0.087) 
0.008 
(0.479) 
-0.225 
(0.026) 
-0.080 
(0.213) 
0.048*** 
(0.000) 
0.014* 
(0.060) 
       
Constant 0.553** 
(0.029) 
-0.185 
(0.148) 
1.109 
(0.389) 
0.006 
(0.994) 
0.428** 
(0.028) 
-0.052 
(0.776) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.085 0.027 
Obs. 5,229 5,229 1,861 1,861 3,311 3,311 
In this analysis, the dependent variable is (1) industry-adjusted capital expenditure of segments or (2) the firm- 
and industry-adjusted capital expenditure of segments. The time period is between 2005 and 2010. The 
independent variables are same as above. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- 
and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
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As a next step, we compute the size of internal capital markets by taking the sum of 
subsidies and transfers of capital resources within diversified firms in a particular year. For 
this analysis, we use the investment of segments that have been adjusted using median 
industry values instead of average values. We present the results in Table 6.22. The 
dependent variable here is the Size of an internal capital market of a diversified firm in a 
particular year.  
 Our results are generally in line with the results reported in prior sections. For 
example, we find that internal capital market activity declines in the UK during the crisis 
period. The variable Crisis appears negative with a coefficient of -0.104 and statistically 
significant. On the other hand, we find that this variable appears positive for both France and 
Germany, but statistically significant only for France. In general, the results indicate that 
managers’ cutback on cross-subsidisations of capital resources during the crisis period in the 
UK. This may be due to the falling sales and cash flow across segments, which then leads to 
fewer resources for reallocation at firm level. Furthermore, external capital constraints may 
also lead to fewer resources available for investment. 
 On the other hand, managers in France and Germany appear to use internal capital 
market channel to possibly support segments in distress during recession by increasing the 
cross-subsidisation of resources to weaker divisions. Internal capital markets appear to 
become more active during the crisis period compared to non-recession period. Furthermore, 
we find that firms that have high Tobin’s-Q tend to operate larger internal capital market in 
Germany. This suggests that firms engage in cross-subsidisation of resources to take 
advantage of investment opportunities within a segment by using cash flow of other segments 
within the firm.   
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Table 6.22  
Size of internal capital markets. 
 UK France Germany 
Herfindahl Index 0.001 
(0.821) 
0.018 
(0.576) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Cash Flow 0.136 
(0.190) 
-0.639 
(0.345) 
0.013 
(0.915) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.062*** 
(0.011) 
-0.315 
(0.589) 
-0.013 
(0.887) 
Short-Term Debt 0.167 
(0.229) 
0.094 
(0.862) 
0.064 
(0.732) 
Long-Term Debt -0.154 
(0.259) 
-0.129 
(0.774) 
-0.278 
(0.127) 
Tobin’s- Q 0.016 
(0.177) 
-0.011 
(0.766) 
0.072*** 
(0.002) 
Inventory Turnover 0.000 
(0.454) 
-0.000 
(0.395) 
-0.000 
(0.046) 
Crisis -0.104*** 
(0.010) 
0.113* 
(0.055) 
0.053 
(0.267) 
    
Constant 0.517* 
(0.094) 
2.056 
(0.546) 
0.106 
(0.837) 
Adj. R-Sq. 0.004 0.002 0.099 
Obs. 1,602 645 1,209 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis for the UK, France and Germany. The 
dependent variable is the size of internal capital market within a multi-segment firm in a particular year. The 
time period is between 2005 and 2010. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and 
clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Finally, we investigate the efficiency of internal capital markets in the three countries 
in our analysis. For this analysis, we construct RVA by (i) using median industry values 
instead of average values (results presented in Table 6.23), and (ii) return on assets of 
segment (results presented in Table 6.24).  
In general, the results support our previous finding that internal capital markets 
become more efficient during the crisis period in the UK. For example, the dummy variable 
for the year 2009 appears positive with a coefficient of 0.006 and statistically significant. 
This is in line with prior literature and suggests that managers improve capital allocation 
process when external credit becomes difficult to obtain such as during a recession 
(Hovakimian, 2011). This also supports the theory that in the presence of free cash flow 
managers are more likely to misallocate resources (Jensen, 1986). Thus, as cash flow declines 
during economic downturn, managers are put under more pressure to make more efficient 
capital allocations.  
On the other hand, we find that this is not the case in France or Germany. For 
example, we find that the dummy variables for year 2008 and 2009 appear negative and 
significant for France. This indicates that efficiency of internal capital markets declines 
during the crisis in France. It may be that firms in France and Germany faced less stringent 
environment during the recession, and hence, managers were under less pressure to increase 
the efficiency of internal capital allocations. It may also be that firms were using internal 
capital markets to support financially weaker segments of the firms even when their 
investment opportunities continued to decline. 
In addition, the size of internal capital markets is negatively related to the efficiency 
of internal capital markets. For example, the coefficient of the variable Size ICM appears 
negative for all countries in our analysis; however, it has significant explanatory power only 
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in the case of France. This suggests that firms that operate larger internal capital markets tend 
to misallocate more capital resources.  
Finally, the results in Table 6.24 also indicate that internal capital markets are more 
inefficient prior to the crisis in the UK and they become less inefficient during the crisis. On 
the other hand, we do not find any evidence to suggest this may be the case for France and 
Germany. In the case of Germany, we find that the dummy variable for the year 2006 is 
positive and significant indicating that managers allow segments high ROA to invest more 
than segments with low ROA. Additionally, the size of internal capital markets appears to 
have a negative sign for the case of UK and France; however, it fails to have any significant 
explanatory power.  
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Table 6.23  
Efficiency of internal capital markets (Tobin’s-Q). 
 UK France Germany 
Size ICM -0.033 
(0.347) 
-0.003* 
(0.099) 
-0.022 
(0.200) 
Cash flow -0.002 
(0.939) 
0.037* 
(0.059) 
-0.996 
(0.147) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.033*** 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.784) 
-1.998 
(0.101) 
Short-term debt 0.003 
(0.873) 
0.007 
(0.668) 
0.131 
(0.502) 
Long-term debt -0.040 
(0.375) 
-0.003 
(0.823) 
0.144 
(0.559) 
Herfindahl Index -0.092*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.264) 
0.000 
(0.598) 
Year 2006 0.012 
(0.362) 
-0.003 
(0.141) 
0.025 
(0.333) 
Year 2007 -0.001 
(0.896) 
-0.002 
(0.382) 
0.129 
(0.131) 
Year 2008 -0.006 
(0.594) 
-0.006** 
(0.018) 
0.251 
(0.114) 
Year 2009 0.006* 
(0.069) 
-0.008* 
(0.090) 
0.269 
(0.112) 
Year 2010 0.009 
(0.172) 
-0.004 
(0.391) 
0.198 
(0.127) 
    
Constant 0.243*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050 
(0.465) 
11.270 
(0.101) 
Adj-R Sq 0.511 0.016 0.014 
Obs. 1,602 645 1,164 
The dependent variable is efficiency of internal capital market of a multi-segment firm in a particular year. The 
time period is between 2005 and 2010. The dependent variable is RVA (Tobin’s-Q as a proxy for segment 
investment opportunities) constructed using median industry values. The regressions are estimated with fixed 
effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 6.24  
Efficiency of internal capital markets (ROA). 
 UK France Germany 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Size ICM -0.000 
(0.600) 
-0.000 
(0.612) 
-0.000 
(0.712) 
-0.000 
(0.673) 
0.000 
(0.404) 
0.000 
(0.398) 
Cash flow 0.001 
(0.312) 
0.001 
(0.353) 
0.001 
(0.853) 
0.001 
(0.771) 
0.004* 
(0.063) 
0.004* 
(0.098) 
Log(Total 
Assets) 
0.001 
(0.336) 
0.001 
(0.346) 
-0.005 
(0.247) 
-0.004 
(0.283) 
0.000 
(0.850) 
0.000 
(0.907) 
Short-term debt -0.001 
(0.416) 
-0.001 
(0.420) 
-0.003 
(0.681) 
-0.003 
(0.670) 
0.001 
(0.682) 
0.001 
(0.709) 
Long-term debt -0.001 
(0.594) 
-0.000 
(0.586) 
0.003 
(0.648) 
0.002 
(0.672) 
0.002 
(0.340) 
0.002 
(0.327) 
Herfindahl 
Index 
0.001 
(0.378) 
0.001 
(0.381) 
-0.001* 
(0.056) 
-0.001* 
(0.071) 
-0.000 
(0.743) 
-0.000 
(0.759) 
Year 2006 -0.001** 
(0.040) 
- -0.000 
(0.999) 
- 0.001* 
(0.097) 
- 
Year 2007 -0.000 
(0.227) 
- 0.000 
(0.709) 
- 0.000 
(0.523) 
- 
Year 2008 -0.000 
(0.614) 
- -0.000 
(0.705) 
- 0.000 
(0.788) 
- 
Year 2009 -0.000 
(0.775) 
- -0.001 
(0.346) 
- 0.000 
(0.654) 
- 
Year 2010 -0.000 
(0.474) 
- -0.001 
(0.492) 
- 0.000 
(0.309) 
- 
Crisis - 0.000 
(0.667) 
- -0.001 
(0.413) 
- 0.000 
(0.514) 
       
Constant -0.003 
(0.340) 
-0.003 
(0.354) 
0.028 
(0.220) 
0.025 
(0.255) 
-0.001 
(0.696) 
-0.001 
(0.762) 
Adj-R Sq 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 
Obs. 1,565 1,565 586 586 1,093 1,093 
This table shows the efficiency of internal capital markets in three countries between 2005 and 2010. The 
dependent variable is the relative value added by allocation (RVA) calculated using return on segment assets 
instead of Tobin’s-Q. All the independent variables are described above and remain the same. The regressions 
are estimated with fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity- and clustered-robust p-values are presented in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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6.7. Summary 
 In this chapter, we examined the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets 
in two distinct financial systems, namely, the bank- and market-based financial system. Our 
objective is to determine (i) whether internal capital markets are active and efficient, (ii) 
impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on their operation and efficiency, and (iii) the 
similarities and differences in internal capital markets in bank- and market-based financial 
system.  
 We find that internal capital markets play a vital role in allocating capital resources 
within multi-segment firms in all three countries, although this is to a lesser extent in 
Germany. Furthermore, we find that internal capital market activity decreases in the UK 
during the financial crisis indicating that managers are more cautious about cross-subsidising 
capital resources to invest in new investment projects. On the other hand, we find that 
diversified firms in France increase the cross-subsidisation of resources during the financial 
crisis. 
 Our next research question aimed to explore the efficiency of internal capital markets 
in these three countries. We find that internal capital markets are inefficient in general, 
although this is to a lesser extent in France or Germany. This suggests that the supervisory 
role of banks (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) and their “hands-on” approach (Chakraborty and 
Ray, 2006) puts more pressure on managers to make better use of capital resources. 
Additionally, during the financial crisis multi-segment firms significantly improve their 
investment policies and allocate resources more efficiently in the UK. However, we find that 
this is not the case in France or Germany. In France, we find that the increase in the level of 
cross-subsidisation of capital resources during the crisis is related to lower efficiency.  
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 In general, our findings indicate that internal capital market activity varies 
significantly between market- and bank-based systems. The crisis has a significant and 
positive effect on managers’ productivity and putting them under more pressure to make 
better use of capital resources in market-based systems. However, this doesn’t appear to be 
the case in bank-based systems. It may be that, due to close relationship with banks, firms’ 
experienced less stringent environment in France and Germany and, therefore, faced less 
pressure to improve their investment policies. It may also be that firms used internal capital 
markets to support financially weaker segments of the firm even during the period when their 
investment opportunities continued to decline. 
 In the next chapter, we examine the link between internal capital markets and 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors. In particular, we investigate whether the presence of 
internal capital markets increase firm complexity, which in turn, negatively affects the 
accuracy of the forecasts.   
 
  
– 243 – 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 – ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECAST ERRORS AND 
INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE UK, FRANCE 
AND GERMANY 
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7.1. Introduction 
 It has been well documented that analysts play a key role in promoting market 
efficiency by reducing the information asymmetries between firms’ management and market 
participants (Hall and Tacon, 2010). As discussed in Chapter 5, financial analysts provide 
three key measures in their research reports, namely, earnings forecasts, buy/sell 
recommendations and target price. A number of studies document that markets react quickly 
to analysts’ research reports and stock prices tend to move in the direction of the forecast 
(e.g. Kim, Lin and Slovin, 1997). For these reasons, the qualities of forecasts as well as the 
factors that may affect analysts’ forecasting ability have received considerable attention in 
prior literature (Ramnath et al., 2008). In particular, the complexity of the firm has shown to 
be a significant factor of earnings forecasts errors (Duru and Reeb, 2002; Plumlee, 2003).  
 In this chapter, we investigate whether the presence of internal capital markets within 
diversified firms aggravate firm complexity and, thus, have an impact on analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors. It is well documented that analysts value segment level information, and 
analyst coverage increases when firms disclose more information about their segments 
(Botoson and Harris, 2000). However, prior literature is silent on the relationship between 
internal capital markets and earnings forecast errors, and whether their presence can explain 
the forecast inaccuracy, bias and dispersion documented in prior literature. 
 In Section 7.2, we discuss our method for computing analysts’ forecast accuracy, bias 
and dispersion. In Section 7.3 we discuss the basic model. Next, we present our results from 
the univariate analysis in Section 7.4. In Section 7.5, we present our findings from the 
multivariate analysis. Our results from the cross-country analysis are presented and discussed 
in Section 7.6. We discuss the robustness of our findings in Section 7.7. Finally, Section 7.8 
concludes the chapter.  
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7.2. Method: Analysts’ Forecast Errors 
In this section, we discuss the method for computing the main variables for the 
analysis, namely, the accuracy of forecasts, bias embedded in these forecasts and dispersion 
in earnings forecasts. In particular, we examine three key estimates, namely, the 1-year 
earnings forecast, 2-year earnings forecast and long-term earnings growth forecast. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, we obtain the data on earnings forecasts from the I/B/E/S 
(Institutional Brokers Estimate System) and the firm- and segment-level data are obtained 
from Datastream. We obtain key data items for these estimates for our sample of firms in 
three countries in our analysis.20 
For this analysis, we require firms to have at least three analysts following in a 
respective research year and estimates are available in the 3-4 months after the release of 
financial statements by the firm. The forecast errors are calculated at 3-4 months after the 
firms’ fiscal year-end month. If the forecast information is not available then we exclude the 
firm from the analysis. 
For example, for a firm with December as fiscal year-end month, we would require 
earnings estimates to be available between March-April in the following year. Also, if the 
firm year-end month is March, then we would require estimates between June-July. The 3-4 
month lag is consistent with prior studies (Rajan and Sarvaes, 1997; Bradshaw et al., 2006) 
and we can be sure that analysts’ have access to financial statements and sufficient time to 
absorb segment-level data and incorporate this information into their forecasts. 
The Figure 7.1 below demonstrates this method by using a timeline of events. We use 
an example of a firm whose fiscal year-end month is December and analysts provide future 
                                                          
20  We obtain the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of 1-year, 2-year and LTG 
forecasts as well as the number of analysts following the firm. The analysts’ variables we obtain from I/B/E/S 
represent the monthly consensus items. 
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earnings forecasts in April (t+4 months) using the internal capital markets data for the prior 
fiscal year (t-1), such as the 1-year, 2-year and long-term growth (LTG) forecasts. The 
procedure is similar for firms whose fiscal month end is March or July. In the example given 
in Fable 7.1, the forecast error will be calculated at month t+4 (i.e. April 2006) for the 
upcoming year(s). 
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Figure 7.1  
Timeline. 
 
 
 April 2006. – 
Analysts determine 
ICM activity and 
efficiency for year 
2005 and make 
predictions about 
firms’ 1- and 2-year 
earnings. As well 
as, estimate firms’ 
earnings growth. 
 April 2007. – 
Analysts determine 
ICM activity and 
efficiency for the 
year 2006 and make 
predictions about 1- 
and 2-year earnings 
as well as growth.  
 
     
     
     
Dec 2005. – 
Release of financial 
statements by the 
firm which contains 
ICM data. Firm 
announces earnings 
per share for prior 
fiscal year. 
 Dec 2006. – Firm 
announces the 
earnings per share 
for prior fiscal year. 
Firm also discloses 
financial statements 
which contain ICM 
data. 
 Dec 2007. – Firm 
announces earnings 
per share for prior 
fiscal year. 
Financial 
statements become 
available with ICM 
data.  
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As a first step, we follow Bradshaw et al. (2006) to compute the 1-year (FY1), 2-year 
(FY2) and long-term growth (LTG) forecast error variables. In terms of the long-term growth 
estimate, a five-year horizon is representative of what analysts’ have in mind when these 
forecasts are made.21  
 
FY1: This is the realised earnings per share for the upcoming year minus the monthly 
consensus forecast amount. 
 
FY2: The realised earnings per share for the year after the upcoming year minus the 
monthly consensus forecast amount. 
 
LTG: This variable is computed as the realised long-term growth minus the monthly 
consensus long-term growth forecast amount. The realised long-term growth is taken 
as the coefficient of an OLS regression of the natural log of earnings per share on a 
time trend. We require at least two actual reported earnings to be available to be able 
to compute realised growth in earnings per share. 
 
As a next step, we follow Bradshaw et al. (2006) and Hilary and Hsu (2013) to 
compute the Accuracy, Bias and Dispersion in these forecasts. Similar to Bradshaw et al. 
(2006) we take the forecast error at month 4 from the fiscal year month end of a firm. As a 
robustness check, we also take the forecast at month 3 after firms’ fiscal year end and 
compute the forecast errors (Rajan and Servaes, 1997).  
                                                          
21 Thomson Financial, I/B/E/S Database. 
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Firstly, the Accuracy of the forecast is the absolute distance of the estimate from the 
actual earnings, normalised by stock price at the end of the month. This variable indicates the 
analysts’ ability to make accurate predictions about the firms’ future earnings. A number of 
studies have documented that ranked analysts are better able to process complex information 
(Plumlee, 2003) and issue more accurate forecasts.  
Second, the Bias of the forecast is the signed error of the estimate from the actual 
earnings. It is obtained as realised earnings minus the forecast, normalised by stock price at 
the end of the month. Prior literature finds that analysts are generally optimistic about firms’ 
performance (Bradshaw et al., 2006; Ramnath et al., 2008). Therefore, we expect the signed 
error to be negative in general indicating optimism about firms’ future earnings performance. 
Jackson (2005) argues that only experienced investors are likely to be aware of systematic 
bias in forecasts and, hence, will be able to de-bias forecasts.  
Third, we examine the Dispersion in earnings forecast. This variable is computed as 
the standard deviation of forecasts, normalised by stock price at the end of the month. A 
number of studies have normalised the standard deviation by absolute mean value of the 
forecasts for the month (Barron and Stuerke, 1998; Avramov et al., 2008) as well as stock 
price (Hope, 2010). We normalise the variable by stock price at the end of the month, and in 
our robustness analysis we use absolute mean value of the forecasts to normalise the 
variables.  
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Table 7.2  
Analysts’ forecast characteristics. 
  
Forecast Error 
 
Method 
Accuracy 
 
 
|𝑅𝑌𝑎𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑌𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝐹𝑇𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑆 −  𝐹𝑜𝐹𝑌𝑐𝑎𝑆𝐹|
𝑆𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑆 𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑌  
Bias 
 
 
𝑅𝑌𝑎𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑌𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝐹𝑇𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑆 −  𝐹𝑜𝐹𝑌𝑐𝑎𝑆𝐹
𝑆𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑆 𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑌  
Dispersion 𝑆𝐹𝑎𝑇𝑑𝑎𝐹𝑑 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐹𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑇|𝑀𝑌𝑎𝑇 𝐹𝑜𝐹𝑌𝑐𝑎𝑆𝐹|  
This table shows the method for calculating the analysts’ earnings forecast characteristics, namely, accuracy, 
bias and dispersion. The realised earnings is the actual earnings per share of a firm reported for the particular 
year. The forecast amount is the monthly consensus forecast (mean) amount. The forecast errors at calculated at 
t+4 month from the firms’ fiscal year-end month. Stock price is the end of month price in which the forecast 
error is calculated. Standard deviation measures the dispersion in earnings forecasts supplied by analysts.  
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7.3. The Basic Model 
 In this section, we present and discuss the model we use to determine the relationship 
between internal capital markets and analysts’ forecast errors. In particular, we extend the 
model mainly used in prior literature to investigate the link between forecast errors and 
external financing (e.g. Bradshaw et al., 2006) by including our internal capital markets 
variables. Our measures of internal capital markets operations and efficiency are discussed in 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Here we merely use the results from Chapter 6 and determine 
whether presence of internal capital markets increases firm complexity and, thus, affects 
analysts’ forecast errors.  
 
7.3.1. Forecast Errors and Internal Capital Markets 
Prior empirical literature mainly uses regression analysis to determine the impact of 
key firm variables on forecast characteristics (e.g. Duru and Reeb, 2002; Bradshaw et al., 
2006). For example, Duru and Reeb (2002) use accuracy and bias in earnings forecasts as the 
dependent variable and firm complexity measures as independent variables in their analysis. 
Similarly, Bradshaw et al. (2006) use the Fama-Macbeth regression analysis to investigate the 
link between analyst variables and external financing i.e. debt and equity.  
In particular, Bradshaw et al. (2006) use forecast errors as dependent variable and 
external financing variables as independent variable, and find that equity and debt financing 
are highly significant. Equation (7.1) shows the relationship between the two variables. 
Bradshaw et al. (2006) also document that analysts’ are generally optimistic in their forecasts 
about the future profitability of firms’ that are involved in issuing debt or equity. Although 
the level of optimism is higher with equity financing compared with debt financing.  
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𝑅𝑇𝑎𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐹 𝑑𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑌 =  𝛼 +  𝛽.𝐸𝑥𝐹𝑌𝐹𝑇𝑎𝑆 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑎𝑇𝑐𝐹𝑇𝐸 +  𝜀               (7.1) 
 
As our primary objective is to determine whether internal capital markets increase 
firm complexity and, in turn, affect analyst variables, we extend the model by including our 
measure of internal capital market activity and efficiency. Thus, our dependent variable is the 
Accuracy, Bias or Dispersion in earnings forecast. Additionally, the main independent 
variables under investigation are the size of internal capital markets (Size ICM) and their 
efficiency (Efficiency ICM). Our choice of control variables is guided by prior literature and 
availability of data.   
Internal capital markets allow segments to overcome frictions associated with raising 
finance on external markets. However, the data on internal capital markets is static and their 
operations are imperfectly observable only at irregular intervals i.e. from the segment-level 
information in firms’ annual or semi-annual reports. The lack of visibility to financing 
decisions made internally is likely to aggravate information asymmetry problems between 
firms’ management and external market participants. In addition to this, it may increase 
firms’ complexity and distort analysts’ forecasts to a greater extent, especially if firms are 
operating large internal capital markets.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the complexity of the task is negatively related to accuracy 
and positively related to optimism and dispersion in earnings forecasts (Duru and Reeb, 2002; 
Plumlee, 2003). If internal capital markets aggravate complexity then we expect the extent of 
their operations and forecast accuracy to be negatively related. Furthermore, prior research 
finds that analysts are generally optimistic (Bradshaw et al., 2006) and the level of optimism 
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rises with firm complexity. On the one hand, analysts may be more optimistic about firms’ 
future performance if they believe firms’ internal capital markets to be efficient. On the other 
hand, inefficient internal capital markets may be seen as value-diminishing and, therefore, 
associated with less optimism.  
 
𝑅𝑇𝑎𝑆𝐹𝑆𝐹 𝑑𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑏𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1.𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑌_𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2.𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑌𝑇𝑐𝐹_𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿.𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (7.2) 
 
In Equation (7.2), the dependent variable is the analysts’ earnings forecast errors and i 
and t refer to firm and year respectively. 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑌 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑐𝐹𝑌𝑇𝑐𝐹 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 are the size 
and efficiency of internal capital market of firm i in the last fiscal year t-1, respectively. 
Lastly, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  indicates the control variables in the analysis. Prior research has shown that 
external financing activity can have a significant impact on the analysts’ forecast accuracy 
(Bradshaw et al., 2006). For example, analysts tend to be more optimistic about firms’ future 
performance when it raises finance in external markets.  
Therefore, we include net proceeds from issuing equity (∆E) and net proceeds from 
issuing debt (∆D) in our model as control variables. We calculate net proceeds from equity as 
net proceeds from sale/issue of common and preferred stock minus share buyback amount 
during the fiscal year minus cash dividends paid in total during the fiscal year. Similarly, net 
proceeds from debt are obtained from proceeds from long-term borrowing minus 
increase/decrease in short-term borrowing minus reduction in long-term debt. Both variables 
are normalised by total assets of the firm.  
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Earlier empirical studies also suggest that analysts tend to be more optimistic in their 
short- and long-term forecasts when firms raise finance from equity issuance. Debt financing 
is mainly related to higher optimism in the short-term forecasts. Increased debt level can 
force cash out of the firm and increase firm risk. We expect a negative relationship between 
external financing measures and Bias indicating that analysts are more optimistic when a firm 
issues debt or equity. We do not combine equity and debt financing proceeds in our model; 
this is because we are interested in their partial effect on analysts forecast accuracy.  
Additionally, we follow Duru and Reeb (2002) to include Firm Size (natural log of 
total assets), Sales Growth and Investment (capital expenditure normalised by total assets). 
We also include Herfindahl Index in our model as a measure of diversity. We expect a 
positive relationship between accuracy of forecasts and firms’ level of diversity. This is 
because if firms have operations in related business then the information complexity is likely 
to be less compared with firms that have operations in unrelated business lines. As a last step, 
we include time- and country-dummy variables in the model. As discussed in Chapter 5 and 
6, we take the recessionary period between 2008 and 2010. In specific, we consider 2008 as 
early crisis, 2009 as mid-crisis and 2010 as late-crisis period. In the next section we present 
our findings. 
 
7.4. Empirical Results 
In general, our results indicate that the presence of internal capital markets has an 
effect on analysts’ forecasts errors and this effect varies between countries. In line with our 
hypothesis on internal capital markets increasing firm complexity, we find that their level of 
operations negatively affect the accuracy of short-term forecasts in the UK. This suggests that 
firms that operate larger internal capital markets increase the complexity of information for 
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analysts and, thus, reduce their ability to issue accurate forecasts. However, we do not find 
any evidence to suggest that this is the case in France or Germany. 
Furthermore, we find that internal capital market operations are positively related to 
the level of dispersion in long-term growth forecasts in the UK. This suggests that analysts 
tend to disagree about the impact of internal capital market operations on long-term 
performance of the firm. On the other hand, we do not find this is the case in France or 
Germany. However, we do find some evidence which suggests that analysts are more 
optimistic about firms’ performance when internal capital markets are efficient in Germany. 
Lastly, our analysis indicates that analysts are generally optimistic about firms’ 
performance, and this optimism significantly reduces during the financial crisis. We also find 
that accuracy declines and the level of dispersion increases during the recessionary period in 
all three countries. These findings highlight the general uncertainty among investors during 
the financial crisis. In the next subsection, we present and discuss our findings from the 
univariate and multivariate analysis.  
 
7.4.1. Univariate Analysis 
 In this subsection, we examine the relationship between the analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors and internal capital markets operations and efficiency. We present the analysis 
separately for each country in order to make a distinction between the three countries. As 
discussed above, our three analysts’ forecast characteristics are accuracy, bias and dispersion. 
In particular, we focus on three estimates provided by analysts, namely, 1-year, 2-year and 
long-term earnings growth forecast.  
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7.4.1.1. Results from the UK  
Table 7.3 presents descriptive statistics on analysts forecast characteristics for the UK. 
In general, we find more analysts provide short-term forecasts and fewer analysts provide 
long-term forecasts, and for this reason, our analysis on long-term growth forecasts is based 
on fewer observations. Similarly, Bradshaw et al. (2006) have almost 4 times as many short-
term forecast observations than long-term growth forecast observations in their analysis. In 
general, our findings indicate that analysts appear to be more accurate with their short-term 
forecasts compared with long-term forecasts. For example, we find that the average (median) 
Accuracy for the 1-year forecasts is 0.040 (0.001) and for the long-term growth forecasts its 
0.097 (0.070).  
This may suggest that analysts are better able to incorporate information on factors 
that may affect firms’ profitability in the short-term into their forecasts. Furthermore, the time 
period in our analysis captures the financial crisis of 2008 which may aggravate the long-term 
growth forecast errors. For example, declining sales, cash flow and investment opportunities 
during the recessionary period are likely to increase doubts on firm’ future cash flows and 
profitability. The general uncertainty during the crisis, coupled with volatility in cash flows, 
may lead to greater forecasting complexity. This is in line with Haw et al. (1994) who 
document that as forecast complexity increases, analysts forecast accuracy declines.  
As a next step, we examine the bias in earnings forecast and in line with prior 
literature we find that analysts are generally optimistic about firms’ future performance. For 
example, we report the average (median) Bias in 1-year forecast and long-term growth 
forecast as -0.019 (-0.000) and -0.072 (-0.063), respectively. These results are in line with the 
findings of Dechow and Sloan (1997) and Bradshaw et al. (2006). In particular, Bradshaw et 
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al. (2006) find optimism in analysts forecast in the US and report the average 1-year and 2-
year earnings forecast error as -0.028 and -0.036, respectively.  
Additionally, we examine the impact of the financial crisis on analysts’ forecast bias 
and find optimism in earnings forecast significantly reduces during the crisis. For example, in 
the UK we find that average Bias in long-term growth forecast was around 0.087 before the 
crisis and it declines to 0.052 during the crisis, difference statistically significant at 1 percent 
level. We find no significant evidence to suggest that analysts’ are more or less optimistic 
with the short-term earnings forecasts before and during the crisis in the UK, as we find 
insignificant change in 1-year or 2-year earnings forecast bias.  
Lastly, we find that the Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts increases as the time horizon 
of the forecast increases. We report the average (median) dispersion in 1-year and 2-year 
earnings forecast as 0.089 (0.055) and 0.162 (0.069), respectively. Similarly, we report 
average (median) dispersion as 0.640 (0.446) in long-term growth forecasts. This suggests 
that there is generally a greater level of disagreement amongst analysts about firms’ long-
term performance than short-term earnings. The increase in level of dispersion during the 
crisis is also likely to be aggravated by the uncertain economic environment during the 
financial crisis of 2008.   
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Table 7.3  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Number 
of firms 
Accuracy FY1 0.040 0.001 0.112 1,469 405 
FY2 0.049 0.014 0.098 1,469 405 
LTG 0.097 0.070 0.088 537 153 
Bias  FY1 -0.019 -0.000 0.117 1,469 405 
FY2 -0.029 -0.003 0.105 1,469 405 
LTG -0.072 -0.063 0.110 537 153 
Dispersion FY1 0.089 0.055 0.413 1,233 362 
FY2 0.162 0.069 0.179 1,204 356 
LTG 0.640 0.522 0.744 270 73 
This table presents the forecast characteristics for the UK. FY1 and FY2 are the 1-year and 2-year earnings 
forecasts, respectively. LTG is the long-term earnings growth forecasts. Accuracy is the absolute distance 
between mean forecast and realised earnings. Bias is the signed error of the estimate from the actual earnings. 
Dispersion is the standard deviation in forecasts supplied by analysts over mean forecast. The forecast variables 
are constructed at firm-level and time period is between 2006 and 2011. The number of observations shows firm 
years.  
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Table 7.4 shows the relationship between analysts forecast characteristics and size of 
internal capital market within the firm. In particular, our objective is to determine whether 
analysts forecasts errors increase or decrease with the level the internal capital market activity 
within multi-segment firms. In general, we find that analysts tend to disagree more about 
firms’ future performance when the firm operates larger internal capital market. We report a 
significant increase in Dispersion associated with higher level of internal capital markets 
operations. However, we do not find significant affect of internal capital market activity on 
forecast accuracy or bias. 
Firstly, our results suggest that the level of dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts 
increases as the size of internal capital markets increases in the UK. This is consistent with 
the idea that internal capital markets aggravate forecast complexity. As managers are not 
required to disclose information on intra-segmental cross-subsidisation of capital resources, it 
is likely to aggravate problems due to information asymmetry, and therefore, analysts may 
have differing opinions about the value creating aspect of such transfers of capital resources.  
Secondly, we find only some evidence that suggests analysts are less optimistic about 
firms’ future performance when the firm operates large internal capital market. For example, 
the average (median) bias in the 2-year forecast is -0.037 (-0.006) in the lower quartile (0-
25%) and -0.028 (-0.002) in the upper quartile (75-100%), difference in median is statistically 
significant. This finding suggests that increase in the level of cross-subsidisation of resources 
reduces forecast bias. Similarly, we find that accuracy improves when firms operate larger 
internal capital markets; however, the results are statistically insignificant. This suggests that 
analysts expect multi-segment firms to shift resources between segments to some extent. 
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Table 7.4  
ICM Activity and Forecast Errors in the UK. 
 
 
 
FY1 FY2 LTG 
0-25% 0.046 
(0.012) 
[0.113] 
0.059 
(0.021) 
[0.102] 
0.095 
(0.065) 
[0.088] 
25-50% 0.042 
(0.009) 
[0.122] 
0.047 
(0.016) 
[0.096] 
0.097 
(0.077) 
[0.078] 
50-75% 0.037 
(0.009) 
[0.101] 
0.046 
(0.014) 
[0.089] 
0.094 
(0.066) 
[0.088] 
75-100% 0.036 
(0.006)a 
[0.109] 
0.043** 
(0.009)a 
[0.103] 
0.010 
(0.070) 
[0.098] 
Panel A  
Bias 
0-25% -0.022 
(0.000) 
[0.120] 
-0.037 
(-0.006) 
[0.111] 
-0.069 
(-0.058) 
[0.011] 
25-50% -0.012 
(-0.001) 
[0.127] 
-0.023 
(-0.002) 
[0.104] 
-0.070 
(-0.071) 
[0.010] 
50-75% -0.018 
(-0.000) 
[0.106] 
-0.028 
(-0.002) 
[0.096] 
-0.069 
(-0.056) 
[0.011] 
75-100% -0.016 
(-0.000)c 
[0.114] 
-0.032 
(-0.002)b 
[0.107] 
-0.079 
(-0.058) 
[0.012] 
Panel B  
Dispersion 
0-25% 0.137 
(0.052) 
[0.482] 
0.076 
(0.060) 
[0.059] 
0.754 
(0.404) 
[1.367] 
25-50% 0.159 
(0.055) 
[0.439] 
0.183 
(0.092) 
[0.645] 
1.684 
(0.477) 
[7.495] 
50-75% 0.125 
(0.053) 
[0.379] 
0.338 
(0.076) 
[2.049] 
2.005 
(0.511) 
[7.217] 
75-100% 0.145 
(0.078)a 
[0.273] 
0.194*** 
(0.069)b 
[0.878] 
0.844* 
(0.622)a 
[0.844] 
This table shows the mean (median) and [standard deviation] of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, bias (Panel 
A) and dispersion (Panel B). Internal capital markets variables are calculated between 2005 and 2010. Analysts’ 
forecasts are calculated between 2006 and 2011. The 0-25 range indicates low ICM activity and 75-100 
indicates high ICM activity. The mean (median) values marked *** (a), ** (b), * (c) shows 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. This shows the difference in forecast errors of high and low internal capital markets operations. 
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7.4.1.2. Results from France 
In Table 7.5 we present the descriptive statistics on analysts forecast characteristics 
for France. Similar to the findings for the UK, we find that accuracy of the forecast generally 
declines as the time horizon of the forecast increases. For example, we report the average 
(median) Accuracy is 0.047 (0.015) for the 1-year forecasts and 0.117 (0.073) for the long-
term growth forecasts. This suggests that analysts are more accurate about firms’ earnings in 
the short-term than its long-term performance.  
Additionally, we find that analysts are more optimistic about firms’ long-term 
performance compared with short-term performance. For example, we report the average 
(median) Bias in short-term forecasts as -0.015 (-0.002) and in long-term forecasts as -0.094 
(-0.059). This is in line with the findings of Kang et al. (1994) suggesting that analysts’ 
optimism increases with forecast horizon. Comparing the bias in 2-year forecast in the UK 
and France, we find that the average Bias is -0.030, and -0.033 for the UK and France, 
respectively. These results are very similar and suggest that there are little differences in 
analysts’ optimism in firms based in these two countries. 
 In line with above findings, the level of dispersion amongst analysts appears to 
increase with the forecast time horizon.  For example, we find that Dispersion increases from 
0.244 (0.088) for 1-year forecast to 0.950 (0.585) for long-term growth forecast. Although 
there is a greater level of optimism in the long-term growth, there is also a higher level of 
variation in forecasts provided by analysts on firms’ earnings growth.  
 
 
  
– 262 – 
 
Table 7.5  
Descriptive Statistics.  
 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Number 
of firms 
Accuracy FY1 0.047 0.015 0.086 520 131 
FY2 0.064 0.030 0.094 520 131 
LTG 0.117 0.073 0.126 239 70 
Bias  FY1 -0.015 -0.002 0.097 520 131 
FY2 -0.033 -0.014 0.109 520 131 
LTG -0.094 -0.059 0.144 239 70 
Dispersion FY1 0.244 0.088 0.552 438 120 
FY2 0.211 0.114 0.344 435 120 
LTG 0.950 0.585 1.119 144 52 
This table presents the forecast characteristics for France. FY1 and FY2 are the 1-year and 2-year earnings 
forecasts, respectively. LTG is the long-term earnings growth forecasts. Accuracy is the absolute distance 
between mean forecast and realised earnings. Bias is the signed error of the estimate from the actual earnings. 
Dispersion is the standard deviation in forecasts supplied by analysts. The forecast variables are constructed at 
firm-level and time period is between 2006 and 2011. The number of observations shows firm years. 
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Table 7.6 presents the analysts’ forecast characteristics by the level of internal capital 
market activity. Unlike the findings from the UK, our results from France indicate that 
forecast accuracy declines and bias increases with the increasing internal capital market 
activity within the firm. For example, we find that long-term growth Accuracy increases from 
0.010 (0.059) in the lower quartile to 0.121 (0.086) in the upper quartile. This is also the case 
with short-term forecasts. This suggests that internal capital markets increase the forecasting 
complexity and reduce accuracy (Duru and Reeb, 2002).  
In addition, we find that Bias also increases in the long-term growth forecasts with the 
level of internal capital markets activity, however, it is statistically insignificant. For 
example, we find average (median) Bias in the 1-year forecasts in the lower quartile is -0.014 
(-0.004) and in the upper quartile it increases to -0.033 (-0.006). This suggests that increase in 
complexity is generally associated with higher optimism in forecasts (Plumlee, 2003). 
Finally, unlike the findings from the UK which suggested internal capital market activity 
increase dispersion in forecasts, we find that the level of dispersion is higher in the inter-
quartile range in France. This may suggest that analysts disagree on the level of cross-
subsidisation of capital resources to finance investment projects within the firm.  
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Table 7.6  
ICM Activity and Forecast Errors in France. 
 
 FY1 FY2 LTG 
0-25% 0.047 
(0.021) 
[0.067] 
0.063 
(0.031) 
[0.091] 
0.010 
(0.059) 
[0.117] 
25-50% 0.047 
(0.012) 
[0.083] 
0.066 
(0.028) 
[0.099] 
0.131 
(0.088) 
[0.146] 
50-75% 0.037 
(0.014) 
[0.064] 
0.053 
(0.029) 
[0.073] 
0.114 
(0.073) 
[0.124] 
75-100% 0.059 
(0.017) 
[0.118] 
0.073 
(0.033) 
[0.109] 
0.121 
(0.086) 
[0.115] 
Panel A  
Bias 
0-25% -0.014 
(-0.004) 
[0.080] 
-0.021 
(-0.014) 
[0.109] 
-0.089 
(-0.052) 
[0.129] 
25-50% -0.008 
(-0.001) 
[0.095] 
-0.035 
(-0.009) 
[0.114] 
-0.093 
(-0.063) 
[0.172] 
50-75% -0.006 
(-0.000) 
[0.073] 
-0.037 
(-0.013) 
[0.082] 
-0.092 
(-0.047) 
[0.143] 
75-100% -0.033 
(-0.006) 
[0.129] 
-0.039 
(-0.020) 
[0.126] 
-0.102 
(-0.069) 
[0.131] 
Panel B  
Dispersion 
0-25% 0.242 
(0.097) 
[0.689] 
0.213 
(0.113) 
[0.318] 
0.849 
(0.634) 
[1.066] 
25-50% 0.187 
(0.086) 
[0.439] 
0.219 
(0.106) 
[0.591] 
2.614 
(0.757) 
[9.882] 
50-75% 0.572 
(0.090) 
[3.133] 
0.271 
(0.112) 
[0.763] 
0.897 
(0.597) 
[1.255] 
75-100% 0.279 
(0.124) 
[0.573] 
0.231 
(0.127) 
[0.358] 
0.957 
(0.630) 
[0.892] 
This table shows the mean (median) and [standard deviation] of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, bias (Panel 
A) and dispersion (Panel B). Internal capital markets variables are calculated between 2005 and 2010. Analysts’ 
forecasts are calculated between 2006 and 2011. The 0-25 range indicates low ICM activity and 75-100 
indicates high ICM activity. The mean (median) values marked *** (a), ** (b), * (c) shows 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. This shows the difference in forecast errors of high and low internal capital markets operations. 
 
  
– 265 – 
 
7.4.1.3. Results from Germany 
As a next step, we repeat the analysis and present descriptive statistics on analysts’ 
forecast characteristics for Germany in Table 7.7. Similar to the results for the UK and 
France, we find that forecast accuracy tends to decline as the time horizon of the forecast 
increases. For example, we report the average (median) Accuracy is 0.069 (0.021) for the 1-
year forecasts and 0.154 (0.110) for the long-term growth forecasts. This suggests that short-
term forecasts issued by analysts are closer to actual reported earnings than long-term 
forecasts. We find that there does not appear to be significant difference in accuracy of 
forecasts issued by analysts for firms based in the three countries in our analysis.  
However, we find that analysts are more optimistic about firms’ long-term 
performance in Germany than in France or the UK. We find the average (median) Bias in 
long-term earnings growth forecast as -0.106 (-0.087). Similarly, we report the average 
(median) Bias in 1-year forecast as -0.033 (-0.004). The Bias in short-term forecasts in 
Germany is very similar to the 1-year Bias reported in the UK and France. Thus, it appears 
that analysts’ were more optimistic about long-term performance of firms in Germany 
compared with firms in the UK and France. 
In relation to this, we find that dispersion is also significantly higher for long-term 
forecasts in Germany than the UK or France. This suggests that there is wider disagreement 
amongst analysts and some analysts may be more optimistic about firms’ future performance 
than others. For example, the average (median) Dispersion in the long-term forecast is 1.092 
(0.647). Additionally, the average (median) dispersion in the 1-year and 2-year forecast is 
0.297 (0.117) and 0.239 (0.125), respectively.  
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Table 7.7  
Descriptive Statistics.  
 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
observations 
Number 
of firms 
Accuracy FY1 0.069 0.021 0.141 874 204 
FY2 0.075 0.039 0.097 874 204 
LTG 0.154 0.110 0.139 338 89 
Bias  FY1 -0.033 -0.004 0.154 874 204 
FY2 -0.032 -0.016 0.118 874 204 
LTG -0.106 -0.087 0.178 338 89 
Dispersion FY1 0.297 0.117 0.772 735 188 
FY2 0.239 0.125 0.740 726 184 
LTG 1.092 0.647 1.503 194 62 
This table presents the forecast characteristics for Germany. FY1 and FY2 are the 1-year and 2-year earnings 
forecasts, respectively. LTG is the long-term earnings growth forecasts. Accuracy is the absolute distance 
between mean forecast and realised earnings. Bias is the signed error of the estimate from the actual earnings. 
Dispersion is the standard deviation in forecasts supplied by analysts. The forecast variables are constructed at 
firm-level and time period is between 2006 and 2011. The number of observations shows firm years. 
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Furthermore, in Table 7.8 we present the forecast characteristics by the level of 
internal capital market activity. In line with the results from France, we find that forecast 
accuracy declines with the increase in internal capital markets operations. We report the 
average (median) Accuracy for long-term growth as 0.018 (0.122) in the lower quartile and 
0.147 (0.111) for the upper quartile, difference in average value is statistically significant. 
This suggests that internal capital markets operations increase forecasting complexity, which 
in turn, reduces forecast accuracy. 
In addition to this, we find that Bias in short- and long-term growth forecast 
significantly increases with the size of internal capital markets in Germany. This is in line 
with the findings from France but in contrast to the findings from the UK. We report that the 
average Bias in short-term forecasts increases from -0.025 to -0.038 and for long-term 
forecasts it increases from -0.112 to -0.122 with increased internal capital market operations. 
This suggests that analysts are more optimistic about future performance of firms that operate 
larger internal capital markets in Germany. 
 Finally, we find that dispersion in the short-term forecasts appears to be positively 
related to the internal capital market activity. For example, for the Dispersion in 1-year 
forecasts increases from 0.299 to 0.667 with the level of internal capital markets operations. 
This result is in line with the findings reported for the other two countries and suggests 
analysts disagree to a greater extent about future performance of firms that operate larger 
internal capital markets. On the other hand, dispersion in long-term forecasts appears to be 
negatively related to internal capital market activity as we report 1.465 in the lower quartile 
and 1.124 in the upper quartile. 
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Table 7.8  
ICM Activity and Forecast Errors in Germany 
 
 FY1 FY2 LTG 
0-25% 0.070 
(0.022) 
[0.142] 
0.078 
(0.047) 
[0.100] 
0.018 
(0.122) 
[0.158] 
25-50% 0.068 
(0.021) 
[0.137] 
0.073 
(0.034) 
[0.100] 
0.122 
(0.087) 
[0.104] 
50-75% 0.075 
(0.019) 
[0.155] 
0.073 
(0.040) 
[0.092] 
0.166 
(0.118) 
[0.156] 
75-100% 0.065 
(0.021) 
[0.129] 
0.074 
(0.039) 
[0.098] 
0.147* 
(0.111) 
[0.122] 
Panel A 
Bias 
0-25% -0.025 
(-0.003) 
[0.156] 
-0.022 
(-0.014) 
[0.125] 
-0.112 
(-0.072) 
[0.213] 
25-50% -0.033 
(0.001) 
[0.149] 
-0.040 
(-0.018) 
[0.117] 
-0.081 
(-0.076) 
[0.136] 
50-75% -0.037 
(-0.007) 
[0.168] 
-0.024 
(-0.012) 
[0.115] 
-0.106 
(-0.095) 
[0.196] 
75-100% -0.038 
(-0.005) 
[0.139] 
-0.043 
(-0.020) 
[0.114] 
-0.122 
(-0.104) 
[0.155] 
Panel B 
Dispersion 
0-25% 0.299 
(0.126) 
[1.017] 
0.234 
(0.130) 
[0.473] 
1.465 
(0.895) 
[1.737] 
25-50% 0.755 
(0.109) 
[1.049] 
0.232 
(0.127) 
[0.444] 
0.922 
(0.608) 
[1.340] 
50-75% 0.221 
(0.119) 
[0.344] 
0.211 
(0.122) 
[0.414] 
0.935 
(0.566) 
[1.324] 
75-100% 0.667 
(0.111) 
[1.842] 
0.275 
(0.119) 
[1.252] 
1.124 
(0.628)a 
[1.168] 
This table shows the mean (median) and [standard deviation] of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, bias (Panel 
A) and dispersion (Panel B). Internal capital markets variables are calculated between 2005 and 2010. Analysts’ 
forecasts are calculated between 2006 and 2011. The 0-25 range indicates low ICM activity and 75-100 
indicates high ICM activity. The mean (median) values marked *** (a), ** (b), * (c) shows 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. This shows the difference in forecast errors of high and low internal capital markets operations. 
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7.5. Multivariate Analysis 
 In this section, we present our results from the regression analysis on the relationship 
between analysts’ forecast errors and internal capital markets. Our objectives are to determine 
(i) whether the operations of internal capital market have an impact on the earnings forecast 
errors, and (ii) the link between the efficiency of internal capital markets and earnings 
forecast errors. 
 Our main findings appear to suggest that internal capital markets have a limited 
impact on forecast characteristics and their effect varies from country to country. For 
example, we find evidence to suggest that internal capital markets operations are negatively 
related to accuracy and positively related to the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts in 
the UK, but not in France or Germany. On the other hand, we find that internal capital 
markets efficiency has a greater impact on short-term bias in forecasts in France and 
Germany. Nevertheless, this evidence appears to suggest that internal capital markets 
aggravate firm complexity to some extent and have an effect on forecast characteristics. 
As our objective is to determine the relationship between internal capital markets and 
analysts’ forecast errors, the dependent variable in the regression analysis is the Accuracy, 
Bias or Dispersion in forecasts issued by analysts for firm j at time t. The internal capital 
market variables of firm j are measured at time t-1. We track the forecast errors and internal 
capital markets of a firm over a period of six years for the sample of diversified firms in our 
analysis. We allow firms to leave or enter our sample in the time period covered, however, 
we require firms to remain in the sample for at least two years.  
Therefore, our analysis is based on panel data for the sample of diversified firms over 
a six year period. As discussed in Chapter 6, our analysis focusing on diversified firms only 
can present a number of issues. We address some of the key issues in the next few 
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subsections. Subsequently, in Section 7.5.4 we begin with the discussion on our empirical 
results for the UK. 
 
7.5.1. Multicolinearity 
As a first step, we perform a number of tests which can enable us to detect the 
presence of multicolinearity. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Gauss-Markov assumption only 
requires that there should not be perfect linear relationship among independent variables. In 
that case, the coefficients will remain best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE). However, if 
there is perfect linear relationship or near perfect relationship among independent variables 
(i.e. close to one) then it is likely to cause statistical problems (Wooldridge, 2006).  
Firstly, in Table 7.9 we present the results from the pairwise correlations which can 
identify high linear dependence amongst independent variables. Multicolinearity is more 
likely to be an issue when variables are computed from one or more of the independent 
variables within the model; however, it does not cause any problem in our analysis. We 
conclude that there is no high linear dependency amongst variables in our analysis. 
Secondly, we perform the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) test to determine whether 
near high multicolinearity is present (O‘Brien, 2007). The findings are presented in Table 
7.10. VIF measures how much the variance of the coefficients is inflated by multicolinearity 
and it is given by the Equation 7.3. As a rule of thumb, VIF of 1 will indicate no colinearity 
and a value greater than 10 will indicate high colinearity. We find that this is not an issue for 
our analysis. 
𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑗 =  11− 𝑅𝑗2           (7.3)
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Table 7.9  
Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A – UK 
 FY1-B FY2-B FY1-A FY2-A FY1-D FY2-D LTG-B LTG-A LTG-D ICM-S ICM-E 
FY1-B 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
FY2-B 0.417 1 - - - - - - - - - 
FY1-A -0.839 -0.498 1 - - - - - - - - 
FY2-A -0.408 -0.868 0.592 1 - - - - - - - 
FY1-D -0.109 -0.059 0.112 0.104 1 - - - - - - 
FY2-D -0.205 -0.063 0.259 0.065 -0.215 1 - - - - - 
LTG-B -0.034 -0.082 0.081 0.066 -0.042 -0.025 1 - - - - 
LTG-A 0.003 -0.033 -0.004 0.033 0.046 0.052 -0.688 1 - - - 
LTG-D 0.016 0.009 -0.013 -0.025 0.008 0.111 0.011 0.013 1 - - 
ICM- S 0.027 0.039 -0.043 -0.078 0.047 0.033 0.013 0.038 -0.041 1 - 
ICM- E -0.001 0.039 0.003 -0.362 0.037 0.069 -0.016 0.029 -0.031 0.133 1 
Panel B – France 
FY1-B 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
FY2-B 0.409 1 - - - - - - - - - 
FY1-A -0.463 -0.231 1 - - - - - - - - 
FY2-A -0.370 -0.526 0.623 1 - - - - - - - 
FY1-D -0.223 -0.051 -0.102 0.001 1 - - - - - - 
FY2-D -0.179 -0.089 -0.037 0.012 0.054 1 - - - - - 
LTG-B 0.010 0.062 -0.044 -0.026 0.024 0.021 1 - - - - 
LTG-A 0.009 -0.044 0.006 -0.014 -0.042 -0.077 -0.891 1 - - - 
LTG-D -0.223 -0.024 0.222 0.021 -0.014 -0.059 0.006 -0.007 1 - - 
ICM-S -0.153 -0.146 0.139 0.125 0.161 0.176 0.129 -0.193 -0.032 1 - 
ICM-E 0.054 0.033 -0.055 -0.044 -0.007 0.035 0.031 0.014 0.008 0.004 1 
Panel C – Germany 
FY1-B 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
FY2-B 0.230 1 - - - - - - - - - 
FY1-A -0.606 -0.094 1 - - - - - - - - 
FY2-A -0.281 -0.522 0.418 1 - - - - - - - 
FY1-D -0.045 0.039 0.081 0.009 1 - - - - - - 
FY2-D -0.090 0.018 0.131 0.147 0.088 1 - - - - - 
LTG-B -0.049 -0.119 0.041 0.137 0.037 0.062 1 - - - - 
LTG-A 0.043 0.027 -0.025 -0.041 -0.069 -0.059 -0.631 1 - - - 
LTG-D -0.018 -0.057 0.012 0.032 0.046 0.082 0.229 0.019 1 - - 
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ICM-S -0.065 -0.066 -0.033 0.013 0.082 0.152 -0.007 -0.007 -0.042 1 - 
ICM-E -0.062 -0.132 0.045 0.132 0.043 0.117 0.027 -0.056 -0.026 0.268 1 
This table shows the Correlation Matrix for the UK, France and Germany. The internal capital market variables are calculated between 2005 and 2010. Analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors are calculated between 2006 and 2011. FY1, FY2 and LTG represent 1-year forecast, 2-year forecast and long-term growth forecast, respectively. The 
variables marked with B, A and D represents forecast Bias, Accuracy and Dispersion, respectively. ICM is the internal capital markets variables and, variables marked with S 
and E represents the Size of internal capital markets and Efficiency of internal capital markets, respectively.  
  
– 273 – 
 
Table 7.10  
Test for the presence of Multicolinearity. 
 UK France Germany 
 VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
ICM Size  1.18 0.849 1.40 0.713 1.46 0.686 
ICM Efficiency 1.04 0.959 1.01 0.989 1.10 0.908 
Sales Growth 1.15 0.868 2.02 0.495 1.20 0.836 
Capex 2.08 0.481 2.67 0.375 2.10 0.477 
HI 1.20 0.831 2.89 0.345 1.60 0.627 
∆ Debt  1.08 0.928 1.34 0.748 1.13 0.887 
∆ Equity  1.11 0.897 1.11 0.901 1.09 0.917 
Firm Size  1.51 0.905 1.26 0.737 1.83 0.407 
Year 2007 2.22 0.449 2.29 0.437 2.04 0.489 
Year 2008 2.51 0.399 2.41 0.415 2.13 0.469 
Year 2009 2.88 0.347 2.36 0.424 2.14 0.466 
Year 2010 2.82 0.355 2.10 0.476 2.01 0.497 
Year 2011 2.51 0.398 2.09 0.479 1.81 0.553 
Mean VIF 1.79  1.91  1.66  
This table shows the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) to determine whether multicolinearity is present in our 
data for the UK, France and Germany. The dependent variable in this analysis is the 1-year forecast accuracy. 
As a rule of thumb, a value greater than 10 represents high multicolinearity. We also perform this test for other 
models in our analysis and find that multicolinearity does not cause any issues in our analysis. 
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7.5.2. Heteroskedasticity 
As a next step, we determine if heteroskedasticity is present in our data. In the 
presence of heteroskedasticty, the OLS estimates are no longer BLUE and standard errors are 
biased. We follow Cameron and Trivedi (1990) to perform the information matrix test and an 
orthogonal decomposition for heteroskedasticity, skewness, and kurtosis. We perform this 
test for the models discussed in Section 7.2. The White (1980) test for homoskedasticity 
against unrestricted forms of heteroskedasticity is usually similar to the first term of the 
Cameron-Trivedi decomposition.  
The results are presented in Table 7.11. The findings show that heteroskedasticity is 
present in our dataset across the three countries. Thus, we correct for this by using the 
White’s robust standard errors in all our regression tests. 
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Table 7.11  
Test for Heteroskedasticity. 
 UK France Germany 
 chi sq Df P chi sq Df p chi sq Df P 
Heteroskedasticity 159.58 89 0.000 111.35 89 0.055 206.73 89 0.000 
Skewness 42.17 13 0.001 46.73 13 0.000 52.41 13 0.000 
Kurtosis 23.38 1 0.000 12.01 1 0.001 16.51 1 0.000 
Total 225.13 103 0.000 170.09 103 0.000 275.66 103 0.000 
This table shows the results from the information matrix test (Cameron-Trivedi decomposition) to determine 
whether heteroskedasticity is present in our data for the UK, France and Germany. The dependent variable in 
this analysis is the 1-year forecast accuracy. We perform this test when the dependent variable is Bias or 
Dispersion and find similar results.  
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7.5.3. Fixed effects Model 
In this study, we use fixed effects model to estimate the coefficients and standard 
errors. Our panel data set of publicly listed firms consists of several firm characteristics and 
forecasts information obtained over a period of six years. Our primary objective is to 
determine the relationship between internal capital markets and earnings forecast errors. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, one of the important advantages of panel data is the ability to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. In our analysis, we include a number of control variables 
which have been shown to have an impact on forecast errors in the prior literature. In addition 
to the several firm- and segment-level characteristics in our model, there may be other factors 
which could have an impact on forecast errors, such as ability or education level of analysts. 
Thus, there is potential for an omitted variable bias i.e. unobserved heterogeneity, which may 
be correlated with the explanatory variables and result in biased estimates.  
In our analysis, we make use of the fixed effects method. The key advantage of using 
fixed effects method is that it allows us to eliminate the time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity. Additionally, we conduct the Hausman Test (Hausman, 1978) to determine 
whether fixed effects or random effects should be used for the analysis. We find a large and 
significant Hausman statistic which indicates that a large and significant difference between 
the fixed and random effects estimation. Thus, we use fixed effects method as it appears to be 
more appropriate than random effects method.  
Alternatively, prior empirical studies have also looked Fama-MacBeth estimates; 
however, this technique was developed to account for the correlation between observations 
on different firms in the same year, not to account for the correlation between observations on 
the same firm in different years (Petersen, 2008). Many authors have acknowledged the bias 
and proposed adjustments to estimating the correlation (for example, Fama and French, 
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2002). In general, prior empirical studies find that the adjusted standard errors in Fama-
MacBeth estimates produce similar results to OLS cluster-robust standard errors (Petersen, 
2008).  
In the presence of both time effect and firm effect, we include time dummy variables 
within the model and estimate the standard errors on the other dimension, i.e. cluster by firm. 
By allowing unobserved effects to be arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables in 
each time period, the purpose of the time dummy variables is to remove the correlation 
between observations in the same time period. Prior empirical studies have shown that in 
such a case the standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased (Petersen, 2008).22  
  Our analysis focuses on the relationship between internal capital markets and forecast 
errors and, hence, we mainly focus on diversified firm, as single segment firms do not operate 
internal capital markets (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). Sample selection issues can 
arise when the information or observations are from a non-random sub-sample of the 
population of interest. There are two common approaches to this problem are Heckman 
(1976) two-step estimator and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimator.  
 The first approach involves estimation of a probit model for selection and calculation 
of the inverse Mills ratio, and then inserting this correction factor into the OLS model of 
interest (Bushway et al., 2007). In the PSM analysis, the first step is to consider the variables 
that determine the participation (i.e. diversification) which will characterise the selection 
model. Then estimate the propensity score, which are often obtained by logit or probit 
functions. The propensity-score is the probability that a firm in the complete sample is 
diversified, given a set of variables. 
                                                          
22 Petersen (2008) shows that when there are only a few clusters in one dimension, clustering by the more 
frequent cluster yields results that are almost identical to clustering both by firm and time. 
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 However, the implementation of such method requires significantly rich data, which 
may limit their usage. For example, obtaining the propensity scores requires matching the 
treated with untreated units taking into account (i) matching with or without replacement, (ii) 
proximity, (iii) weight cases and, (iv) number of comparison units matched to each treatment 
unit. Depending the matching criteria selected the following matching algorithms may be 
applied; (i) nearest neighbour matching, (ii) radius matching and, (iii) kernel and local-linear 
matching. The advantage for fixed effects models is that sample selection is only a problem 
when selection is related to the idiosyncratic errors (Wooldridge, 2002). Also, Imai and Kim 
(2011) find results that suggest the fixed effects and matching estimators do not 
fundamentally differ in their ability to cope with endogeneity in observational studies.  
 
7.5.4. Evidence from the UK 
 In Table 7.12 we present the results from the regression analysis examining the 
relationship between analysts’ earnings forecast characteristics and internal capital markets in 
the UK. The results indicate that there is some evidence to suggest higher internal capital 
market activity leads to less accurate forecasts in the short-term. For example, we find that 
when the dependent variable is 1-year Accuracy the variable ICM Size has coefficient of 
0.005, statistically significant at 5 percent level. This suggests that it becomes more difficult 
to make accurate estimates about future performance of a firm that engages in greater cross-
subsidisation of resources. When firms increase their internal capital market activity, their 
actual earnings deviate more from than the estimated earnings. 
 Furthermore, we include the interaction variable between the size of internal capital 
markets and crisis period. We find the variable Crisis x ICM Size appears negative and 
significant when the dependent variable is 1-year Accuracy. For example, we report the 
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coefficient of this variable as -0.015, statistically significant at 5 percent level. This suggests 
that firms that operate smaller internal capital markets during the crisis period tend to have 
higher short-term forecast error. The results from the prior chapter indicated that firms 
significantly cut back on the size of internal capital markets during the financial crisis in the 
UK. The negative relationship we observe between short-term accuracy and internal capital 
markets operations during the crisis may be due to the uncertainty about the type of projects 
that are going to be financed via internal capital markets. It may also be that analysts expect 
firms to use internal capital markets more during the crisis to support weaker segments. 
 We do not find that this is the case for long-term growth forecast accuracy. The 
internal capital market variables appear insignificant in the analysis. This suggests that 
internal capital markets operations do not appear to have a significant impact on the accuracy 
of long-term growth forecasts. Additionally, there is no significant evidence to suggest that 
presence of internal capital markets has an impact on bias in the forecasts. It may be the case 
that analysts consider internal capital markets to perform a limited role and their presence do 
not have significant impact. However, there is some evidence to suggest that analysts are 
more optimistic about future performance of firms that operate larger internal capital markets 
during the crisis. For example, we report the coefficient of the variable Crisis x ICM Size as 
0.019, statistically significant at 5 percent level when the dependent variable is 1-year Bias.   
 In relation to this, we find that internal capital markets have a significant impact on 
the level of dispersion in analysts’ long-term forecasts. For example, when the dependent 
variable is Dispersion LTG we report the coefficient of the variable ICM Size as 1.173, 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. Similarly, when the dependent variable is 2-year 
Dispersion, the coefficient of ICM Size is 0.135, statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
This suggests that there is more disagreement amongst analysts about the future profitability 
of firms with increasing internal capital markets operations. 
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 Some of the findings from this analysis are in line with our hypothesis and suggest 
that the internal capital markets within diversified firms can increase forecasting complexity 
and, in turn, reduce accuracy, which can also lead to a greater disagreement amongst analysts 
about the future performance of the firm. This is because, in addition to the presence of 
internal capital markets, the direction of capital resources transfers may be more difficult to 
predict. Although efficient internal capital market theory promotes the use of capital 
resources to finance good investment opportunities, our analysis in Chapter 6 indicated that 
capital resources are generally misallocated in multi-segment firms.     
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Table 7.12  
Analysts’ Forecast Errors and ICM in the UK. 
 Accuracy Bias Dispersion 
 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 
ICM Size 0.005** 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.201) 
-0.562 
(0.130) 
-0.002 
(0.321) 
-0.002 
(0.414) 
0.738 
(0.152) 
0.257 
(0.112) 
0.135* 
(0.065) 
1.173*** 
(0.002) 
ICM Efficiency 0.001 
(0.299) 
0.000 
(0.759) 
-0.476 
(0.620) 
-0.001 
(0.236) 
-0.000 
(0.577) 
-2.116 
(0.144) 
-0.008 
(0.431) 
0.001 
(0.969) 
-1.194 
(0.112) 
Firm size 0.073*** 
(0.009) 
0.045 
(0.111) 
-1.372 
(0.683) 
-0.080*** 
(0.008) 
-0.069** 
(0.040) 
3.544 
(0.535) 
0.938 
(0.112) 
1.413*** 
(0.002) 
-9.484 
(0.276) 
HI -0.004 
(0.253) 
-0.000 
(0.742) 
0.097 
(0.105) 
0.005 
(0.185) 
0.008 
(0.276) 
0.323*** 
(0.004) 
-0.099*** 
(0.001) 
-0.018 
(0.565) 
-0.155* 
(0.062) 
∆ Debt -0.029 
(0.223) 
0.012 
(0.548) 
2.556 
(0.224) 
0.010 
(0.703) 
-0.009 
(0.670) 
-4.726 
(0.147) 
-0.019 
(0.982) 
0.777* 
(0.096) 
1.264 
(0.444) 
∆ Equity -0.000 
(0.110) 
-0.000 
(0.998) 
0.004 
(0.551) 
0.000 
(0.653) 
-0.000 
(0.803) 
0.005 
(0.739) 
-0.000 
(0.768) 
0.000 
(0.896) 
0.000 
(0.931) 
Capex 0.236** 
(0.045) 
0.109 
(0.153) 
-13.589 
(0.470) 
-0.247* 
(0.094) 
-0.134 
(0.122) 
41.313 
(0.198) 
6.419 
(0.215) 
7.315 
(0.179) 
-35.542 
(0.256) 
Sales Growth 0.009 
(0.252) 
0.001 
(0.885) 
3.302 
(0.136) 
-0.009 
(0.294) 
-0.003 
(0.653) 
0.238 
(0.947) 
0.209 
(0.214) 
0.228 
(0.101) 
-5.792 
(0.010) 
Crisis 0.011 
(0.256) 
0.012 
(0.236) 
-1.113 
(0.369) 
-0.006 
(0.557) 
-0.003 
(0.774) 
4.997*** 
(0.003) 
0.459*** 
(0.004) 
0.458 
(0.012) 
3.867 
(0.133) 
Crisis x ICM 
Size 
-0.015** 
(0.033) 
-0.001 
(0.866) 
1.753 
(0.141) 
0.019** 
(0.034) 
-0.007 
(0.431) 
0.748 
(0.572) 
-0.191 
(0.228) 
-0.042 
(0.814) 
-0.704 
(0.507) 
Crisis x 
Efficiency 
-0.002 
(0.183) 
-0.000 
(0.737) 
-3.930 
(0.287) 
0.002 
(0.155) 
0.001 
(0.550) 
-0.442 
(0.922) 
0.029 
(0.141) 
0.019 
(0.409) 
-0.915 
(0.755) 
          
Constant -0.402** 
(0.011) 
-0.226 
(0.149) 
19.701 
(0.375) 
0.459*** 
(0.007) 
0.378* 
(0.041) 
-35.643 
(0.350) 
-4.178 
(0.172) 
-7.278*** 
(0.008) 
65.753 
(0.250) 
R-Sq. 0.038 0.015 0.040 0.025 0.018 0.092 0.030 0.047 0.133 
Obs. 1,469 1,469 531 1,469 1,469 531 1,234 1,204 271 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis examining the relationship between internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors in the 
UK. The dependent variable in this analysis is accuracy, bias or dispersion. The analysts’ forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the reporting 
year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. Internal capital market variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects. ***, ** 
and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. 
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7.5.5. Evidence from France 
 As a next step, we repeat the analysis for firms in France and present the regression 
results in Table 7.13. The dependent variable in our analysis is the Accuracy, Bias or 
Dispersion in the analysts’ forecasts. As before, the main variables of interest are the internal 
capital market size and efficiency. 
 In general, we find a positive and significant relationship between dispersion in long-
term earnings forecast and internal capital markets operations. Similar to the findings for the 
UK, we report the coefficient of ICM Size as 1.270, statistically significant at 10 percent 
level. This suggests that the level of disagreement amongst analysts about firms’ long-term 
growth is higher when firms operate larger internal capital markets. It may be the case that 
internal capital markets are considered to play an important role in mainly financing long-
term investment projects of the firm and analysts tend to disagree more about their impact on 
the long-term profitability of the firm.  
In relation to this, although we find that the coefficient of ICM Size is positive when 
the dependent variable is Dispersion in 1-year and 2-year forecasts, however, it does not have 
significant explanatory power. Thus, the impact of internal capital markets operations on the 
level of dispersion in short-term forecasts appears to be limited. Additionally, we do find 
some evidence which suggests that the size internal capital markets has an impact on the level 
of dispersion in the short-term forecasts during the crisis in France. For example, we report 
the variable Crisis x ICM Size as negative and significant when the dependent variable is 1-
year and 2-year Dispersion. This suggests that internal capital markets operations are 
negatively related to the level of dispersion in short-term forecasts during the financial crisis. 
Unlike the findings for the UK, we find no significant evidence to suggest internal 
capital markets have an impact on the accuracy or bias in France. Although, the internal 
– 283 – 
 
capital market variables have the same sign in our analysis for the UK and France, they 
appear to be insignificant in all the tests for France. This suggests that internal capital markets 
operation and efficiency do not affect the forecast errors in the same way across countries, 
and it may also be that analysts are better able to incorporate internal capital market 
information into their forecast in France.  
Interestingly, we find that efficiency of internal capital markets is negatively related 
to long-term growth forecast accuracy in France. This suggests that firms that are efficient 
have smaller forecast errors compared to firms that are inefficient. As we expected, efficient 
internal capital markets can provide a signal about the internal workings of the firm and 
analysts anticipate firms to efficiently allocate capital resources, the forecasts are more 
accurate. When firms misallocate resources and finance less profitable segments, their actual 
earnings tend to deviate more from the estimated earnings.  
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Table 7.13  
Analysts’ Forecast Errors and ICM in France 
 Accuracy Bias Dispersion 
 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 
ICM Size 0.008 
(0.211) 
0.008 
(0.443) 
-0.874 
(0.374) 
-0.006 
(0.497) 
-0.011 
(0.450) 
0.958 
(0.553) 
0.084 
(0.206) 
0.045 
(0.168) 
1.270* 
(0.099) 
ICM Efficiency -0.063 
(0.350) 
-0.036 
(0.659) 
-53.040** 
(0.048) 
0.032 
(0.673) 
0.055 
(0.665) 
59.225 
(0.224) 
-0.295 
(0.530) 
0.329 
(0.529) 
2.869 
(0.879) 
Firm size -0.011 
(0.843) 
0.132* 
(0.061) 
-18.480 
(0.311) 
-0.127 
(0.103) 
-0.193** 
(0.021) 
15.976 
(0.479) 
-0.069 
(0.802) 
0.223 
(0.379) 
-15.288** 
(0.020) 
HI 0.008 
(0.205) 
0.003 
(0.629) 
0.586 
(0.736) 
-0.007 
(0.581) 
0.016 
(0.114) 
-1.252 
(0.485) 
-0.068 
(0.383) 
-0.086 
(0.221) 
0.059 
(0.939) 
∆ Debt 0.017 
(0.562) 
-0.016 
(0.552) 
-3.645 
(0.686) 
-0.027 
(0.670) 
-0.033 
(0.419) 
5.242 
(0.581) 
0.389 
(0.107) 
0.283 
(0.134) 
11.392 
(0.146) 
∆ Equity 0.000 
(0.582) 
0.000 
(0.178) 
0.048* 
(0.062) 
-0.000 
(0.908) 
-0.000 
(0.144) 
-0.011 
(0.769) 
-0.002* 
(0.061) 
-0.003*** 
(0.003) 
0.061 
(0.252) 
Capex -0.323* 
(0.069) 
0.029 
(0.807) 
-40.895 
(0.585) 
0.303 
(0.288) 
-0.269 
(0.167) 
125.215 
(0.175) 
1.374 
(0.287) 
1.509 
(0.170) 
-79.147 
(0.071) 
Sales Growth -0.006 
(0.555) 
-0.007 
(0.443) 
-1.967 
(0.785) 
-0.002 
(0.862) 
-0.013 
(0.246) 
1.622 
(0.829) 
0.015 
(0.826) 
0.063 
(0.408) 
-1.034 
(0.673) 
Crisis 0.046*** 
(0.002) 
0.024* 
(0.096) 
4.866** 
(0.033) 
0.008 
(0.612) 
0.019 
(0.878) 
-2.462 
(0.314) 
0.229** 
(0.025) 
0.147* 
(0.095) 
2.222 
(0.294) 
Crisis x ICM 
Size 
-0.011 
(0.105) 
-0.012 
(0.294) 
1.434 
(0.136) 
-0.004 
(0.646) 
-0.002 
(0.878) 
0.232 
(0.876) 
-0.148** 
(0.037) 
-0.119** 
(0.027) 
-0.948 
(0.172) 
Crisis x 
Efficiency 
0.082 
(0.307) 
0.063 
(0.551) 
51.231 
(0.171) 
-0.031 
(0.750) 
-0.019 
(0.887) 
-38.451 
(0.448) 
0.711 
(0.180) 
0.299 
(0.474) 
5.916 
(0.772) 
          
Constant 0.99 
(0.768) 
-0.781* 
(0.071) 
134.304 
(0.262) 
0.765 
(0.107) 
1.194** 
(0.019) 
-120.295 
(0.417) 
0.579 
(0.741) 
-1.169 
(0.454) 
109.695** 
(0.013) 
R-Sq. 0.108 0.081 0.101 0.049 0.139 0.099 0.049 0.124 0.118 
Obs. 518 518 239 518 518 239 438 435 144 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis examining the relationship between internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors in 
France. The dependent variable in this analysis is accuracy, bias or dispersion. The analysts’ forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the 
reporting year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. Internal capital market variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. 
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7.5.6. Evidence from Germany  
 In Table 7.14, we present our findings from the regression analysis examining the 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors and internal capital markets in Germany. Similar to the 
analysis for other countries, we examine three forecast characteristics, namely, the Accuracy, 
Bias and Dispersion in earnings forecasts in Germany.  
 In general, our results indicate that internal capital markets efficiency has a significant 
impact on all three characteristics for the short-term forecasts. For example, when the 
dependent variable is the Accuracy 1-year and 2-year forecasts we find that ICM Efficiency 
variable appears as -0.048 and -0.046, respectively. The results are significant at 5 percent 
level or better. This suggests that as the efficiency of internal capital markets improve, the 
forecast accuracy tends to increase. This is in line with the results for France and suggest that 
analysts anticipate firms to efficiently allocate resources. Efficient firms are more likely to 
signal good internal governance and fewer resources being misallocated e.g. due to rent-
seeking activities compared with inefficient firms.  
In line with this finding, our results indicate that analysts are more optimistic about 
future performance of firms that operate more efficient internal capital markets. For example, 
when the dependent variable is Bias in short-term forecasts, the ICM Efficiency variables are 
negative and statistically significant. As discussed in Section 7.2, a negative value of variable 
Bias indicates optimism and positive value indicates pessimism. This suggests that efficient 
investment policies of the firm have a positive and significant impact on the analysts’ 
expectations on the internal workings of the firm and its long-term profitability.  
In addition, we find some evidence to suggest that more efficient internal capital 
markets are negatively related to the level of dispersion in the short-term forecasts. For 
example, when the dependent variable is the Dispersion in 1-year forecasts, the coefficient of 
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the variable ICM Efficiency appears as -0.107, statistically significant at 5 percent level. This 
suggests that when internal capital markets are inefficient there is higher level of 
disagreement amongst analysts regarding the future performance of the firm. Inefficient 
internal capital markets are likely to signal severe internal governance failures, misallocation 
of resources and rent-seeking activities by division managers. When the internal problems are 
severe, it may be more difficult to accurately forecast the future profitability of the firm.  
Unlike the results for the UK, we find no evidence to suggest that the size of internal 
capital markets has any significant impact on the accuracy of the earnings forecasts in 
Germany. This suggests that either the internal capital market operations are very limited and 
do not have considerable impact on firms’ future profitability. Although, we find that ICM 
Size appears positive when the dependent variable is Dispersion in 1-year, 2-year or LTG 
forecasts, we find that the variable is insignificant in almost all the tests. This indicates that 
the presence of internal capital markets has no significant impact on the level of disagreement 
amongst analysts about the future performance of the firm.  
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Table 7.14  
Analysts’ Forecast Errors and ICM in Germany. 
 Accuracy Bias Dispersion 
 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 
ICM Size -0.007 
(0.300) 
-0.007 
(0.116) 
-0.297 
(0.814) 
0.007 
(0.227) 
0.011* 
(0.086) 
1.122 
(0.559) 
0.003 
(0.851) 
0.014 
(0.434) 
0.651 
(0.350) 
ICM Efficiency -0.048** 
(0.026) 
-0.046*** 
(0.000) 
-7.922 
(0.885) 
-0.056* 
(0.074) 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
14.480 
(0.808) 
-0.107** 
(0.018) 
0.050 
(0.203) 
15.496 
(0.533) 
Firm size 0.169** 
(0.021) 
0.074** 
(0.014) 
6.183 
(0.316) 
-0.185* 
(0.067) 
-0.189*** 
(0.000) 
-3.799 
(0.779) 
0.672** 
(0.019) 
0.435** 
(0.031) 
11.608 
(0.199) 
HI -0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.486) 
0.360 
(0.836) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.117) 
-1.274 
(0.599) 
0.016 
(0.539) 
0.006 
(0.627) 
1.233 
(0.251) 
∆ Debt -0.019 
(0.730) 
0.053* 
(0.073) 
7.931 
(0.332) 
-0.033 
(0.496) 
-0.056 
(0.312) 
4.984 
(0.580) 
-0.141 
(0.207) 
-0.086 
(0.356) 
6.869* 
(0.090) 
∆ Equity -0.001 
(0.528) 
0.000 
(0.699) 
0.053 
(0.638) 
-0.001 
(0.591) 
-0.001** 
(0.027) 
0.009 
(0.957) 
-0.002 
(0.654) 
-0.002 
(0.251) 
0.007 
(0.936) 
Capex 0.052 
(0.695) 
-0.069 
(0.315) 
-34.953 
(0.105) 
-0.221 
(0.101) 
-0.059 
(0.504) 
7.887** 
(0.049) 
0.896 
(0.111) 
0.797 
(0.190) 
-20.171 
(0.274) 
Sales Growth -0.012 
(0.225) 
-0.008 
(0.255) 
-1.472 
(0.674) 
0.008 
(0.548) 
0.005 
(0.607) 
7.865 
(0.109) 
-0.206 
(0.159) 
-0.084 
(0.333) 
-7.236*** 
(0.004) 
Crisis 0.026 
(0.144) 
0.015 
(0.122) 
-1.762 
(0.443) 
-0.016 
(0.456) 
0.018 
(0.240) 
11.372*** 
(0.002) 
0.094*** 
(0.003) 
0.094*** 
(0.003) 
4.284* 
(0.085) 
Crisis x ICM 
Size 
0.003 
(0.765) 
0.006 
(0.387) 
-0.543 
(0.775) 
-0.004 
(0.755) 
0.001 
(0.931) 
-10119 
(0.706) 
0.004 
(0.915) 
-0.016 
(0.561) 
1.586 
(0.538) 
Crisis x 
Efficiency 
0.033 
(0.872) 
0.056 
(0.702) 
-62.156 
(0.338) 
-0.021 
(0.934) 
0.127 
(0.596) 
15.131 
(0.886) 
-0.127 
(0.865) 
0.049 
(0.922) 
14.552 
(0.841) 
          
Constant -0.922** 
(0.029) 
-0.366** 
(0.034) 
-20.077 
(0.605) 
1.062* 
(0.068) 
1.076*** 
(0.000) 
15.747 
(0.846) 
-3.783** 
(0.025) 
-2.396** 
(0.043) 
-68.868 
(0.218) 
R-Sq. 0.085 0.064 0.045 0.046 0.113 0.138 0.178 0.099 0.230 
Obs. 874 868 337 868 868 337 735 726 194 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis examining the relationship between internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors in 
Germany. The dependent variable in this analysis is accuracy, bias or dispersion. The analysts’ forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the 
reporting year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. Internal capital market variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects. 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. 
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7.5.7. Discussion on Control Variables 
 In this subsection, we discuss the significance of various control variables in the 
analysis on analysts’ earnings forecast errors. In particular, we discuss the impact of the size 
of the firm, performance as well as diversity on forecast characteristics. Furthermore, we also 
discuss the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on forecasts.  
 
7.5.7.1. Firm Size 
Duru and Reeb (2002) document that, on the one hand, firm size is likely to indicate 
high complexity, and thus, reduce the forecast accuracy, but on the other hand, more pre-
disclosure information is usually available for larger firms, which could also lead to higher 
forecast accuracy. Furthermore, larger firms are more likely to be well-known in their 
respective industry and, therefore, have greater analyst coverage providing more information 
to market participants. We include firm size as the natural log of total assets of the firm in our 
analysis. In general, we find that firm size is negatively related to short-term forecast 
accuracy in all three countries in our analysis. For example, we report the variable Firm Size 
to be positively and significantly related to accuracy of short-term forecasts, which suggests 
that larger firms have higher forecast error.  
This is in line with prior literature and suggests that larger firms are likely to be more 
complex which, in turn, leads to lower accuracy (Brown, 1993; Duru and Reeb, 2002). Large 
firms are also likely to have more segments in related as well as unrelated industries 
compared to smaller firms, which can aggravate task complexity and lower accuracy (Duru 
and Reeb, 2002; Plumlee, 2003).  
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In relation to this, we find some evidence to suggest firm size leads to higher 
dispersion in the UK and Germany, but this is not the case in France. For example, we report 
the variable Firm Size as positive and significant when the dependent variable is Dispersion 
in the UK and Germany; however, this variable is insignificant in our analysis for France. 
This is line with the discussion above and suggests that firm size is positively related to task 
complexity, and higher analyst coverage may lead to higher level of dispersion.  
 
7.5.7.2. Diversity 
It is now well acknowledged that firms operating in multiple industries can increase 
firm complexity and this can lead to lower forecast accuracy. For example, Dunn and Nathan 
(2000) suggest that industrial diversification can lead to lower forecast accuracy. In this 
analysis, we include Herfindahl Index and find that there is some evidence to suggest firms 
that have operations in unrelated industries have lower short-term forecast accuracy in 
Germany. However, we find that this is not the case in France or the UK.  
We find some evidence which indicates firms that have segments in unrelated 
industries have higher dispersion in the short-term forecasts. Additionally, we find that firms 
operating in related industries have higher Bias (overoptimistic) in short-term forecasts in 
Germany. This finding suggests that analysts anticipate firm that have related operations to be 
more profitable in the future. On the other hand, this does not appear to be the case for firms 
in France or the UK as we find that the variable HI does not have any significant explanatory 
power. 
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7.5.7.3. External Financing 
Prior literature documents that the decision to raise finance on the external market can 
signal potential as well as opposing effect. For example, on the one hand, firm may raise 
finance to take advantage of good investment opportunities. On the other hand, a number of 
studies have shown that firms raise finance when management consider their stock to be 
overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Furthermore, raising finance on external markets can be costly. It has been well 
documented that analysts affiliated with investment banks usually issue more optimistic 
forecasts in order to gain more business e.g. advisory fees and commissions associated with 
debt or equity issues (Barber et al., 2007). Similarly, Bradshaw et al. (2006) documents a 
strong positive relationship between firms’ decision to raise finance on the external markets 
and optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts. For equity transactions, optimism extends to 
long-term forecasts as well short-term forecasts. 
We include proceeds from debt and equity finance as control variables in our analysis. 
In general, we only find some evidence to suggest change equity is related to increased 
optimism in the short-term forecasts in Germany. However, this variable is mainly 
insignificant for the other two countries in our analysis. Also, we find that there is only some 
evidence to indicate change in debt lowers the accuracy of the forecast in the short-term.  
 
7.5.7.4. Firm Performance 
A number of studies have documented that a significant change in firms’ performance 
can have an impact on the analysts’ earnings forecasts (Brown et al., 1987; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Gu and Wu, 2001). In our analysis, we include two key measures which 
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can indicate recent significant change in level of performance of the firm, namely, sales 
growth and investment. Sales growth is the sales at t-1 minus sales at t-2 divided by sales at t-
2. Investment is the capital expenditure normalised by total assets of the firm. In general, we 
find little evidence to suggest that analysts’ earnings forecast errors are driven by firm 
performance variables. We find that these variables are insignificant in all the three countries 
in our analysis. 
 
7.5.7.5. Financial Crisis 
A number of studies have documented that forecast time horizon is negatively related 
to forecast accuracy (Brown, 1993; Duru and Reeb, 2002). According to I/B/E/S, a 5 year 
period is what analysts have in mind when they issue long-term growth forecasts. The time 
period in our study covers the financial crisis of 2008, and hence, we include time dummy 
variables to study the impact of the crisis on earnings forecast characteristics. 
 We find that short- and long-term forecast accuracy declines significantly during the 
recessionary period in France. For example, when the dependent variable is 1-year Accuracy 
we report the coefficient of the variable Crisis as 0.046, statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. This suggests that forecasting complexity increases during the financial crisis which, in 
turn, reduces the accuracy of the forecasts. 
 In addition to this, we find a positive and significant relationship between Dispersion 
in short- and long-term forecasts and the financial crisis variable in Germany. For example, 
when the dependent variable is Dispersion in 1-year forecasts, we report the coefficient of the 
variable Crisis as 0.094, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This also indicates that 
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forecasting complexity increases during the crisis, which then leads to a higher level of 
disagreement amongst analysts about firms’ short-term and long-term performance.  
 
7.6. Cross-Country Analysis 
In this section, we present our findings from the pooled data for three countries in our 
study and repeat the analysis. Table 7.15 shows the results from the regression analysis 
examining the relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and internal capital markets in 
the UK, France and Germany. 
  
7.6.1. Accuracy 
Firstly, our findings suggest that internal capital markets operations in Germany have 
a less significant impact on forecast accuracy compared with the UK. For example, when the 
dependent variable is 1-year Accuracy we report DE x ICM Size as -0.019, statistically 
significant at 5 percent level. This is in line with the results reported in prior section and 
indicates that internal capital markets increase complexity and reduce forecast accuracy in the 
UK, but this does not appear to be the case in Germany.   
Secondly, firms with more efficient internal capital markets are associated with higher 
forecast accuracy in Germany compared with the UK. For example, when the dependent 
variable is 1-year Accuracy, we report DE x ICM Efficiency as -0.045, statistically significant 
at 5 percent level. This appears to be in line with findings reported in the previous section and 
suggests that internal capital markets efficiency as well as the signal it provides about the 
internal workings of the firm play a role in determining future profitability of the firm. We 
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find that this is not the case in France as the variables do not have significant explanatory 
power. 
We also find that firm size is negatively associated with analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
For example, we report the coefficient of Firm Size as 0.079, statistically significant at 1 
percent level, when the dependent variable is the Accuracy in the short-term forecasts. In line 
with prior literature, this finding suggests that large firms are generally more complex which 
reduces forecasting ability.  
In general, in line with prior results we find some evidence to suggest that internal 
capital markets operations have significant impact on short-term earnings forecast accuracy. 
For example, when the dependent variable is 1-year Accuracy we report ICM Size as 0.009, 
statistically significant at 10 percent level. This provides some evidence to suggest that 
internal capital markets aggravate firm complexity and, in turn, reduce forecast accuracy. 
However, we find that this variable is insignificant when the dependent variable is 2-year or 
LTG forecast. This indicates that internal capital markets size has a greater impact on short-
term rather than long-term forecast accuracy.  
 
7.6.2. Bias 
We find some evidence to suggest that analysts are less optimistic about firms’ long-
term performance when the firm operates large internal capital markets. For example, when 
the dependent variable is Bias in LTG, we report the coefficient of the variable ICM Size as 
0.815, statistically significant at 10 percent level. This suggests that increasing internal 
capital market activity reduces the level of optimism in forecasts. It may be that analysts 
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consider internal capital markets to be inefficient in general and, thus, higher internal capital 
market activity will further reduce the profitability of a firm by misallocating resources. 
On the other hand, we find that there is significant evidence to suggest that firms in 
Germany operating smaller but more efficient internal capital markets have higher level of 
bias in short-term forecasts. For example, when the dependent variable is 2-year Bias, we 
report the coefficient of DE x ICM Size as 0.009, statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
Similarly, we find that DE x ICM Efficiency appears as -0.032, statistically significant at 5 
percent level. This suggests that analysts consider firms to be more profitable if they operate 
a limited and an efficient internal capital market in Germany.  
Interestingly, we find that FR x ICM Size appears negative and significant in our 
analysis. We report the coefficient of this variable as -0.014, statistically significant at 5 
percent level. This suggests that analysts are more favourable towards firms that operate 
internal capital markets to a greater extent than the UK.  
Lastly, we find some evidence to suggest that firms’ decision to raise finance 
externally increases the optimism in forecasts. For example, when the dependent variable is 
2-year Bias, we report the ∆ Debt as -0.048, statistically significant at 5 percent level. This is 
in line with the findings of Bradshaw et al. (2006) suggesting that analysts are more 
optimistic about firms’ performance that raise finance on external markets. Furthermore, we 
also find that change in debt level lowers the forecast accuracy.  
 
7.6.3. Dispersion  
We find some evidence to suggest that internal capital market activity has a 
significant impact on the level of dispersion in the short-term forecasts. When the dependent 
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variable is the Dispersion in 2-year forecasts, we report the coefficient of the variable ICM 
Size as 0.109, statistically significant at 5 percent level. This is in line with the prior findings 
that size of internal capital markets lowers the forecast accuracy and leads to an increase in 
the level of disagreement between analysts.  
In comparison to the UK there is more dispersion in analysts’ short-term forecasts 
when firms operate larger internal capital markets in France. For example, with the dependent 
variable is the 2-year Dispersion, we find that FR x ICM Size appears as -0.137, statistically 
significant at 10 percent level. Additionally, we find that FR x ICM Efficiency appears 
positive and statistically significant. These findings shed light on some key differences in 
internal capital markets and forecast errors between the three countries in our study. 
Furthermore, analysts appear to be more optimistic about future performance of the 
firm when the firm is large. We report the coefficient of Firm Size as -0.121, statistically 
significant at 1 percent level, when the dependent variable is Bias in short-term forecasts. 
This is in line with study of Plumlee (2003) who documents that analysts are more optimistic 
when task complexity is high.  
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Table 7.15  
Analysts’ Forecast Errors and ICM. 
 Accuracy Bias Dispersion 
 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 
ICM Size 0.009* 
(0.065) 
0.004 
(0.207) 
-0.186 
(0.620) 
-0.005 
(0.362) 
-0.001 
(0.787) 
0.815* 
(0.090) 
-0.170 
(0.294) 
0.109** 
(0.042) 
-0.124 
(0.687) 
ICM Efficiency 0.001 
(0.242) 
0.000 
(0.645) 
-1.152 
(0.337) 
-0.002 
(0.200) 
-0.001 
(0.473) 
-1.700 
(0.221) 
0.006 
(0.424) 
0.002 
(0.335) 
-0.525 
(0.654) 
Firm size 0.079*** 
(0.002) 
0.074*** 
(0.000) 
-3.456 
(0.266) 
-0.121*** 
(0.000) 
-0.147*** 
(0.000) 
7.742 
(0.131) 
-0.056 
(0.758) 
0.028 
(0.773) 
3.602* 
(0.097) 
HI -0.008** 
(0.049) 
-0.001 
(0.370) 
0.179 
(0.131) 
0.009** 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.443) 
0.136 
(0.509) 
-0.024 
(0.417) 
-0.023 
(0.131) 
-0.544** 
(0.016) 
∆ Debt -0.013 
(0.538) 
0.029* 
(0.055) 
4.870* 
(0.064) 
-0.016 
(0.428) 
-0.043** 
(0.048) 
-3.022 
(0.378) 
-0.026 
(0.873) 
-0.073 
(0.686) 
1.068 
(0.533) 
∆ Equity -0.000* 
(0.097) 
0.000 
(0.629) 
0.005 
(0.508) 
0.000 
(0.695) 
-0.000 
(0.141) 
0.003 
(0.842) 
-0.000 
(0.224) 
-0.000 
(0.462) 
-0.022*** 
(0.000) 
Capex 0.082 
(0.365) 
0.026 
(0.578) 
-2.992** 
(0.034) 
-0.135 
(0.239) 
-0.140** 
(0.040) 
6.866*** 
(0.011) 
0.689 
(0.257) 
0.127 
(0.843) 
4.966* 
(0.080) 
Sales Growth -0.001 
(0.901) 
-0.002 
(0.603) 
0.515 
(0.610) 
-0.002 
(0.727) 
-0.004 
(0.414) 
2.842** 
(0.045) 
-0.023 
(0.668) 
-0.089 
(0.206) 
2.137 
(0.482) 
Crisis 0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.882) 
0.594 
(0.483) 
0.002 
(0.730) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
3.454*** 
(0.004) 
0.086 
(0.263) 
0.052 
(0.226) 
1.536** 
(0.035) 
Crisis x ICM Size -0.001 
(0.790) 
-0.005 
(0.166) 
0.996* 
(0.100) 
-0.003 
(0.569) 
0.002 
(0.646) 
0.347 
(0.627) 
0.217 
(0.285) 
0.042 
(0.534) 
0.111 
(0.859) 
Crisis x Efficiency -0.002 
(0.125) 
-0.000 
(0.591) 
-1.553 
(0.495) 
0.002 
(0.110) 
0.001 
(0.410) 
-0.736 
(0.776) 
-0.009 
(0.344) 
-0.009* 
(0.083) 
1.734 
(0.252) 
FR x ICM size -0.010 
(0.216) 
0.003 
(0.517) 
-0.274 
(0.671) 
0.000 
(0.978) 
-0.014** 
(0.021) 
-0.079 
(0.913) 
0.099 
(0.273) 
-0.137* 
(0.077) 
0.192 
(0.662) 
DE x ICM size -0.019** 
(0.038) 
-0.007** 
(0.048) 
-0.396 
(0.699) 
0.013 
(0.185) 
0.009* 
(0.072) 
-0.186 
(0.892) 
0.676 
(0.237) 
-0.031 
(0.785) 
0.802 
(0.327) 
FR x ICM 
efficiency 
-0.011 
(0.547) 
0.010 
(0.470) 
4.080 
(0.372) 
0.021 
(0.478) 
0.024 
(0.247) 
1.804*** 
(0.001) 
0.579 
(0.129) 
0.196* 
(0.078) 
0.859 
(0.670) 
DE x ICM 
efficiency 
-0.045** 
(0.043) 
-0.044*** 
(0.000) 
-3.150 
(0.288) 
0.046 
(0.151) 
-0.032** 
(0.022) 
2.907 
(0.530) 
-1.753 
(0.251) 
-0.308 
(0.104) 
1.830 
(0.321) 
          
Constant -0.427*** 
(0.005) 
-0.381*** 
(0.000) 
3.578* 
(0.078) 
0.692*** 
(0.000) 
0.832*** 
(0.000) 
-6.507** 
(0.052) 
0.403 
(0.706) 
-0.042 
(0.943) 
-2.779* 
(0.080) 
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R-Sq. 0.018 0.025 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.026 0.003 0.008 
Obs. 2,855 2,855 1,107 2,855 2,855 1,107 2,331 2,296 549 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis examining the relationship between internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors in the UK, 
France and Germany. The dependent variable in this analysis is accuracy, bias or dispersion. The analysts’ forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Crisis takes a value of 1 if 
the reporting year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. DE and FR take a value of 1 if the firms’ home country is Germany or France and 0 otherwise. Internal capital market 
variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. 
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7.7. Robustness Checks  
 In this section, we examine the robustness of the results reported earlier by using 
alternative methods to compute the key variables in our analysis. Firstly, we take the 
analysts’ forecast errors at t+3 months after firms’ fiscal year-end month instead of taking 
forecast errors at t+4 months. Secondly, we normalise the dependent variable by realised 
earnings, instead of using month end stock price. Third, we use alternative measures of size 
and efficiency of internal capital markets. We discuss our findings in the subsequent 
subsections. 
 
7.7.1. Forecast Error at t+3 Months  
In the analysis in prior sections, we followed Bradshaw et al. (2006) and computed 
analysts forecast errors at 4 months after the firms’ fiscal year-end month. In this section, we 
compute analysts’ earnings forecast errors after 3 months of fiscal year-end month. The three 
month time period between year-end month and earnings forecast issued by analysts is also 
used in the study by Rajan and Sarvaes (1997). Our objective is to select a forecast month in 
which we can be sure that analysts have access to financial statements of the firm and are 
able to incorporate the information on firms’ internal capital market operation and efficiency 
into their forecasts. 
We present the regression results in Table 7.16 for all three countries in our analysis. 
In general, we find that internal capital market variables have limited impact on forecast 
errors in all three countries. For example, although we find that ICM Size appears positive for 
Accuracy 1-year and LTG, which indicates that larger internal capital market operations 
reduce forecast accuracy, however, it does not have any significant explanatory power.  
– 299 – 
 
Similarly, we find that ICM Efficiency appears negative when the dependent variable 
is Bias in short-term forecasts. This suggests that analysts are more optimistic about the 
future performance of the firm that operates an efficient internal capital markets. However, 
this finding is also insignificant in our analysis. On the other hand, we find some evidence to 
suggest internal capital markets operation and efficiency is related to dispersion in long-term 
forecasts in France. For example, when the dependent variable is Dispersion in LTG 
forecasts, we find that FR x ICM Size and FR x ICM Efficiency appear negative and 
significant at 5 percent significance level.  
Consistent with results reported in prior sections, we find that accuracy of forecasts is 
negatively related to the firm size. This finding is in line with the theory that large firms 
increase task complexity and reduce forecast accuracy. We find that analysts are more 
optimistic about firms that are large. In line with study by Plumlee (2003), this also suggests 
that analysts are more optimistic about firms that are more complex. 
Furthermore, we find that raising finance on the external markets is generally related 
to higher optimism in forecasts, in line with the findings of Bradshaw et al. (2006). For 
example, when the dependent variable is Bias in short-term forecasts, we find the variable ∆ 
Debt appears as -0.077, statistically significant at 1 percent level. This may suggest higher 
optimism is related with firms having good investment opportunities that decide to raise 
finance or it may indicate investment banking conflicts as documented in prior studies.   
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Table 7.16  
Analysts’ Forecast Errors at Month 3. 
 Accuracy Bias Dispersion 
 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 
ICM Size 0.003 
(0.617) 
-0.000 
(0.970) 
0.116 
(0.785) 
-0.000 
(0.979) 
0.002 
(0.625) 
-0.156 
(0.780) 
-0.009 
(0.806) 
-0.022 
(0.191) 
-0.088 
(0.774) 
ICM Efficiency 0.001 
(0.236) 
0.000 
(0.825) 
-0.988 
(0.453) 
-0.002 
(0.177) 
-0.000 
(0.684) 
0.007 
(0.997) 
-0.001 
(0.761) 
-0.015 
(0.354) 
0.381 
(0.754) 
Firm size 0.116* 
(0.075) 
0.028 
(0.228) 
11.117** 
(0.036) 
-0.226*** 
(0.001) 
-0.152*** 
(0.000) 
2.262*** 
(0.002) 
0.206 
(0.247) 
0.277 
(0.101) 
1.569 
(0.555) 
HI -0.001 
(0.698) 
0.003 
(0.169) 
-0.026 
(0.589) 
0.008 
(0.127) 
-0.003 
(0.897) 
0.089 
(0.752) 
0.009 
(0.329) 
0.009 
(0.312) 
-0.023 
(0.832) 
∆ Debt -0.064** 
(0.028) 
0.026 
(0.309) 
0.045 
(0.985) 
-0.058* 
(0.068) 
-0.077*** 
(0.011) 
4.157 
(0.152) 
0.044 
(0.584) 
0.019 
(0.688) 
0.829 
(0.565) 
∆ Equity -0.000** 
(0.025) 
0.000 
(0.590) 
-0.007 
(0.119) 
0.000 
(0.706) 
0.000 
(0.924) 
0.005 
(0.353) 
0.000 
(0.111) 
0.000 
(0.555) 
-0.002 
(0.715) 
Capex -0.405* 
(0.060) 
-0.001 
(0.996) 
-4.259*** 
(0.007) 
-0.297 
(0.294) 
-0.277 
(0.168) 
2.925 
(0.177) 
0.268 
(0.586) 
0.132 
(0.589) 
-4.898 
(0.769) 
Sales Growth 0.004 
(0.658) 
-0.005 
(0.460) 
6.509*** 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.667) 
-0.002 
(0.734) 
2.643 
(0.446) 
-0.090 
(0.236) 
0.002 
(0.941) 
-2.597 
(0.273) 
Crisis 0.040*** 
(0.001) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
-0.087 
(0.913) 
0.005 
(0.743) 
0.003 
(0.786) 
3.234*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014 
(0.770) 
0.016 
(0.667) 
0.572 
(0.537) 
Crisis x ICM Size 0.006 
(0.359) 
-0.002 
(0.506) 
0.343 
(0.539) 
-0.003 
(0.725) 
0.002 
(0.593) 
1.290* 
(0.066) 
-0.002 
(0.960) 
0.011 
(0.516) 
0.441 
(0.586) 
Crisis x Efficiency -0.001 
(0.172) 
0.000 
(0.819) 
2.478 
(0.239) 
0.002* 
(0.075) 
0.003 
(0.581) 
-1.791 
(0.526) 
-0.000 
(0.966) 
0.016 
(0.342) 
-3.484* 
(0.094) 
FR x ICM size 0.009 
(0.640) 
-0.000 
(0.968) 
0.113 
(0.876) 
0.026 
(0.201) 
-0.004 
(0.951) 
0.468 
(0.601) 
0.005 
(0.918) 
0.004 
(0.810) 
-3.892*** 
(0.000) 
DE x ICM size -0.006 
(0.486) 
-0.003 
(0.916) 
0.537 
(0.483) 
0.003 
(0.971) 
-0.002 
(0.707) 
-0.369 
(0.745) 
-0.037 
(0.428) 
0.032 
(0.423) 
-0.886 
(0.288) 
FR x ICM 
efficiency 
0.046 
(0.293) 
0.011 
(0.639) 
0.967 
(0.853) 
0.072 
(0.283) 
0.045 
(0.165) 
2.183*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.993) 
0.094* 
(0.069) 
-12.781*** 
(0.000) 
DE x ICM 
efficiency 
0.168 
(0.390) 
0.049** 
(0.025) 
6.307 
(0.867) 
0.153 
(0.444) 
0.007 
(0.772) 
1.964 
(0.622) 
0.238** 
(0.031) 
-0.153 
(0.251) 
9.895 
(0.273) 
          
Constant 0.754* 
(0.054) 
0.216 
(0.102) 
8.688*** 
(0.014) 
1.353*** 
(0.001) 
0.904*** 
(0.000) 
-16.174*** 
(0.001) 
-1.086 
(0.298) 
-1.582 
(0.115) 
-9.757 
(0.607) 
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R-Sq. 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.042 
Obs. 2,654 2,654 935 2,654 2,654 935 2,607 2,607 491 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis examining the relationship between internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors in the UK, 
France and Germany. The dependent variable in this analysis is accuracy, bias or dispersion calculated at t+3 months after the firms’ fiscal year-end month. The analysts’ 
forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. DE and FR take a value of 1 if the firms’ home 
country is Germany or France and 0 otherwise. Internal capital market variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects. ***, ** 
and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. 
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7.7.2. Normalising Dependent Variables  
 In this section, we present the results from the analysis using dependent variables 
normalised by actual earnings instead of the month-end stock price and determine whether 
this changes our results significantly. In Section 7.2, the forecast Accuracy and Bias were 
normalised by Stock Price (Bradshaw et al. 2006) and the Dispersion in forecasts was 
normalised by Mean Forecast in that month. In this section, we normalise the Accuracy of 
the forecast and Bias in the forecast by the Actual Earnings (Hall and Tacon, 2010). 
Similarly, we normalise the Dispersion in forecasts by end of the month Stock Price (Barron 
and Stuerke, 1998). 
The results from the regression analysis are reported in Table 7.17. In general, our 
findings again indicate that internal capital markets variable do not have a significant impact 
on forecast errors. Although we find that the variable ICM Size is positive when the 
dependent variable is Accuracy or Dispersion of the forecasts, these results are insignificant. 
Similarly, the variable ICM Efficiency is negative when the dependent variable is Bias, 
however, it is also insignificant at any level. 
On the other hand, we do find some evidence to suggest analysts are more optimistic 
about future performance of the firm that operates an efficient internal capital market in 
Germany compared with the UK. Similarly, the variable ICM Efficiency in Germany is 
negatively related to Dispersion in forecasts, suggesting that there is significantly less 
disagreement about firms performance that operate efficient internal capital markets in 
Germany compared with the UK.  
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Table 7.17  
Analysts’ forecast errors – alternative method. 
 Accuracy Bias Dispersion 
 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 
ICM Size -0.036 
(0.936) 
0.013 
(0.898) 
0.271 
(0.330) 
0.235 
(0.224) 
-0.007 
(0.522) 
0.418 
(0.180) 
0.009 
(0.639) 
-0.000 
(0.997) 
0.016 
(0.549) 
ICM Efficiency 0.0415 
(0.373) 
0.005 
(0.533) 
0.310 
(0.659) 
-0.043 
(0.348) 
-0.002 
(0.779) 
-0.198 
(0.757) 
-0.000 
(0.981) 
0.000 
(0.822) 
-0.00 
(0.972) 
Firm size 1.077 
(0.254) 
0.652* 
(0.061) 
1.287 
(0.539) 
-1.926* 
(0.054) 
-1.762*** 
(0.000) 
-1.383 
(0.539) 
0.015 
(0.306) 
0.017 
(0.126) 
-0.556*** 
(0.008) 
HI -0.451 
(0.322) 
-0.081 
(0.284) 
0.260 
(0.169) 
0.413 
(0.370) 
-0.016 
(0.793) 
0.381** 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.221) 
-0.001 
(0.317) 
-0.005 
(0.505) 
∆ Debt -0.320 
(0.842) 
-0.094 
(0.855) 
1.429 
(0.374) 
0.851 
(0.603) 
0.190 
(0.723) 
-2.387 
(0.183) 
-0.007 
(0.517) 
-0.002 
(0.818) 
0.214** 
(0.048) 
∆ Equity -0.001 
(0.505) 
-0.004 
(0.439) 
0.061** 
(0.042) 
0.001 
(0.589) 
-0.000 
(0.862) 
0.062** 
(0.038) 
-0.000** 
(0.048) 
-0.000 
(0.175) 
-0.001* 
(0.091) 
Capex 8.095 
(0.272) 
-0.822 
(0.478) 
-5.885 
(0.181) 
-8.946 
(0.234) 
-0.589 
(0.610) 
0.381 
(0.925) 
0.023 
(0.385) 
0.043 
(0.245) 
-1.697 
(0.240) 
Sales Growth 0.590 
(0.359) 
0.117 
(0.509) 
2.340*** 
(0.001) 
-0.579 
(0.371) 
-0.178 
(0.360) 
2.338** 
(0.040) 
-0.003 
(0.246) 
-0.002 
(0.302) 
-0.204* 
(0.072) 
Crisis -0.110 
(0.846) 
0.123 
(0.483) 
-0.253 
(0.361) 
0.853 
(0.134) 
0.452*** 
(0.012) 
-0.121 
(0.698) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.009*** 
(0.010) 
0.332*** 
(0.000) 
Crisis x ICM Size 0.117 
(0.549) 
-0.181 
(0.126) 
0.624** 
(0.015) 
-0.195 
(0.376) 
-0.110 
(0.444) 
-0.277 
(0.418) 
-0.000 
(0.900) 
-0.001 
(0.750) 
0.011 
(0.819) 
Crisis x Efficiency -0.041 
(0.395) 
-0.003 
(0.845) 
-0.883 
(0.613) 
0.047 
(0.327) 
0.008 
(0.659) 
0.344 
(0.834) 
-0.001 
(0.453) 
-0.000 
(0.879) 
-0.086 
(0.521) 
FR x ICM size -0.046 
(0.660) 
0.061 
(0.703) 
-0.695* 
(0.067) 
-0.198* 
(0.064) 
0.065 
(0.737) 
0.341 
(0.474) 
-0.004** 
(0.043) 
-0.001 
(0.521) 
0.009 
(0.978) 
DE x ICM size -0.352 
(0.279) 
0.067 
(0.669) 
-0.523 
(0.154) 
-0.241 
(0.550) 
0.305 
(0.165) 
-0.797 
(0.159) 
0.003 
(0.205) 
-0.001 
(0.639) 
0.069 
(0.230) 
FR x ICM 
efficiency 
-0.728 
(0.481) 
0.205 
(0.407) 
-0.711 
(0.821) 
-0.522 
(0.438) 
0.129 
(0.669) 
7.636** 
(0.031) 
-0.002 
(0.831) 
0.002 
(0.684) 
0.587*** 
(0.000) 
DE x ICM 
efficiency 
0.649 
(0.359) 
0.405 
(0.115) 
-2.533 
(0.334) 
-1.132 
(0.236) 
-0.943*** 
(0.005) 
4.337 
(0.236) 
-0.029*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009** 
(0.021) 
0.699 
(0.743) 
          
Constant -5.531 
(0.308) 
-2.951 
(0.151) 
-5.791 
(0.675) 
10.935* 
(0.058) 
9.913*** 
(0.000) 
8.593 
(0.562) 
-0.083 
(0.346) 
-0.095 
(0.156) 
4.069*** 
(0.006) 
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R-Sq. 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.025 
Obs. 2,855 2,855 1,107 2,855 2,855 1,107 2,378 2,378 547 
This table shows the estimation results from the regression analysis examining the relationship between internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors in the UK, 
France and Germany. The dependent variable in this analysis is accuracy, bias or dispersion. Accuracy and Bias are normalised by actual earnings and Dispersion is normalised 
by end of month stock price. The analysts’ forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. DE 
and FR take a value of 1 if the firms’ home country is Germany or France and 0 otherwise. Internal capital market variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. All 
regressions are estimated with fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. 
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7.7.3. ICM Operation and Efficiency  
As a final step, we use an alternative measure of internal capital market operations 
and efficiency in our analysis. In the analysis above, the internal capital market variables are 
computed using average industry values. In this section, we use internal capital market 
variables that are computed using median values instead of averages. The findings are 
reported in Table 7.18. 
In line with prior findings, the results mainly suggest that internal capital market 
efficiency is negatively related to the size of the forecast errors. For example, we report the 
coefficient of the variable ICM Efficiency as -1.594, statistically significant at 10 percent 
level, when the dependent variable is the Accuracy of long-term growth forecasts. This 
suggests that forecasting accuracy improves when firms allocate resources efficiently through 
internal capital markets.  
The results also indicate that analysts tend to be less optimistic about the long-term 
performance of firms that operate large internal capital markets. On the other hand, more 
efficient internal capital markets are associated with higher optimism in the long-term 
forecasts. However, we find that this is not the case with short-term forecasts as internal 
capital markets variables appear as insignificant. 
We also find that firm size is negatively related to forecast accuracy and positively 
related to optimism in analysts’ forecasts. These findings again suggest that larger firms are 
more complex and reduce forecast accuracy. Analysts tend to be more optimistic about the 
future performance of large firms. Finally, as discussed earlier, our findings indicate that 
raising finance on external markets is generally associated with higher optimism in forecasts 
but lower accuracy. 
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Table 7.18  
Analysts’ Forecast Errors and ICM. 
 Accuracy Bias Dispersion 
 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 1-year 2-year LTG 
ICM Size 0.001 
(0.881) 
-0.004 
(0.400) 
-0.377 
(0.180) 
0.001 
(0.929) 
0.003 
(0.554) 
1.045** 
(0.022) 
0.009 
(0.255) 
-0.002 
(0.876) 
2.455 
(0.145) 
ICM Efficiency -0.022 
(0.218) 
-0.011 
(0.106) 
-1.594* 
(0.094) 
0.019 
(0.315) 
0.004 
(0.618) 
-3.111** 
(0.030) 
-0.075 
(0.546) 
-0.004 
(0.956) 
-8.419* 
(0.096) 
Firm size 0.077*** 
(0.003) 
0.076*** 
(0.000) 
-3.279 
(0.286) 
-0.120*** 
(0.000) 
-0.149*** 
(0.000) 
7.599 
(0.146) 
-0.010 
(0.951) 
0.013 
(0.893) 
4.506** 
(0.042) 
HI -0.008* 
(0.068) 
-0.001 
(0.286) 
-0.019 
(0.896) 
0.009* 
(0.055) 
0.001 
(0.464) 
-0.155 
(0.522) 
-0.025 
(0.408) 
-0.076 
(0.358) 
-2.097 
(0.047) 
∆ Debt -0.016 
(0.428) 
0.032** 
(0.036) 
5.061* 
(0.054) 
-0.013 
(0.502) 
-0.048** 
(0.048) 
-3.309 
(0.388) 
0.038 
(0.833) 
-0.061 
(0.737) 
5.021* 
(0.092) 
∆ Equity -0.000* 
(0.080) 
0.000 
(0.545) 
0.005 
(0.483) 
0.000 
(0.728) 
-0.000 
(0.132) 
0.004 
(0.795) 
-0.001 
(0.242) 
-0.000 
(0.357) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Capex 0.090 
(0.323) 
0.031 
(0.497) 
-2.722* 
(0.065) 
-0.139 
(0.236) 
-0.134** 
(0.039) 
6.579*** 
(0.011) 
0.745 
(0.202) 
0.222 
(0.730) 
5.583** 
(0.050) 
Sales Growth -0.002 
(0.838) 
-0.001 
(0.629) 
0.529 
(0.599) 
-0.002 
(0.812) 
-0.004 
(0.502) 
3.063** 
(0.034) 
0.075 
(0.493) 
-0.087 
(0.207) 
3.058 
(0.310) 
Crisis 0.021*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.892) 
0.695 
(0.397) 
0.003 
(0.631) 
0.031*** 
(0.000) 
3.271*** 
(0.004) 
0.119 
(0.131) 
0.025 
(0.626) 
1.345** 
(0.051) 
Crisis x ICM Size 0.004 
(0.541) 
-0.002* 
(0.069) 
0.856* 
(0.056) 
-0.007 
(0.413) 
0.001 
(0.338) 
0.429 
(0.521) 
0.078 
(0.262) 
0.098 
(0.224) 
0.198 
(0.614) 
Crisis x Efficiency -0.004 
(0.245) 
-0.000 
(0.967) 
-2.947 
(0.182) 
0.001 
(0.229) 
0.000 
(0.467) 
-1.145 
(0.635) 
-0.003 
(0.242) 
-0.005 
(0.187) 
1.472 
(0.381) 
FR x ICM size -0.002 
(0.799) 
0.001 
(0.848) 
-7.047 
(0.174) 
0.008 
(0.260) 
-0.016** 
(0.021) 
-2.447 
(0.676) 
-0.069 
(0.138) 
-0.037 
(0.246) 
2.206 
(0.485) 
DE x ICM size 0.003 
(0.811) 
0.007 
(0.421) 
0.176 
(0.868) 
0.000 
(0.981) 
-0.011 
(0.416) 
1.229 
(0.626) 
0.034 
(0.916) 
-0.051 
(0.525) 
1.723 
(0.303) 
FR x ICM 
efficiency 
0.057 
(0.534) 
0.019 
(0.515) 
-8.812 
(0.217) 
0.132* 
(0.059) 
0.088 
(0.168) 
6.423 
(0.383) 
2.862* 
(0.098) 
0.766 
(0.351) 
5.605* 
(0.085) 
DE x ICM 
efficiency 
0.260 
(0.144) 
-0.173 
(0.266) 
1.916 
(0.500) 
-0.292 
(0.154) 
-0.025 
(0.955) 
5.268 
(0.512) 
-3.157 
(0.296) 
0.036 
(0.969) 
-5.685 
(0.891) 
          
Constant -0.418*** 
(0.006) 
-0.386*** 
(0.001) 
3.453* 
(0.086) 
0.687*** 
(0.000) 
0.835*** 
(0.000) 
-6.377* 
(0.062) 
0.165 
(0.870) 
0.085 
(0.884) 
-3.349** 
(0.039) 
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R-Sq. 0.017 0.025 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.040 0.001 0.007 
Obs. 2,855 2,855 1,107 2,855 2,855 1,107 2,331 2,359 549 
The dependent variable in this analysis is accuracy, bias or dispersion, as described in Section 7.2. The analysts’ forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Internal capital 
market variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. The internal capital markets variables are constructed using median industry values instead of average industry values. 
The analysts’ forecast errors are between 2006 and 2011. Crisis takes a value of 1 if the reporting year is 2008, 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. DE and FR take a value of 1 if the 
firms’ home country is Germany or France and 0 otherwise. Internal capital market variables are measured between 2005 and 2010. All regressions are estimated with fixed 
effects. ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level. 
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7.8. Summary 
In this chapter, we investigate the link between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and 
internal capital markets. In particular, we focus on the accuracy, bias and dispersion in 
analysts’ short-term and long-term earnings forecasts, and the operation and efficiency of 
internal capital markets in UK, France and Germany. We measure the operation and 
efficiency of internal capital markets within diversified firms between 2005 and 2010. The 
analysts forecast characteristics are obtained at t+1, i.e. between 2006 and 2011 for these 
firms.  
It is now well documented that firm complexity can reduce forecast accuracy (Duru 
and Reeb, 2002; Plumlee, 2003). Our objective is to determine whether operation and 
efficiency of internal capital markets aggravate firm complexity and, thus, affect earnings 
forecast errors. Previous research has mainly looked at external financing measures and 
forecast accuracy (e.g. Bradshaw et al., 2006); however, the link between operations and 
efficiency of internal capital markets and earnings forecast errors remains unexplored.  
In general, we find limited evidence of the relationship between internal capital 
markets and forecast errors. Overall, we find that analysts are generally optimistic about 
firms’ future performance. This is consistent for both short- and long-term earnings forecast 
across the three countries in our sample. We find that there is only some evidence which 
suggests that operations and efficiency of internal capital markets has an impact on the 
accuracy of short-term earnings forecasts in the UK. This suggests that internal capital 
markets aggravate firm complexity to certain extent and reduce forecast accuracy. In 
addition, the efficiency of internal capital markets appears to be positively related to forecast 
bias only in Germany, indicating that analysts consider efficient firms to be more profitable 
in the future.  
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Furthermore, our results suggest that firms which operate larger internal capital 
markets have higher level of dispersion in long-term earnings growth forecasts in the UK. 
This finding is more pronounced in highly diversified firms. This suggests that internal 
capital markets aggravate firm complexity and reduce forecast accuracy which, in turn, leads 
to higher level of disagreement amongst analysts. However, we do not find any evidence to 
suggest that this is the case with short-term earnings forecast in all three countries. 
In Chapter 8, we discuss the key findings of the study on financial systems, internal 
capital markets and the financial crisis of 2008. We also discuss our main findings from the 
analysis on internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecast errors. We also discuss 
some of the limitations of the studies and future research that can add to our understanding of 
internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
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CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
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8.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the operations and efficiency of internal 
capital markets in two opposing financial systems, namely, the market-based and bank-based 
financial systems, and it’s with analysts’ earnings forecast errors.  
This study contains a number of important and original aspects, and it contributes to 
the existing literature in a number of ways. The main objectives of the research are: 1) 
determine whether internal capital markets are active and efficient, 2) document the 
similarities and differences in the operations and efficiency of internal capital markets in 
market- and bank-based systems, 3) examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on 
operation and efficiency of internal capital markets in these two financial systems, 4) 
investigate the link between internal capital markets and analysts’ forecast errors, and 
determine whether the extent of internal capital market operations have an impact on 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, bias and dispersion, and 5) whether the efficiency of 
internal capital markets have an effect on forecast accuracy, bias and dispersion. 
In this chapter, we discuss our results from the empirical analysis on financial 
systems, internal capital markets and the financial crisis of 2008 in Section 8.2. In Section 
8.3, we discuss our results from the empirical analysis on internal capital markets and 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors. Next, in Section 8.4 we discuss the contribution to existing 
literature and policy implications are discussed in Section 8.5. Lastly, Sections 8.6 and 8.7 
presents the discussion on limitations and suggestions for future research.  
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8.2. Financial Systems, Internal Capital Markets and the Financial Crisis 
The main purpose of internal capital markets is to facilitate the allocation of resources 
within diversified firms. In general, prior empirical studies have shown that internal capital 
markets are active in the US (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Hovakimian, 2011). However, internal 
capital markets appear to allocate more resources to divisions with poor investment 
opportunities and fewer resources to divisions with good investment opportunities (Rajan et 
al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). A number of studies have suggested that, in the event 
of external resources becoming more expensive or unavailable such as during a recession, 
managers significantly improve the efficiency of internal capital markets (Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga, 2010). 
We find evidence to suggest that diversified firms operate internal capital markets, i.e. 
internal capital markets are active. For example, in our analysis we find that a segment of a 
diversified firm is significantly dependent on internal resources available for reallocation for 
its investments. However, we report limited internal capital markets operations in Germany, 
whereas, internal capital markets appear to play a more active in France compared to the UK. 
Internal capital markets appear to be more successful at reducing segment’s dependence on 
its own cash flow for investment in France and enable firms to shield segment investments 
from adverse cash flow shocks. In contrast, internal capital markets appear to be less active in 
Germany. This suggests that segments are more dependent on their own cash flow for 
investments and internal capital markets play a limited role in shielding segment investment 
from adverse shocks to their own cash flow.  
Furthermore, we find that internal capital markets are generally inefficient at 
allocating resources. Thus, resources appear to flow from divisions with good investment 
opportunities and towards divisions with poor investment opportunities. On the one hand, the 
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literature suggests that internal capital markets can add value by enabling diversified firms to 
finance good investment opportunities of a segment by using the cash flow of other segments, 
and hence, bypassing external markets. On the other hand, internal capital markets may 
destroy value if resources are misallocated to finance lesser profitable investments of the 
firm. Our results are mainly in line with prior literature and suggest that managers generally 
misallocate resources. 
Our analysis also indicates that the recent financial crisis of 2008 has a varied impact 
on the operation and efficiency of internal capital markets in bank- and market-based 
systems. In general, segment investments significantly decline during the financial crisis of 
2008 in all three countries. This is in line with declining sales and investment opportunities 
across industries during this period (Campello et al., 2010; Kahle and Stulz, 2013). In line 
with the findings of Hovakimian (2011), we find that internal capital markets operations 
significantly decreased during the crisis in the UK. Firms make fewer cross-subsidisations of 
resources which may be due to declining firm-wide cash flow and investment opportunities. 
In contrast, internal capital markets operations increased during the crisis in France, while 
there is an insignificant change in Germany. Segments of diversified firms in France relied 
more on internal capital markets during difficult economic conditions. Firms in France may 
have used internal capital markets to support weaker segments by transferring more resources 
from cash-rich segments to cash-constrained segments.  
Additionally, our results indicate that the efficiency of internal capital markets 
increases during the crisis only in market-based systems. Although, internal capital markets 
are still inefficient during the crisis period, they become significantly less inefficient 
compared with the non-recession period in the UK. However, this does not appear to be the 
case in bank-based systems as we report a significant decline in efficiency during the crisis 
period in France and insignificant change in Germany. This suggests that larger amount of 
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capital resources are directed towards lesser profitable segments of the firm via internal 
capital markets during the crisis in France. This is in line with the theory that firms used 
internal capital markets to support segments in financial distress and not to finance 
investment projects of more profitable segments.  
Also, firms in bank-based systems have close relationship with investors compared 
with arm’s-length relationship between firms and investors in market-based systems. It is 
likely that firms in market-based systems face more stringent environment during the crisis 
which leads to greater increase in efficiency. For example, it has been well documented that 
banks can go out of their way to help distressed clients and maintain their relationship, even 
when it may appear to be a lesser profitable decision for the bank (Hoshi et al. 1991). 
Additionally, the government intervention during the crisis in France forced banks to increase 
lending to domestic firms (Hardie and Howarth, 2009). In such a situation, firms are less 
likely to experience stringent financial environment in bank-based systems compared with 
firms in market-based system. Thus, managers appear to be under less pressure to 
significantly improve their investment policies in France and Germany.  
 
8.3. Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors and Internal Capital Markets 
Analysts provide detailed company analyses to numerous market participants via 
research reports and, within these reports, analysts provide key earnings forecasts, for 
example, the 1-year and 2-year earnings as well as long-term earnings growth forecasts. Prior 
literature has documented that this information can enable investors to make profitable 
investment decisions (e.g. Hall and Tacon, 2010) and, thus, the quality of these forecasts have 
received considerable attention in the academic literature (Ramnath et al., 2008). Prior 
empirical studies have shown that complexity of the firm increases with diversification and, 
– 315 – 
 
which in turn, reduces analysts’ ability to make accurate forecasts (Duru and Reeb, 2002). 
Our analysis focuses on three forecast characteristics, namely, the accuracy, bias, and 
dispersion. We determine whether operation and efficiency of internal capital markets 
increases firm complexity and effects analysts’ earnings forecast errors. 
In this study, we find some evidence to suggest that internal capital markets 
operations increase firm complexity and make it more difficult for analysts to make accurate 
forecasts. For example, we find that the accuracy of short-term forecasts decreases as the size 
of internal capital markets increases in the UK. However, this does not appear to be the case 
in France or Germany. This suggests that internal capital markets increase the uncertainty 
about firms’ financing and investment decisions, which in turn, may aggravate uncertainties 
about its future earnings and profitability in some countries and not in others.  
Furthermore, our finding indicate that internal capital markets operations appear to be 
negatively associated with bias in short-term forecasts. This suggests that analysts are more 
optimistic about performance of the firm that operates larger internal capital market. This is 
in line with prior studies suggesting that analysts are more optimistic when the complexity of 
the task increases (Plumlee, 2003). 
Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest that dispersion in long-term forecasts 
is positively related to internal capital markets operations. For example, firms that tend to 
operate larger internal capital markets have higher level of disagreement amongst analysts 
about its long term performance in the UK. This suggests internal capital markets increase the 
complexity of the firm and the uncertainty about its future cash flow which then leads to 
higher variation in earnings forecasts.   
Our analysis reveals that efficiency of internal capital markets does not have a 
significant impact on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy in the UK, as we expected in 
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Chapter 4. It appears that size of the internal capital market is a more important determinant 
of accuracy than its efficiency. These findings are robust when we perform a number of tests 
with alternative variables. In the case of Germany, we find some evidence that suggests that 
efficiency of internal capital markets is positively related to short-term forecast accuracy, i.e. 
firms that operate efficient internal capital markets have lower forecast errors. This is in line 
with our hypothesis and suggests that efficiency of internal capital markets efficiency 
provides a signal about the internal workings of the firm,   
Furthermore, analysts are generally optimistic about firms’ future performance and 
bias in short-term forecasts is higher for firms that operate more efficient internal capital 
markets in Germany. However, there is no evidence to suggest this is also the case in UK or 
France. This suggests that analysts anticipate more efficient capital allocation will generate 
higher cash flow and earnings in the future. Lastly, we do not find any evidence to suggest 
efficiency of internal capital markets is related to the level of dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts.  
 
8.4. Contribution to Literature 
 The findings reported in this thesis are interesting and insightful, and contribute to 
literature in many ways. In this section, we discuss the implication of our results on the 
literature on internal capital markets, financial systems and analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
  
8.4.1. Financial Systems and ICM Literature 
 Prior literature on internal capital markets generally finds that they are active and 
operate inefficiently (e.g. Maksimovic and Phillips, 2007). Our findings on the differences in 
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the operations and efficiency of internal capital markets in two distinct financial systems 
provide further evidence not only between firms but also on how multi-segment firms operate 
in different countries. 
 In general, diversified firms appear to use internal capital markets to finance projects 
of a segment using cash flow of other segments within the firm. However, we find that extent 
of internal capital markets activity differs significantly between countries. For example, they 
tend to play a more subdued role in Germany, whereas a more significant role in France 
compared with UK.  
 Furthermore, a number of studies have documented that internal capital markets 
generally tend to operate inefficiently (Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). We 
find that internal capital market efficiency differs significantly across countries. Firms in 
bank-based financial systems tend to operate more efficient internal capital markets 
compared with firms based in market-based financial systems. 
 Additionally, the impact of the financial crisis on the operation and efficiency of 
internal capital markets differs significantly across countries. For example, we find that the 
efficiency of internal capital markets significantly improves during the crisis only in market-
based systems. In contrast, efficiency of internal capital markets does not improve during the 
crisis in Germany but declines in France.  
 Our findings suggest that the financial system of the country in which the firms is 
domiciled has a significant role in determining the operation and efficiency of internal capital 
markets. For example, there is significant evidence to suggest that supervisory role of banks 
and their active involvement in firms’ investment project selection has a significant and 
positive impact on efficiency of internal capital markets in bank-based systems. 
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 Furthermore, firms in bank-based systems do not appear to experience same level of 
pressure as firms in market-based systems to improve their investment policies during the 
financial crisis of 2008, as the prior literature appears to suggest. We only find significant and 
positive change in efficiency in the UK. This suggests that firms in bank-based systems do 
not experience the same level of stringent environment as firms in market-based systems. 
Also, relationships-based financing in bank-based systems appear to be better able to reduce 
the impact of adverse external capital shocks on firms investments than arm’s-length 
financing in market-based systems. 
 
8.4.2. Analysts’ Forecast and ICM Literature 
 A number of studies have documented that firm complexity reduces analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy. Furthermore, analysts tend to be more optimistic when task 
complexity is high. For example, diversified firms that operate in multiple industries tend to 
have lower accuracy and higher optimism (Duru and Reeb, 2002). However, there remains a 
gap in the literature on firm factors that increase their complexity.  
We contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between internal capital 
markets as a factor that may increase firm complexity, and hence, effect the analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors. Furthermore, prior empirical studies have mainly looked at the 
impact of equity and debt issue on analysts’ earnings forecasts (for example see, Bradshaw et 
al., 2006), and to our knowledge, there are no studies which have examined the analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and internal investment policies of diversified firms. 
We find some evidence to suggest internal capital markets operations aggravates firm 
complexity and affects analysts’ short-term earnings forecast accuracy in the UK. 
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Furthermore, we find some evidence to suggest the extent of internal capital market activity 
is positively related to dispersion in long-term earnings growth forecasts. These findings are 
more pronounced in the UK than in France or Germany. 
Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest that efficiency of internal capital 
market is positively related to the level of optimism in short-term forecasts in Germany. This 
suggests that analysts tend to be more optimistic about future performance of the firm that 
operates efficient internal capital markets. Our analysis shows important cross-country 
differences in the impact of internal capital markets operation and efficiency on analysts’ 
forecast errors. 
 
8.5. Practical Implications 
 Our research sheds light on some of the important factors that may affect the activity 
and efficiency of internal capital markets. The findings may be useful for, but not limited to, 
investors, analysts and other market participants using analysts’ earnings forecasts to form 
trading/investment decisions or to understand the financing and investment decisions within 
diversified firms. 
 
8.5.1. Investors 
Our research findings reveal that, in line with prior studies, internal capital markets 
are active and inefficient. Results are consistent across the three countries in our study and 
suggest that fewer resources are allocated towards divisions that appear to have good 
investment opportunities. These findings imply that there are potential opportunities available 
to investors that, if utilised, may enhance the value of the firm. For example, it has now been 
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well-documented that efficient internal capital markets are related to the value of the firm (for 
example, Rajan et al., 2000; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010).  
Furthermore, literature on efficiency of internal capital markets pays considerable 
attention to good corporate governance and alignment of interests. Thus, investors should 
consider (i) placing more emphasis on obtaining information on investment opportunities 
facing the firm that may enable them to differentiate between profitable from non-profitable 
projects without completely relying on analysis from management, (ii) look at placing 
independent body within the firm that is tasked with analysing and monitoring investment 
projects and reporting back to shareholders, and (iii) better mechanisms that align interests of 
managers with the interests of shareholders.   
Additionally, our analysis reveals analysts’ earnings forecasts, which may be used by 
investors to make investment or trading decisions, are affected by internal capital markets 
operations and efficiency. For example, the analysis reveals two key results. Firstly, analysts 
are systematically optimistic about the future performance of the firm that operates more 
efficient internal capital market. Secondly, the accuracy of the forecast is negatively affected 
by the size of firms’ internal capital market. Investors should consider activity and efficiency 
of internal capital markets as additional variables that may impact the quality of forecasts.  
Finally, our results provide support for the argument that internal capital markets help 
firms to shield good investments in the event of adverse cash flow shocks by cross-
subsidising resources. This finding is in line with the findings reported by Hovakimian (2011) 
and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010). Segments appear to cut-back on investment during 
the financial crisis to a lesser extent compared with focused firms operating in the same 
industry. Investors should take into account this important benefit of firms’ internal capital 
market when considering investment in diversified or focused firm. 
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8.5.2. Financial Analysts  
 Internal capital markets play a key role in financing investment projects of segments 
within diversified firms. Our findings indicate that the presence of internal capital markets 
can increase the difficulty of forecasting future performance of the firm. This is because the 
cash flow generated by the firm in the future will depend on the type of investment projects 
being financed. On the one hand, efficient internal capital markets may enhance firm value by 
financing good investment projects. On the other hand, inefficient internal capital markets 
may destroy value if resources are misallocated. 
 In the main, the findings suggest that analysts should lay more emphasis on inter-
segmental capital allocation of resources when producing their earnings forecasts. 
Furthermore, our analysis shows forecasts appear to be positively biased when firms operate 
an efficient internal capital market. Analysts should do more, given their close engagement 
with firms’ management, to uncover the potential causes or factors that lead to an efficient or 
inefficient internal capital market within the firm. For example, analysts should attempt to 
uncover any signs of internal disputes, power struggles or CEO displaying favouritism and 
report back to firms’ shareholders and potential investors.  
 Additionally, our research shows that financial structure of the country plays a key 
role in determining the activity and efficiency of internal capital markets. In line with prior 
studies such as Holmstorm and Tirole (1997) and Chakraborty and Ray (2006) our findings 
suggest monitoring and active involvement in firms’ decision making process improves 
capital allocation process within firms. Analysts should take into account the financial 
structure of the country in which the segment or firm is operating when determining the 
operations and efficiency of internal capital markets.   
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8.5.3. Regulators  
 Our study suggests that policymakers in countries such as emerging markets where 
the trend may be towards developing a market-based system should consider this key 
advantage of bank finance over market finance. Literature on the role of markets in 
accelerating the growth of industries is sparse; however, banks role as financial 
intermediaries could itself be a source of value. The effect of good governance can lead to 
good corporate investments which, in turn, can support job creation and economic growth. 
Furthermore, our research, in line with prior studies, indicates that internal resources 
are generally misallocated within diversified firms and directed towards divisions that appear 
to have weak investment opportunities. Although, these decisions are made within the firm 
and do not need to be disclosed, regulators should do more to reduce information asymmetry 
between firm and investors.  
For example, regulators may be able to invite management to disclose some 
information (voluntarily or compulsory) on firms’ investment opportunities in their annual 
reports which, in turn, can enable investors and analysts to better understand the decision 
making process within the firm and efficiency of internal capital markets. This can lead to 
reduced information asymmetry, better allocation of resources within the financial system 
and puts managers under more pressure to make better investment decisions.  
 Also, it has been documented that analysts’ earnings forecasts errors are not only of 
interest to investors but also regulators as systematic errors can distort the capital allocation 
process within capital markets (Hilary and Hsu, 2013). Thus, our research puts forward 
additional variables that may help to explain the errors observed in forecast errors. For 
example our analysis indicates that forecast accuracy is significantly reduced when firms are 
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operating larger internal capital markets. Furthermore, our results show that dispersion in 
earnings forecast is positively related to size of firms’ internal capital market. As discussed 
above, unlike debt and equity finance, internal financing decisions are not required to be 
disclosed to external market participants that, in turn, can increase the complexity of the task 
of forecasting future profitability of the firm.  
 
8.6. Limitations 
In this study, we are not able to compute investment opportunities at segment level. 
Instead, we take the median industry value as a proxy for segment investment opportunities. 
However, it may be that the segment is significantly larger (or smaller) than average or 
median single segment firm in the industry. Thus, it may not be the best proxy for segment 
investment opportunities. We compute Tobin’s-Q as a proxy for investment opportunities, 
which may not be the best proxy for segment opportunities. Although, we do make use of 
return on segment assets as an alternative, this is a backward-looking measure compared with 
Tobin’s-Q is a forward-looking measure. 
In our analysis we control for a number of factors while attempting to determine the 
effect of specific variables. However, due to data availability our list of control variables is 
not comprehensive. For example, stock options and equity holdings may also influence 
management to make more efficient capital allocations. As stock options are usually linked to 
the performance of the firm, and internal capital markets may be more efficient in their 
presence. We are not able to obtain data on compensation structure of executives of firms in 
our sample in three European countries. Additionally, this research mainly focuses on 
diversified firms and excludes single segment firms from the analysis. The main motivation 
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behind our decision to exclude focused firms is that our objectives revolve around the 
operations and efficiency of internal capital markets within diversified firms.  
The adoption of the IFRS accounting standards in 2005 required publicly listed 
companies to disclose information to the same set of rules and promotes the disclosure of 
more segment level information. However, the data we obtain on segments of diversified 
firms is consolidated, and thus, it may make the cross-country comparison more difficult. For 
our analysis, we exclude firms that have missing segment level data and assume the missing 
data is random. For example, it is not the case that smaller diversified firms have more 
missing data than larger diversified firms, as if that was the case, the latter will be 
overrepresented in our analysis. 
 The time period we examine is six years in which contain the recent financial crisis of 
2008. It may be argued that the time period is not extensive enough to determine the prior and 
during crisis characteristics of internal capital markets and analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
However, due to the major changes in accounting regulation in Europe in 2005, data prior to 
the year 2005 is patchy and incomplete. We use data from subsequent years as we are sure all 
firms are preparing financial statement using the same set of rules.  
Lastly, this research does not examine whether analysts’ employer, experience and 
education have an impact. Due to data limitations, we do not have the data at individual 
analyst level but only the aggregate data. For example, although we have data on number of 
analysts following a firm, but we are not able to determine whether those analysts belong to 
large organisations or whether they are so called star-analysts. We have the aggregate mean 
(median) forecast but not at analyst level information. 
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8.7. Future Research 
 This study has mainly examined the operations and efficiency of internal capital 
markets and analysts’ earnings forecasts in three European countries before and during the 
financial crisis. Further research can develop on this work in a number of ways. 
 Firstly, it is well documented that internal capital markets can affect the value of a 
firm by allocating capital resources efficiently or inefficiently. Additionally, a firm with 
efficient internal capital market may also be able to raise finance for its investment projects at 
a lower cost than firms that are considered as inefficient. Prior literature is silent on whether 
efficient firms have a lower cost of capital than those which are inefficient, and it is here that 
future research can contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between firms’ 
cost of capital and efficiency of internal capital markets. As the findings from this study 
suggest that country characteristics as well as firm characteristics can have an effect on 
efficiency of internal capital markets, thus, the objective should be to provide cross-country 
evidence on the cost of capital and internal capital markets relationship. 
Secondly, behavioural finance, being the study of the influence of psychology on the 
behaviour of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets, can help to explain 
why and how internal capital markets might be inefficient. Future research can investigate 
whether firms which display inefficient investment behaviour have an overconfident CEO. 
For example, a CEO who believes highly in his or her own ability and pays less attention to 
private/public signals when allocating capital resources is more likely to misallocate 
resources. The study should aim to provide another explanation to why internal resources 
may not be allocated efficiently in some firms while others may have well-functioning 
internal capital market. 
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Thirdly, a key distinction between single segment firms and multi-segment firms is 
the presence of internal capital markets in the latter. Prior literature documents that efficiency 
of internal capital markets is negatively related to the diversity of the firm. For example, 
firms misallocate resources when they tend to operate multiple segments in unrelated 
industries. One of the ways a firm may become more focused (diversified) is through a 
divesture (M&A). Future research can look to determine whether internal capital markets 
become more (less) efficient when a diversified firm engages in a divesture of a segment 
(addition of a segment through M&A). 
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